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the Representative of the United States of America and contained in document AEC/15/Rev. 1, are based, and instructs the Working Committee to include these Findings and Recommendations in the draft of the Commission's report to be delivered to the Security Council by December 31, 1946, having conformed the wording of such portions of these Findings and Recommendations as deal with the same subject matter to the wording of the relevant parts of the Text of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946 on the 'Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments'."
Many important questions, which have been considered only in broad outline during the course of its deliberations, remain to be further studied by the Commission. These questions include: the detailed powers, characteristics, and functions of the international control agency for which the need is expressed in the "First Report on Safeguards Required To Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy Only for Peaceful Purposes", including such matters as organization, financing, and staffing; the relationships between the agency, the various organs of the United Nations, and the participating States; powers of the agency in matters of research, development, and planning; the provisions for transition to the full operation of the international system of control; and other specific matters which should be included in the international treaty or convention establishing control over atomic energy.
Part II: Findings
A. Findings on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of the Problem of Control
HE REPORT OF THE Scientific and Technical Committee on Scientific and Technical Aspects of the Problem of Control, included in its entirety as Part IV of this report, was accepted by Committee 2 as a basis for its future work. The Commission now records its approval of that report and incorporates in its present findings the conclusions summarized therein in Chapter 6, as follows:
"The substances uranium and thorium play a unique role in the domain of atomic energy, since as far as we know these are the only raw materials from which the nuclear fuel required for the development of atomic energy can be obtained. There is an intimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of atomic weapons; most of the stages which are needed for the former are also needed for the latter. The character of the different stages of the activities has been discussed in order to explore at each stage the elements of danger and to some extent the problem of safeguards against these dangers.
"With respect to mining operations, which are of special significance as the first step in these activities, it appears hopeful that · safeguards are not too difficult. Particular attention should be paid to the installations in which concentrated nuclear fuel is produced since the product lends itself immediately to the production of bombs. Unless appropriate safeguards are taken at each of these stages, it will be difficult to ensure that no diversion of material or installations will take place.
"With regard to the question posed by Committee 2, 'whether effective control of atomic energy is possible', we do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible. Whether or not it is
politically feasible is not discussed or implied in this report, nor is there any recommendation of the particular system or systems by which effective control can be achieved."
B. Findings on the Safeguards To Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy Only for Peaceful Purposes
The safeguards required at each stage in the production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to prevent the possibilities of misuse indicated in the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee were examined at length in the Informal Conversations of Committee 2. A report on the subject, called the "First Report on Safeguards Required To Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy Only for Peaceful Purposes", was duly prepared, has been approved by the Commission, and is incorporated as Part V of this report.
The summary of the findings of that report is given below. (See page 46 for definitions of the types of safeguards mentioned herein.) These findings have led to the important conclusion that an international control agency must be responsible for the system of safeguards and control. They also indicate some of the essential functions of the agency. The specific control measures mentioned in the findings are not meant to be definitive but rather to be indicative of the various types of safeguards applicable at each stage. In devising a definite system of control, provision must be made for flexibility in adapting safeguards to a rapidly developing technology. Moreover, the findings are interrelated and, although the coordination of safeguards is discussed to some extent, further measures of coordination must be considered before formulating a comprehensive system of control. The findings, therefore, do not represent a plan for atomic energy control but only some of the elements which should be incorporated in any complete and effective plan.
Summary of Findings
1. Safeguards Necessary To Detect and Prevent Diversion From Declared Activities
(a) Diversion of Uranium From Declared Mines and Mills. Adequate safeguards against diversion from declared mines and mills are possible by a system of inspection, including guards, similar to normal managerial operating controls, provided that the inspectorate has unrestricted access to all equipment and
operations and has facilities for independent weighing, assay, and analysis.
(b) Diversion of Thorium From Declared Mines and Mills. Effective control of the raw material and concentrates of thorium is possible through a system of inspection similar to that found adequate for uranium.
(c) Diversion of Uranium and Thorium From Declared Refineries and Chemical and Metallurgical Plants. Adequate safeguards against diversion from declared refineries and chemical and metallurgical plants are possible by a system of inspection, including guards, similar to normal managerial operating controls, provided that the inspectorate has unrestricted access to all equipment and operations and has facilities for independent weighing, assay, and analysis and provided that it has the right to require the plant to be shut down for purposes of clean-up and accounting at appropriate times and to require efficient operating procedure.
At those stages there is no fundamental difference between the processes for thorium and for uranium.
(d) Diversion of Uranium From Declared Isotope Separation Plants. At present it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of uranium isotopes in the case of isotope separation plants. This is one of the important reasons why there must be internal control of such plants by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and be responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operation would still require management by the international control agency.
(e) Diversion of Uranium, Thorium, and Plutonium From Declared Nuclear Reactors and Associated Chemical Extraction Plants.
(i) At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of plutonium in the case of reactors and associated chemical extraction plants. This is one of the important reasons why the chemical extraction plants and, in some cases, the reactors should be subject to internal control by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and be responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operations would still require management by the international control agency.
(ii) The safeguards required for the control of reactors will depend on their size and design and especially on their content and possible rate of production of nuclear fuel. The safeguards available to the international control agency should include licensing and inspection, supervision, and management of the operation of reactors. In addition, close supervision of the design and construction of reactors is essential in all cases.
(iii) Periodic inspection, together with licensing, is an adequate safeguard in the case of small research reactors and their associated chemical plants, unless their total content of nuclear fuel or potential rate of output in any area is of military significance.
(iv) Adequate safeguards for chemical extraction plants associated with all except small research reactors are only possible through management by the international control
(v) Adequate safeguards during the preparation of the highgrade or pure nuclear fuels in a suitable form for insertion in secondary reactors, and, during the storage and shipment of such fuels, are only possible through management by the international control agency.
2. Safeguards Necessary To Ensure the Detection of Clandes
(a) The international control agency will require broad privileges of movement and inspection, including rights to conduct surveys by ground and air. These privileges should, however, be very carefully defined to ensure against misuse.
(b) Reports and returns on relevant matters will be required from national governments.
(c) The international control agency should coordinate all relevant information to determine what areas may be suspected of containing clandestine activities.
(d) Isotope separation plants, reactors, and chemical extraction plants, as well as mines, have distinguishing features which would facilitate the detection of clandestine activities at these stages.
(e) Detection of clandestine refineries and chemical and metallurgical plants is more difficult than detection of clandestine operations at other stages in the processing of nuclear fuel.
(f) The detection of clandestine bomb manufacture as such is almost impossible; it is, therefore, vital that any unauthorized accumulation of essential nuclear fuels be prevented.