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officers, or a ratio of 4.5 in peace and 3.7 in war. In other words, the Senate Military Committee has disregarded not only the recommendation of General Gorgas, the Surgeon General, and the Dodge Commission, but the lessons spread before them by the European war. It is well to bear in mind that the relative reduction in the number of medical officers proposed will apply not only to the army, but to the National Guard and any volunteer troops which may in the future be authorized, as the organization of both of these latter must be the same as that prescribed for the regular army.

England is the only great power besides, the United States which rests national security on a small, highly paid, professional army. The English Army is organized on a basis of ten medical officers per thousand of combatant troops—a figure nearly three times as great as has been fixed in the Senate bill.


In 1908, at the instance of the then Surgeon General, Brig.Gen. Robert M. O'Reilly, Congress passed a law providing for a Reserve Corps of Officers. This corps now numbers about 1,600 men, physicians and surgeons of the highest professional excellence. But are they trained medical officers, ready to step in and fill up the skeleton organization of the Army Medical Corps ? Most certainly not, and this will be evident when it is stated that the law does not permit of giving these officers training in camps of instruction, except at the expense of the individual. During the last summer several camps of instruction were provided and 173 officers of the Reserve Corps received one week of field work. These officers not only gave their time, but paid all the expenses incident to transportation, subsistence and equipment. Admirable as is the spirit shown, it cannot be contended that one week in camp will transform a civilian physician into anything resembling a trained medical officer.


The proposal to reduce the ratio of regular medical officers to about half the number required will mean that every officer will be fully occupied with the administration and garrison needs of the army and there will be none available for the instruction of the sanitary troops of the National Guard or of any other troops which may be authorized. At the present time there are six medical officers available for the instruction of the National Guard of the entire United States, and there should be not less than one hundred on this duty.

The pity of it is that we cannot learn the obvious lesson from our past experiences.

Those of us who saw the most energetic and adventurous of our men march out in 1898 ready to give up their dearest possession, even life itself, are little likely to forget the scenes we saw in our Southern camps. Of the thousands who never came back, only about 250 died on the battlefield, or as the result of wounds received on the battlefield. The remainder were a need




less sacrifice offered up on the altar of national carelessness and national indifference.

This indifference shown toward providing an adequate medical department in time of peace cannot be put on the ground of economy. A most superficial examination of the medical history of our last war will be convincing on that point. There were mustered into the service in 1898 about 225,000 volunteers. Fourteen years later 108,000 of these men had applied for pensions. The Federal Government has paid out on account of this little war in pensions over $50,000,000, and this amount will keep on growing in the years to come. As the great majority of deaths and disability arose from preventable disease, this large sum can be charged to the neglect to provide a proper organization and an adequate number of trained medical officers.

When the next war comes—and it certainly will come some time—shall we have learned our lesson? The answer to this question will be given by the Congress within the next few weeks. Our lawmakers should remember that our people know, as no other people on earth, what constitutes proper medical care of the sick and wounded. Everyone will have father, brother or son at the front. If adequate hospital and professional care is not provided for the wounded and sick, then from every community of this land will come a protest that will not and cannot be ignored. That Government which fails in this respect will sacrifice the whole-hearted and united support of its people, a support which is so necessary to the maintenance of morale and the achievement of victory. (New York Times, April 10, 1916.)

(b) [$284] The Red Cross.

BY EDWARD T. DEVINE. The American Red Cross has received its mandate from the nation. The over-subscription of the liberty loan by 50 per cent. is all but matched by the over-subscription of 20 per cent. to the Red Cross fund. The percentage of excess is less, but in the case of the Red Cross the excess is accepted and the fund thus becomes one of something like a hundred and twenty million dollars. This is more than the entire principal of the Rockefeller Foundation, which so greatly agitated the United States Commission on Industrial Relations a year or two ago; more than has ever been raised at any one time for a philanthropic .purpose; more than the endowment of any university; nearly one-third as much as the combined productive funds of all the five or six hundred higher institutions of learning in the United States. Moreover, this fund is not to be an endowment, but is to be regarded as disposable income for quick expenditure.

NEED OF COOPERATION. The Red Cross, having gathered much experience in its character as a neutral international relief agency, now puts on its shining armor as the relief arm of a belligerent nation. The time for boasting will come when that armor is to be put off. Now is the time for consecration, for vision, for searching of heart, for the making of a program, for wise counsels, for securing public confidence, for establishing co-operation, for courage in policy, for caution in the choice of means. The Com

mittee on Co-operation appointed by the Red Cross War Council receives at the start rather a rough but perhaps wholesome intimation that co-operation is a reciprocal matter. It seems that there are some sixty war-relief organizations whose officials, valuing their autonomy with the ardor of small nations, see no safety except in the principle of collective bargaining. They have, therefore, formed a federation, or at least an entente alliance, and agree not to make a separate arrangement with the Red Cross, but to confer with the latter through a joint committee of seven. That the relief organizations which have been active in support of the allies while we remained neutral should have some recognized standing in the new plans for giving similar support on a larger scale is obvious, and the very appointment by the Red Cross of a committee on co-operation may justly be interpreted as evidence that such a relation is desired. The problems of reconciling the natural and legitimate desire for the continuance of work already undertaken with the advantages of a unified and co-operative national system should not be beyond the powers of Judge Lovett and his associates in the Red Cross if they are met half way, as they doubtless will be, by the patriotic and energetic leaders of other agencies.

