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generations, we have built up a dominion which is buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that today our Dominion does not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought, and, we believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received it, and such as we hope to leave it, with it we are content. I
NO DESIRE FOR CONQUEST.
We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. All that we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to consolidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British liberty. Does it not follow from that, that nowhere in the world is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and ensure peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and breadth of our Empire everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords? Why are the best of our ablebodied men leaving the fields and the factory and the countinghouse for the recruiting office and the training-camp?
If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had no ill-will to gratify, nor wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Germany in particular, our policy-repeatedly stated in Parliament, resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin-our policy has been to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction, and so to estalish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.
POLICY TOWARD GERMANY.
We have said from the first-I have said it over and over again, and so has Sir Edward Grey-we have said from the first that our friendships with certain powers, with France, with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as implying cold feelings, and still less hostile purposes, against any other power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to quote his exact words—“One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have, but not at the expense of the ones we have." That has been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation describes as the "treacherous English.”
We laid down—and I wish to call not only your attention, but the attention of the whole world to this,' when so many false legends are now being invented and circulated-in the following year-in the year 1912 we laid down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view to be.
We said, and we communicated this to the German Government, “Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that.
But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and her defensive resources, especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we are concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world.
DESIRE FOR PEACE.
To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave. None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two years, and never more energetically and niore successfully than during the Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe, but for the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial co-operation between all the powers. From both points of view, that of our domestic interests as a kingdom and an empire, and that of our settled attitude and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes-among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst.
(Extracts from The War, reprinted in Stowell, I, 569-571.)
6.  Future World-Oder Under Germany. BY MEMBER OF THE REICHSTAG, GEORG KERSCHENSTEINER
(December 16, 1916). The great lesson which the German people has had to learn is to think in terms of power and the present war has taught us more in this regard than all the four centuries of European diplomacy and development that preceded it. For all who have eyes to see and a mind alive to the world around them the Great War has made clear our true situation. We must insist on being a World-Power, or we cease to be a Great Power at all. There is no other alternative.
SMALL POWERS. Let no one here say that small States, too, can have a national life of their own. True, so long as the great States around them allow them to exist. But any day may see the end of their existence, in spite of all treaties to the contrary, and every day brings us fresh evidence how little assured is the existence of small States. For neither alliances nor treaties provide the least security for the existence of the Great Powers, still less of small States. Anyone who still retains belief in such things is past all argument. A man who has not learnt wisdom from the events of the last two years is incapable of learning anything. Of course every Great Power will always do its best to form alliances with other Powers, great and small, in order to assure its existence against hostile coalitions. But no one of them can feel any security that these alliances will be observed, Germany least of all....
Let us sum up the argument. Germany needs, quite independently of her Allies, to be large, strong and powerfully organized; in order to secure herself against the possibility of being deserted by the small Powers and being treacherously attacked by the Great.
NO NATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS.
What does she need as a guarantee of this? The answer is: an extensive Empire, with highly developed agriculture and industry, the best possible strategic frontiers against sudden attacks and the best possible allies—alliances based not upon scraps of paper (papierene Verträge) but upon the elementary and vital needs of the allies as regards both defence and economic development. It is unnecessary, nay, harmful, to rely upon the affection and loyalty of any ally unless the material basis of the alliance has been soundly laid. If the war has done no more than awake the German people out of love's young dream-that is, out of its reliance on the goodwill and honest dealing of peoples and States—it will have done us a great service. There are no ethical friendships between States in our day. There are only friendships of convenience. And friendships of convenience last just so long as the convenience itself.
That is the sheet-anchor of all foreign policy. What we desire for our future therefore is a strong, self-dependent Germany, strong enough to secure that Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey shall find their greatest safety and prosperity through the German connection—and only through Germany.
(Kerschensteiner, Die Zukunft Deutschlands, in Europäische Staat sund Wirtschafts Zeitung, December 16, 1916. Italics as in the original. Translated from The Round Table, March, 1917.)
WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD TO
ENTER THE CONFLICT.
A. [$178] GENERAL REFERENCES ON THE
11-13, 33-58, 64-77, 116-161, chs. III, IV. .
refs. in Ch. xxii.
New Republic, March 10, 1917 (2), pp. 7-8.
Jan. 6, 1917, pp. 261-263. 2. American Ideals and the War. See $179 below. Beck, James M. The War and Humanity. A further discussion of
the ethics of the World War and the attitude and duty of the United States. (N. Y. and London, Putnam, 1916.) Believes the American policy of isolation must be abandoned in order to
preserve American ideals in the world. Fullerton, Wm. Morton. Hesitations: The American Crisis and the
War. (N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1916.) States the attitude of many Americans who favored a more vigorous anti-German attitude immediately upon the violation of Belgian neutrality. Believes that a broad view of the Monroe Doctrine necessitated
such action. Herrick, Robert. The World Decision. (Boston and N. Y., Hough
ton, Mifflin, 1916.) Believes the war to be against German materialistic philosophy, and that adherence to traditional ideals
demands American support of the Allies. Roosevelt, Theodore. America and the World War. (N. Y., Scrib.
ner, 1915.) Vigorously denounces the violation of Belgium and the weak attitude of America on that occasion. Speaks for the rights of small states and for the duty of self-defense with.
out militarism. - Roosevelt, Theodore. Fear God and Take Your Own Part. (N. Y.,
Doran, 1916.) A trenchant appeal for a positive policy and
fearlessness in the defense of right. Thayer, Wm. Roscoe. Germany vs. Civilization. Notes on the
atrocious War. (Boston and N. Y., Houghton, Miffin, 1916.) Compares despotism and democracy. Strongly anti-German.
3. Political and Economic Interests. See $182 below. Amer. Academy of Polit. and Social Sci. Annals. (Phila.) “Am
erican Interests as Affected by the European War," LX. (July,
Belligerent Claims and American Commerce in the Years 1914
15. (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1915.) Deals mainly with the American controversies with Great Britain on contraband and blockade, but considers the controversy with Ger
inany on arms shipments also. Hart, A. B. The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation. (Boston,
Little, Brown, 1916.) Considers "permanent interests” which the United States is willing to defend by force as the central
feature of the Monroe Doctrine. Hart, A. B. Obvious Orient. (N. Y., Appleton, 1910.) Relation
of the United States with Asiatic powers and Philippines. Hornbeck, Stanley K. Contemporary Politics in the Far East. (N.
Y. and London, Appleton, 1916.) Discusses American relations
with Japan and China and her interests in the Far East. Jones, Chester Lloyd. Caribbean Interests of the United States.
(N. Y., Appleton, 1916.)
4. International Law and the War.
Blakeslee, George H. (Editor). Problems and Lessons of the War.
(N. Y., 1916.)
European War," Am. Jour. of Int. Law, IX, X, XI. A survey
ents from an entirely impartial standpoint. Phillipson, Coleman. International Law and the Great War.
(N. Y., Dutton, 1916.)
See $182 below.
the American Ambassador to Berlin.
ican point of view by an American. (London, Unwin, 1915.) German efforts to embroil United States with Mexico and Japan,
and destruction of munition plants, etc. Smith, Munroe. "American Diplomacy in the European War,"
Political Science Quarterly, XXXI, 481. A scholarly examination of the controversies of neutral America with the bellig. erents. Believes the violations of right by the Central Powers were far more serious than those by the Allies.
B. [$179] VIOLATION OF AMERICAN POLIT
1. Specific References on the Section.
Merrill Co., 1915.)
(Phila., Lippincott, 1913.)
Atlantic Monthly, vol. 118, pp. 145-152. (Aug., 1916.)