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period enlistment still flourished and played their fatal tricks. General Scott, for instance, was suddenly halted in his triumphant progress from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico by discovering that the twelve-month enlistment of seven out of eleven of his volunteer regiments had expired. Did they re-enlist? They did not; and he saw 4,000, or more than one-third of his army, leave him in the midst of an enemy's country; and had to sit down and wait for re-enforcements.
The Civil War, of course, is the classic instance of great American volunteer armies, and here the short-term enlistment was responsible for early disaster, the tragedy of the first Bull Run being due to the hurling of raw troops into action in great haste lest their term of enlistment should expire before they had fired a gun. To be sure, later enlistments were for three years; but before the war was half over the volunteer system had failed, and both sides were resorting to the draft. With this is the North went the petty practice of hiring substitutes. The country was also treated to the scandal of bounty jumping. Besides, the number of desertions under the volunteer system was astounding, being placed on high authority at over half a million out of 2,700,000 enlistments. . . .
(Collier's, LIX, 6; March 17, 1917.) . [$245] Democracy of Universal Service.
But there are certain highly commendable features, aside from its effectiveness as an instrument of national defense. One of these is its essential democracy. Rich and poor alike must serve, the sons of the Revolutionary sire and the sons of the immigrant. All will be reduced to the common level of duty to their country, and relationship will be upon the basis of the essential manliness of the individual. The result will inevitably be a better understanding between the classes and between the races; the consequence of better understanding will be better liking, better Americanism, and a readier solution of those problems of assimilation and social adjustment that confront the nation to-day. Indeed, it is doubtful if any instrument or institution would prove so effective in unifying and co-ordinating the human elements in the United States as this one. For that alone it would be worth its costs.
Such a fighting force, moreover, does away with the widow and orphan because it takes for war the young man who has not yet assumed the responsibilities of domestic life. At least two million men would be in the field before reaching the age at which most men begin freely to marry. The same would apply to important business relationships. One of the cruelties of the recent National Guard mobilization was that it snatched away men in the prime of life, with families and with business responsbilities developed, to whom the call of war meant absolute hardship and was in effect a sort of punishment for the faithful devotion of long years to the cause of patriotism.
HARDSHIPS OF A MILITIA SYSTEM. In investigating the recent mobilization a committee appointed by the Mayor of New York came across scores of instances like this:
From a Letter Carrier: "My pay was stopped; I am married and have children; my family suffered the loss of $55 a month.”
From an Interborough Ticket Agent: “My pay stopped, and so I lost all that during service. I am forty-one years old, married, and have three children.”
From a Physician: “My family had to go to the home of my parents, and to use our savings. I had a position in a hospital, but resigned it to do military service, and have no position now; my loss is $275 a month.”
From a Banker's Manager: “After this experience I feel I couldn't give more time to military service. My family and I are thoroughly disgusted. I will not re-enlist.”
From a Placer for a Fire Insurance Company: "I will never try to induce friends to enlist in the National Guard. I believe in universal service.”
At the same time all this suffering and injustice was being inflicted by the mobilization of 140,000 guardsmen, there were 1,981,298 unmarried males of eighteen and nineteen years of age in the country and 3,775,376 of from twenty to twenty-four years, inclusive. Under universal service that is where our soldiers would come from.
(Collier's, March 17, 1917.)
(b)  Foreign Systems, in 1914.
By Compulsory military service by conscription, which automatically applies to all male subjects upon reaching the age of 20. They are then given a rigid physical examination. Those who pass are assigned to various arms of the service, the term of training being two years in the Infantry and Engineers, and three years in the Cavalry and Artillery Military authorities pretty well agree that the German training surpasses that of any other army in the world. The reason is apparent in this single illustration. Some time ago the Government bought up a large tract of land near Dresden, including all the villages within the boundary of the purchase. It is called the Koenigsbrück Kriegsplatz, or war field. In peace times the Saxony artillery is trained there, in real war problems, worked out with real guns, firing real shells. For instance, the corps is given a certain position and told that an enemy army, including cavalry, infantry, artillery and supply trains is approaching along a certain road. On that designated road there would be tracks, and along those tracks would be mechanically-pulled floats bearing lifesized imitation cavalry, infantry, guns, etc. It would be the corps' business to destroy this army, and it needed no umpire to imagine the results. They were apparent when the smoke clouds cleared away. By such practical problems Germany develops every branch of the military service.
At the conclusion of his term of training (two or three years) the soldier passes into the Landwehr, remaining there until his 38th year, then passing into the Landsturm. Those who, at the age of 20, fail to pass the physical test, are assigned to a reserve class known as the Landsturm Ohne Waffen (without weapons), which class may, in war time, be called to barracks for training in any sort of service the military authorities determine it can
perfony sort of as in war die
THE FRENCH ARMY SYSTEM.
Compulsory universal military training without exemptions except for physical disability. Men are called to the colors at the age of 20 years and are in active service for three years. They then pass into the reserve for seven years, being called out twice for a month's training; and then into the territorial army, where they have a single period of two weeks' training. The long reserve service gives about 2,000 men, active and reserve, per battalion.
France also uses her military system for unifying the country. In maneuvers soldiers from the north are sent south, and vice versa. They do not sleep in tents, but are housed by the people of the section in which they happen to be. In this way the people of all sections become accustomed to the habits, etc., of those of all other sections, and learn to care in an intimate sort of a way for parts of their country which otherwise might have seemed to them to be very remote.