RED CROSS IS INTERNATIONAL. The Red Cross is an international organization. Its emblem, always accompanied by the national fag, gives protection under the Geneva convention to “matériel,” and “personnel” charged exclusively with the care of the sick and wounded. This does not mean that the American Red Cross is indifferent as between its own armies and those of the enemy. It means that in the relief of individual suffering the Red Cross is no respecter of uniforms. On the battlefield its motto is Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine ageiur. In every land the Red Cross has this international character; but it has also everywhere an ardent national character which is not in the least inconsistent with its obligations under the Geneva convention. It is engaged in very extensive relief operations. It establishes hospitals and equips hospital ships. It mitigates the conditions of prisoners, and it cares for the widow and orphan. It succors those wounded in battle, but also those who suffer from chronic disease. It may rebuild homes, re-establish workers in industry, protect the public health, and do anything else within its resources to make the world safe for humanity.

RED CROSS IS UNIVERSAL. In these tasks the American Red Cross is entitled to the services of every section of the nation. As no one may hold back unless there happens to be some other channel through which he can work to better advantage, so no one can properly be rejected except on the ground that for the particular task someone else is better qualified. To refuse the services of competent doctors, nurses or social workers because of German names or ancestry, or to refuse the services of Catholic sisters because of their garb, would be alike indefensible. Mr. Wadsworth promptly denounced the rumor that the latter discrimination was to be permitted in a letter to Cardinal Gibbons. If England or France is unwilling to permit American Red Cross agents of German birth or ancestry to aid English or French soldiers, such feelings must no doubt be respected, but it would be appropriate





to put very plainly to our allies the seriousness of any such discrimination against persons whose loyalty and devotion to the nation are beyond question. Not knowing our conditions, they are through ignorance making a colossal blunder about a trivial matter.

To supply doctors and nurses to our own and the allied armies is the first obligation. Could the American Red Cross be expected to send doctors, nurses, ambulances, medicines and money into Germany to become a part of the military resources of the armies against which our armies are engaged ?

The Red Cross should, of course, guard its phrases to prevent misconstruction; but eventually its policy will be disclosed in action. It will be neutral where neutrality is legitimate and reasonable, and it will be national and patriotic where this is reasonable and legitimate. Thus it will command respect abroad and affection from Americans of every party and section. Already the Red Cross is the best known of all humanitarian agencies. It is not to be doubted that it will be as well beloved as it is known.”

(The Survey, XXXVIII, 314-315, July 7, 1917.)



1. Specific References on the Section.

Anon. "American Soldiers for France,” in New Republic, XI, 97-98

(May 26, 1917). 2. Urgent Appeals.

(a) From Great Britain, France and Italy.
(b) Their commissions in this country.

3. Roosevelt Plan for a Select Army. 4. War Office Plan for Sending Part of the Regular Army. 5. Necessity of not putting untrained Troops in the Trenches. 6. Supplies. (a) Absolute need of highly organized system of sending supplies

and reserved troops after the army and keeping them up.

7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [$286] The United States as a Sea Power.


The United States once was a maritime nation, in the usual sense of the word; but it is so no longer. Why such a vital transformation came about in our national life is a question that already has a considerable literature, some of it full of the sailor's manly sentimentalism and sincere patriotic fervor, some of it prejudiced by class interests, very little of it written in a spirit of sound historical accuracy.


The traditional argument of our shipping men is founded on the broad claim that we were at one time mistress of the seas.

But the soundness of this claim depends wholly upon what is meant. As to tonnage, we unquestionably were carrying just before the Civil War a preponderant share of the world's trade. As to perfection of ships and ability of officers and crews, the case is equally strong in our favor. But if the traditional argument refers not only to a pre-eminence in ocean commerce, but also to the naval power to control competition—that is to say, a power which is not only active but potential—then I think that the premise is at fault.

In the full sense of sea power, the United States never was mistress of the seas. Our two wars with Great Britain scarcely affected the fact of British naval supremacy, American tradition and school history to the contrary. What we settled on the sea in those wars was the superiority of a few individual American ships over a few individual British ships, and the general superiority of American construction and personnel, as evinced in the work of our swift and daring privateers. We convinced ourselves that we would be able at any time to build and man a navy to cope with England's navy; but we have never done it, and the matter still remains in the region of faith. Our two wars were the chief means of convincing England of the wisdom of using her sea power with moderation; but they did not touch the sea power itself. Even at the zenith of our maritime greatness, with our unsurpassed clipper ships ruling every route of water-borne commerce, we depended upon British sea power for the freedom of the seas. England could have stopped trade anywhere, at any time. That after the war of 1812 she did not attempt to do so, except in a single conspicuous instance, is proof of the general liberality of her sea policy.



The traditional argument holds that the decay of the American merchant marine was brought about by two main factors; the first of which was the staggering blow delivered by Confederate raiders sent out from England during the Civil War. It is altogether unfortunate for a fair view of England's sea policy that the Alabama incident and others' of a similar nature had to occur when they did. They are beside the mark. For the preceding decade conservative feeling in England had been excited by the rapid advance and disproportionate excellence of the American merchant marine. The situation, however, was simmering down; British builders and owners were improving their own merchant marine to compete with ours, and undoubtedly the rivalry would have been allowed to reach its natural results, without the coercion of British sea power. Then came the Civil War, and with it a stiffening of conservative opinion throughout England. The opportunity was seized, against the united protests of British liberals. But after the war these incidents were atoned for in a fair court of arbitration, and British policies became liberal again.


The second factor blamed for the decay of our merchant marine is the policy of a Congress controlled by the interior of

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