All limitation laws, however, must proceed on the theory that the party, by lapse of time and omissions on his part, has forfeited his right to assert his title in the law. Where they relate to * property, it seems not to be essential that the [* 366] adverse claimant should be in actual possession ; 2 but one who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit against that other within a time specified to test the validity of a claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It has consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be executed under a statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could not be valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of the land. Limitation laws cannot compel a resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of all he claims.3 Rep. 131; McMerty v. Morrison, 62 Mo. 140; Goodman v. Munks, 8 Port. (Ala.) 84; Harrison v. Stacy, 6 Rob. (La.) 15; Baker v. Stonebraker's Adm'r, 36 Mo. 338; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361. But the statute of limitations may be suspended for a period as to demands not already barred. Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. 158; Caperton v. Martin, 4 W. Va. 138; s. c. 6 Am. Rep. 270; Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745; s. c. 7 Am. Rep. 270. 1 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 389, per Walker, J.; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 207, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Pearce v. Patton, 7 B. Monr. 162; Griffin v. McKenzie, 7 Geo. 163; Coleman v. Holmes, 44 Ala. 125. 2 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 389; Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442. 3 Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329. In Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12, it was held that this statute could not be enforced as a limitation law in favor of the party in possession, inasmuch as it did not proceed on the idea of limiting the time for bringing suit, but by a conclusive rule of evidence sought to pass over the prop erty to the claimant under the statutory sale in all cases, irrespective of possession. See also Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 480; Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa, 160, 173. The case of Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, is contra. That case follows Wisconsin decisions. In the leading case of Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442, the holder of the original title was not in possession; and what was decided was that it was not necessary for the holder of the tax title to be in possession in order to claim the benefit of the statute; ejectment against a claimant being permitted by law when the lands were unoccupied. This circumstance of possession or want of possession in the person whose right is to be extinguished seems to us of vital importance. How can a man justly be held guilty of laches in not asserting claims to property, when he already possesses and enjoys the property? The old maxim is, "That which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time be made valid; " and if a void claim by force of an act of limitation can ripen into a conclusive title as against the owner in possession, the All statutes of limitation, also, must proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts. A statute could not bar the existing right of claimants without affording this opportunity: if it should attempt to do so, it would be not a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action; though what shall be considered a reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the [* 367] legislature, into the wisdom of * whose decision in establishing the period of legal bar it does not pertain to the jurisdiction of the courts to inquire.2 policy underlying that species of legislation must be something beyond what has been generally supposed. 1 So held of a statute which took effect some months after its passage, and which, in its operation upon certain classes of cases, would have extinguished adverse claims unless asserted by suit before the act took effect. Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. See also Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; Proprietors, &c. v. Laboree, 2 Greenl. 294; Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 141; Blackford v. Peltier, 1 Blackf. 36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; Osborn v. Jaines, 17 Wis. 573; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon (Kan.), 113; Berry v. Ramsdell, 4 Met. (Ky.) 296; Ludwig v. Stewart, 32 Mich. 27; Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162. In the case last cited it was held that a statute which only allowed thirty days in which to bring action on an existing demand was unreasonable and void. And see what is said in Auld r. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135. Compare Davidson v. Lawrence, 49 Geo. 335; Kimbro v. Bank of Fulton, 49 Geo. 419. In Pereless v. Watertown, 6 Biss. 79, Judge Hopkins, U. S. District Judge, decided that a limitation of one year for bringing suits on municipal securities of a class generally sold abroad was unreasonable and void. But a statute giving a new remedy against a railroad company for an injury, may limit to a short time, e. g. six months, the time for bringing suit. O'Bannon v. Louisville, &c. R. R. Co., 8 Bush, 348. So the remedy by suit against stockholders for corporate debts, it is held, may be limited to one year. Adamson v. Davis, 47 Mo. 268. 2 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430; Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318; De Moss v. Newton, 31 Ind. 219. But see Berry v. Ramsdell, 4 Met. (Ky.) 296. It may be remarked here, that statutes of limitation do not apply to the State unless they so provide expressly. Gibson v. Choteau, 13 Wall. 92. And State limitation laws do not apply to the United States. United States v. Hoar, 2 Mas. 311; People v. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 228. And it has been held that the right to maintain a public nuisance cannot be acquired under the statute. State v. Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240. Alterations in the Rules of Evidence. It must also be evident that a right to have one's controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for its citizens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can be regarded as being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to enforce. Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must therefore at all times be subject to modification and control by the legislature; 1 and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as changed would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in legal controversies in the future; and it could not therefore be called retrospective even though some of the controversies upon which it may act were in progress before. It has accordingly been held. in New Hampshire that a statute which removed the disqualification of interest, and allowed parties in suits to testify, might lawfully apply to existing causes of action.2 So may a statute which modifies the common-law rule excluding parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract; and a statute making the protest of a promissory note evidence of the facts therein stated.1 These and the like cases will sufficiently illustrate the general rule, that the whole subject is under the control of the legislature, which prescribes such rules for the trial and determination as well of existing as of future rights and controversies as in its judgment will most completely subserve the ends of justice.5 1 Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 533; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 319, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 533; Karney v. Paisley, 13 Iowa, 89; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray, 1; Hickox v. Tallman, 38 Barb. 608; Webb v. Den, 17 How. 576; Pratt v. Jones, 25 Vt. 303. See ante, p. *288 and note. 2 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 323. A very full and satisfactory examination of the whole subject will be found in this case. To the same effect is Southwick v. Southwick, 49 8 Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76. 4 Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 553. 5 Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 249; Webb v. Den, 17 How. 577; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 534; Fowler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258; Himmelman v. Carpentier, 47 Cal. 42. [* 368] * A strong instance in illustration of legislative control over evidence will be found in the laws of some of the States in regard to conveyances of lands upon sales to satisfy delinquent taxes. Independent of special statutory rule on the subject, such conveyances would not be evidence of title. They are executed under a statutory power; and it devolves upon the claimant under them to show that the successive steps which under the statute lead to such conveyance have been taken. But it cannot be doubted that this rule may be so changed as to make a tax-deed prima facie evidence that all the proceedings have been regular, and that the purchaser has acquired under them a complete title.1 The burden of proof is thereby changed from one party to the other; the legal presumption which the statute creates in favor of the purchaser being sufficient, in connection with the deed, to establish his case, unless it is overcome by countervailing testimony. Statutes making defective records evidence of valid conveyances are of a similar nature; and these usually, perhaps always, have reference to records before made, and provide for making them competent evidence where before they were merely void.2 But they devest no title, and are not even retrospective in character. They merely establish what the legislature regards as a reasonable and just rule for the presentation by the parties of their rights before the courts in the future. But there are fixed bounds to the power of the legislature over this subject which cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be evidence, and which party shall assume the burden of proof in civil cases, its authority is practically unrestricted, so long as its regulations are impartial and uniform; but it has no power to establish rules which, under pretence of regulating the presentation of evidence, go so far as altogether to preclude a party from exhibiting his rights. Except in those cases which fall within the familiar doctrine of estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting upon the like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power 1 Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 543; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams v. Beale, 19 Iowa, 61; Amberg v. Rogers, 9 Mich. 332; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 289; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich. 414; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162; s. c. 46 Mo. 291. The rule once established may be abolished, even as to existing deeds. Hickox v. Tallman, 38 Barb. 608. 2 See Webb v. Den, 17 How. 577. of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition to it. In judicial investigations the law of the land requires an opportunity for a trial;1 and there * can be no [* 369] trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs. The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery; public officers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen of his property; witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records may be collusively manufactured for dishonest purposes; and that legislation which would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, and deprive the party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in the principles of natural justice or of constitutional law. A statute, therefore, which should make a tax-deed conclusive evidence of a complete title, and preclude the owner of the original title from showing its invalidity, would be void, because being not a law regulating evidence, but an unconstitutional confiscation of property.2 And a statute which should 1 Tift v. Griffin, 5 Geo. 185; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 482; Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 89; ante, p. *362, note; post, pp. *382-*383 and notes. 2 Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; White v. Flynn, 23 Ind. 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa, 70; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162; s. c. 46 Mo. 291. And see the well-reasoned case of McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356. Also Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349. As to how far the legislature may make the tax-deed conclusive evidence that mere irregularities have not intervened in the proceedings, see Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508. Undoubtedly the legislature may dispense with mere matters of form in the proceedings as well after they have taken place as before; but this is quite a different thing from making tax-deeds conclusive on points material to the interest of the property owner. See further, Wantlan v. White, 19 Ind. 470; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 212; McCready v. Sexton, supra. It is not competent for the legislature to compel an owner of land to redeem it from a void tax sale as a condition on which he shall be allowed to assert his title against it. Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; Hart v. Henderson, 17 Mich. 218; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill. 44; Reed v. Tyler, 56 Ill. 292; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236. But it seems that if the tax purchaser has paid taxes and made improvements, the payment for these may be made a condition precedent to a suit in ejectment against him. Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 644. The case of Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349, is valuable in this connection. "We apprehend," says Beatty, Ch. J.," that it is beyond the power of the legislature to restrain a defendant in any suit from setting up a good defence to an action against him. The legislature could not directly take the property of A. to pay the taxes of B. Neither can it indirectly do so by depriving A. of the right of setting up in his answer that his separate property has been jointly assessed with that of B., and asserting his right to pay his own taxes without |