THE ENGLISH ARMY SYSTEM. Is very similar to our own, depending upon voluntary enlistments for the small standing army, and upon additional volunteers for war-time needs. However, in the present war England had to resort to conscription, and also was compelled to devise other laws to prevent strikes in munition and other plants whose products were necessary to the conduct of war. England has shown, under the stress of war, not only the failure of a system such as ours, but the equal need of such industrial mobilization as will, by harmonious co-operation and efficiency, throw the whole force of the nation, industrially and commercially, behind the military in time of war.
THE SWISS MILITARY SYSTEM.
Training really begins in the public schools at age of 10. From 10 to 12 years of age the boys receive severe drills in physical training. At the age of 14 the boy becomes a cadet, is given a rifle and instructed how to use it. He also may volunteer for the Corps, a crack organization of 6,000 physically fit youths.
From 14 to 18 years of age the cadet is drilled one hour each day, in addition to two hours' target practice each week.
On his 18th birthday the Swiss boy joints a military unit in his own town, and for five hours each week for a period of one year receives military training under instruction of army officers, active or reserve.
At the end of this period, or upon his 19th birthday, if he passes a rigid examination, he is sent to a recruit school, where, according to the branch of the service he will enter at the age of 20, he serves from 65 to 83 days.
Then comes the real test, determining whether or not he may
respond to the call to the colors. The examination is so severe that approximately 50 per cent. are rejected. The universal service to country theory is carried out by compelling the rejected to pay from $2 to $6, according to their financial ability, as determined by the authorities.
Entering the army, the eligibles spend from 6 to 8 weeks in thorough camp training, and then are put upon the Elite List, or first line. In all they give 75 days of their 21st year to the State.
Every year thereafter, until he has reached the age of 32, the Swiss citizen must serve 75 days with the colors. At the age of 32 he passes into the Landwehr, and for the succeeding 8 years must report for 14 days' drill each year.
Upon his 40th birthday he enters the Landsturm, where he remains for another 8 years, giving 4 days' time each year to the State.
At the age of 48 he passes out of the service.
If the recruit is in mounted branch of service, the State pays one-half the cost of his horse and the balance in 10 installments. The horse is then the soldier's own property.
Politics has no influence upon promotions. Before advancing, a lieutenant must remain in his grade for from 4 to 7 years; a captain, 6 years; a major and lieutenant-colonel, 6 years, etc. There is a healthy competition for promotions and the measure of restrictions is gained from the fact that a second lieutenant of artillery, for instance, must serve 215 days before receiving his commission.
Numerous rifle clubs have brought marksmanship to a high standard.
(d) [$247] Shall We Adopt Universal Military Service?
BY PRESIDENT EMERITUS CHARLES W. ELIOT.
There is endless talk in these days about “preparedness.” Both political parties and both candidates for the Presidency advocate a larger Navy and a larger Army. On preparedness and Americanism the Republican platform uses the braver words; but the Democratic Party has voted—with more or less reluctance—the largest appropriations for the Navy and Army that have ever been voted, and also made the most earnest attempt ever made to convert the state militia into a national force. As to the defunct Progressive Party and its leaders, it shouted louder than either of the others for warlike preparation, and, indeed, appeared to advocate war against piteous little Mexico; but its principal doctrines related to social and industrial improvements at home, and it has had no chance to put those doctrines into practice through legislation. Under these political conditions at home and in the present fearful state of Europe, it is important that the American people, and particularly the , public men who undertake to lead the people, should consider, first, for what uses the United States needs a navy and an army; and secondly, the sort of navy and army which the United States should prepare.
FAILURE OF ISOLATION.
To undertake the maintenance of a great modern navy and a great modern army, always prepared for immediate action, involves the abandonment of a deeply rooted American policythe ancient reliance for safety on the physical isolation of the country between two great oceans. The maintenance of a larger navy will not require much new legislation, or much change of customs; but the maintenance of a great land force which can be mobilized in a few days—all ready for service in the fieldwill require much new legislation, great new expenditures, and many changes in the habits and customs of the people. The policy of maintaining only a small professional army, and even that imperfectly equipped, will have to be abandoned.
Why should the American people make this formidable change in their national habits and their international policy? First, because the industrial and commercial interests of the Nation have completely changed since the Civil War, and can no longer be preserved and promoted in isolation. The country cannot keep its existing machinery running, or sell its surplus foods and raw materials, unless the foreign markets are open to it, and are freely developed. The United States, having become an industrial and commercial World Power, needs to have all the seas and oceans of the world open for its foreign trade in times of peace, and so far as is practicable in times of war alsoopen for both its imports and its exports of foods, drinks, •drugs, raw materials, and manufactured articles.
Secondly, steam and electricity have done away with the physical isolation of the United States. The oceans are not barriers, but highways which invite the passage of fleets, pacific · or hostile. The security of America can no longer be trusted to the width of the Atlantic and the Pacific.
If anyone says that the risk of an invasion of the United States by a strong naval and military Power is very small, particularly within twenty years of the close of the present terrifying and exhausting war, the answer is that, since the war in Europe has demonstrated how horrible a catastrophe an invasion would be, the American people may wisely insure themselves against even a small risk of invasion. The only available insurance is a Navy powerful in every respect, and an Army in reserve visibly strong in numbers and visibly prepared for immediate service.
IF WE HAD UNIVERSAL SERVICE. If the principle of universal military service should be accepted and acted on in the United States, several important consequences would immediately follow:
1. The country would always have on call a trained force for all the duties and services which the Regular Army now performs, and this force could be increased by telegraph and telephone to any desired extent up to the limit of the reserves. Within ten years these reserves would be formidable in number. It would probably be desirable to maintain a special force for a service of two years in the Philippines, the Panama Zone, and other outlying regions; but this force should consist of young