and not for deadly warfare. There are other weapons of mass destruction, but unless we can meet the challenge of atomic warfare-the most dreadful weapon ever devised—we can never meet the challenge of these other weapons.

The United States, with Britain and Canada, have demonstrated their awareness of the grave responsibility inherent in their discovery of the means of applying atomic energy. In a world of uncontrolled armaments, atomic energy would be an advantage to the United States for many years to come. But it is not the desire of the United States to be the leader in an armament race. We prefer to prevent, rather than to win, the next war.

That is why President Truman announced as soon as he knew that the atomic bomb would work, that it was our purpose to collaborate with other nations to insure that atomic energy should not become a threat to world peace.

Shortly thereafter, the heads of the three Governments responsible for the discovery of atomic energy, met at Washington and urged that the United Nations set up a commission to recommend proposals for the effective international control of atomic energy and all other weapons adaptable for mass destruction.

One of the primary reasons for my trip to Moscow in December 1945 was to ask the U. S. S. R. to join with Britain and Canada in sponsoring a resolution to this effect before the General Assembly.

As soon as the agreement of the Government of the U. S. S. R. was obtained, France and China were also asked and they agreed to join in sponsoring the resolution. These efforts resulted in the unanimous passage of the resolution by the General Assembly in January 1946, only six months after the discovery of the atomic bomb.

Long discussion in the United Nations and public debate on the details of United States proposals have perhaps blurred the real significance and magnitude of United States initiative. The resolution was no idle gesture on our part. Having the knowledge of atomic energy and possession of the atomic bomb, we did not seek to hold it and to threaten the world. We did not sit back and play for time. We came forward with concrete proposals designed fairly, effectively and practically to carry out the tasks assigned to that Commission.

Our proposals, when fully operative, would leave with the states responsible for the discovery of atomic energy no rights which would not be shared with other Members of the United Nations. Our proposals outlaw the use of atomic weapons and contemplate the disposal of existing atomic weapons. They set up an international authority with power to prevent the national manufacture and use of atomic weapons for war purposes and to develop atomic energy for human welfare.

Our proposals also provide effective and practical safeguards against violations and evasions. They enable states that keep their pledges to take prompt and collective action against those who violate their pledges.

We do not suggest any diminution of the right of veto in the consideration of the treaty governing this subject. We do say that once the treaty has become effective, then there can be no recourse to a veto to save an offender from punishment.

We are willing to share our knowledge of atomic weapons with the rest of the world on the condition, and only on the condition, that other nations submit, as we are willing to submit, to internationally controlled inspection and safeguards, From the statements made in the committees and in the Assembly we have been encouraged to believe that others are willing likewise to submit to international inspection. If other nations have neither bombs nor the ability to manufacture them, it should be easy for them to agree to inspection. But the world should understand that without collective safeguards there can be no collective disarmament.

The resolution we proposed here urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference. Those terms include the control not only of atomic energy but the control of other instruments of mass destruction. With its specific studies and its accumulated experience that Commission is best equipped to formulate plans for dealing with major problems of disarmament.

Let us concentrate upon those major weapons and not dissipate our energies on the less important problems of controlling pistols and hand grenades.

If we are really interested in effective disarmament and not merely in talking about it, we should instruct our representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission to press forward now with its constructive proposals. The Commission has been at work six months. They can file an interim report next week. I do not want the work of that Commission to be side-tracked or sabotaged.

I am glad that the proposed resolution raises in connection with the problem of disarmament the question of the disposal of troops and the justification of their presence on foreign soil. For disarmament necessarily raises the question of the use which may be made of arms and armed forces which are not prohibited. Reducing armaments will not bring peace if the arms and armed forces that remain are used to undermine collective security.

The United States has persistently pressed for the early conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the ex-satellite states. We want to make possible the complete withdrawal of troops from those states. The United States has also persistently urged the conclusion of a

treaty recognizing the independence of Austria and providing for the withdrawal of foreign troops. Austria, in our view, is a liberated and not an ex-enemy country. The United States, United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R., as signatories of the Moscow Declaration of 1943, are obliged to relieve her of the burden of occupation at the earliest possible moment.

The United States believes that armed occupation should be strictly limited by the requirements of collective security. For that reason we proposed to the Council of Foreign Ministers that we should fix agreed ceilings on the occupation forces in Europe. We could not secure agreement this week, but we shall continue our efforts to reduce the occupation forces in Europe. We are also prepared to fix agreed ceilings for the occupation forces in Japan and Korea.

On VJ-day we had over five million troops overseas. We had to send with them extensive supplies and equipment which could not be disposed of overnight.

But despite the tremendous problem of liquidating our extensive overseas war activities, today we have less than 550,000 troops outside of American territory. Most of these troops are in Germany, Japan and the Japanese Islands, Korea, Austria and Venezia Giulia.

The great majority of the troops we have on the territory of the other states outside these occupation areas are supply or administrative personnel. Let me state specifically just what combat troops we have in these other states.

We have a total of 96,000 military personnel in the Philippines but only about 30,000 are combat forces, air and ground, and of these 17,000 are Philippine Scouts. These troops are in the Philippines primarily to back up our forces in Japan. Substantial reductions are contemplated in the near future.

Of the 19,000 troops we have in China, about 15,000 are combat troops and roughly one half of these are today under orders to return home.

We have about 1,500 troops in Panama, excluding the Canal Zone. One thousand of those, composed of a small air unit and some radar air warning detachments, can be classified as combat forces. We have, of course, our normal protective forces in the Panama Canal Zone proper.

We have no combat units in countries other than those I have just mentioned.

Our military personnel in Iceland number less than 600 men. They include no combat troops. They are being withdrawn rapidly and all will be withdrawn by early April 1947, in accordance with our agreement with the Government of Iceland. The military personnel

have been there only to maintain one of our air-transport lines of communication with our occupation forces in Germany.

In the Azores, on the southern air-transport communication line to Germany, we have about 300 men. Again there is not a single combat soldier among them. They are technicians and administrative officials. They are there under an agreement with the Government of Portugal. Our combat troops are in North China at the request of the Chinese National Government. Their task is to assist in carrying out the terms of surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of the Japanese. Their mission is nearly completed. Instructions have already been issued for the return of half of our forces now in China although the Chinese Government has urged that they be retained there until conditions become more stabilized.

We have made it clear that our troops will not become participants in civil strife in China. But we are eager to do our part, and we hope other states are eager to do their part, to prevent civil war in China and to promote a unified and democratic China. A free and independent China is essential to world peace, and we cannot ignore or tolerate efforts upon the part of any state to retard the development of the freedom and independence of China. The United States Government repudiates the suggestion that our troops in China or elsewhere, with the consent of the states concerned, are a threat to the internal or external peace of any country.

Because the representative of the U. S. S. R. has referred to our troops in China, it is for me to say that I am confident that the number of American troops in North China is far less than the number of U. S. S. R. troops in South Manchuria, in the Port Arthur area.

Under the Finnish Peace Treaty the U. S. S. R. acquires the right to lease the Porkkala naval base in Finland and to maintain troops there. The temporary presence of a few thousand United States troops in China at the request of that country certainly raises no essentially different question than the permanent presence of U. S. S. R. troops in another country under treaty arrangements.

It is our desire to live up to the letter and the spirit of the Moscow Declaration. We do not intend to use our troops on the territories of other states contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The implementation of the Moscow Declaration is not made easier by loose charges or counter charges. The Declaration requires consultation and that is the method we should pursue if we wish to advance the cause of disarmament and of collective security.

Last December at Moscow we consulted the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom regarding our troops in China. We have now asked

for consultation in the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the number of troops to be retained in Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania under the conclusion of the peace treaties with the ex-satellite states.

The task before us is to maintain collective security with scrupulous regard for the sovereign equality of all states. This involves more than the question of armaments and armed forces. Aggressor nations do not go to war because they are armed, but because they want to get with their arms things which other nations will not freely accord to them. Aggressor nations attack not only because they are armed but because they believe others have not the armed strength to resist them. Sovereignty can be destroyed not only by armies but by a war of nerves and by organized political penetration. World peace depends upon what is in our hearts more than upon what is written in our treaties.

Great states must strive for understandings which will not only protect their own legitimate security requirements but also the political independence and integrity of the smaller states. It is not in the interest of peace and security that the basic power relationships among great states should depend upon which political party comes to power in Iran, Greece or in China. Great states must not permit differences among themselves to tear asunder the political unity of smaller states. Then, smaller states must recognize that true collective security requires their cooperation just as much as that of the larger states. Without the cooperation of large states and small states, all of our disarmament plans are doomed to failure.

A race for armaments, a race for power is not in the interest of any country or of any people. We want to stop the race for armaments and we want to stop the race for power. We want to be partners with all nations, not to make war, but to keep the peace. We want to uphold the rule of law among nations. We want to promote the freedom and well-being of all peoples in a friendly civilized world.