(a) Problems relating to seizure have been considered thus far only in preliminary terms. The major questions of seizure are political rather than technical. It appears, however, that technical measures could reduce the military advantages and, therefore, the dangers of seizure.

4. Coordination of Safeguards

(a) In addition to material accounting at each individual step in atomic energy processes, the international control agency should provide for material-accounting checks between points of shipment and receipt of material as a means of detecting possible diversion in transit.

(b) The international control agency should control the storage and shipment of uranium and thorium materials to the degree necessary for security purposes.

(c) The international control agency should itself store and itself handle all enriched or pure nuclear fuel in transit. This does not necessarily imply ownership either of the materials or of the transit or storage facilities, questions which have not yet been discussed.

(d) Since stocks of concentrated or pure nuclear fuel are acutely dangerous, operations at successive stages in the production of atomic energy should be so scheduled that stocks of materials in transit and in storage are minimized, but without interfering unduly with the development and effectiveness of peaceful activities.

C. General Findings

The findings of the "First Report on Scientific and Technical Aspects of the Problem of Control" and of the "First Report on Safeguards Required To Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy Only for Peaceful Purposes", while limited to the more technical aspects of the control of atomic energy, provide a basis for further progress by the Commission toward the fulfilment of the terms of reference set out in the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, establishing a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters. The Resolution of December 14, 1946 of the General Assembly, entitled "Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments", provides certain broad and essential political agreements. Based upon the proposals and information presented to the Commission, upon the hearings, pro

ceedings, and deliberations of the Commission to date, and upon the proceedings, discussions, and reports of its several committees and subcommittees, all as set forth in this report, the Commission has made the following additional findings of a general nature:

1. That scientifically, technologically, and practically, it is feasible,

(a) to extend among "all nations the exchange of basic scientific information" on atomic energy "for peaceful ends"," (b) to control "atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes","

(c) to accomplish "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons",1 and

(d) to provide "effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions".1

2. That effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mechanisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure-including one or more of the following types of safeguards: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing-must be applied through the various stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel and are used. (Cf. "Findings on the Safeguards To Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy Only for Peaceful Purposes", Part II, B, of this report.) Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as mandatory.

3. That whether the ultimate nuclear fuel be destined for peaceful or destructive uses, the productive processes are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced state of manufacture. Thus, the control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished through a single unified international system of control and inspection designed to carry out all of these related purposes.

'Commission's terms of reference, article V, Resolution of the General Assembly, January 24, 1946.

4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions.

5. That an effective system for the control of atomic energy must be international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within the United Nations, possessing adequate powers and properly organized, staffed, and equipped for the purpose.

Only by such an international system of control and inspection can the development and use of atomic energy be freed from nationalistic rivalries with consequent risks to the safety of all peoples. Only by such a system can the benefits of widespread exchange of scientific knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence of the people of all nations.

6. That international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any such international system of control and inspection. An international treaty or convention to this effect, if standing alone, would fail

(a) "to ensure" the use of atomic energy "only for peaceful purposes",1 and

(b) to provide "for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions","

and thus would fail to meet the requirements of the terms of reference of the Commission. To be effective, such agreement must be embodied in a treaty or convention providing for a comprehensive international system of control and inspection and including guarantees and safeguards adequate to ensure the carrying out of the terms of the treaty or convention and "to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions".1

1 Commission's terms of reference, article V, Resolution of the General Assembly, January 24, 1946.

Part III: Recommendations

B

ASED UPON THE FINDINGS of the Commission set forth in Part II of this report, the Commission makes the following recommendations to the Security Council with respect to certain of the matters covered by the terms of reference of the Commission, which recommendations are interdependent and not severable, embodying the fundamental principles and indicating the basic organizational mechanisms necessary to attain the objectives set forth in Part II, C, General Findings, paragraph 1 (a)–(d) above.

1. There should be a strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection aimed at attaining the objectives set forth in the Commission's terms of reference.

2. Such an international system of control and inspection should be established and its scope and functions defined by a treaty or convention in which all of the nations Members of the United Nations should be entitled to participate on fair and equitable

terms.

The international system of control and inspection should become operative only when those Members of the United Nations. necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty or convention have bound themselves to accept and support it.

Consideration should be given to the matter of participation by non-members of the United Nations.

3. The treaty or convention should include, among others, provisions

(a) Establishing, in the United Nations, an international control agency possessing powers and charged with responsibility necessary and appropriate for the prompt and effective discharge of the duties imposed upon it by the terms of the treaty or convention. Its rights, powers, and responsibilities, as well as its relations to the several organs of the United Nations, should be clearly established and defined by the treaty or convention. Such powers should be sufficiently broad and flexible to enable the international control agency to deal with new developments that may hereafter arise in the field of atomic energy. The treaty shall provide that the rule of unanimity of the permanent Members,

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which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council, shall have no relation to the work of the international control agency. No government shall possess any right of veto over the fulfilment by the international control agency of the obligations imposed upon it by the treaty nor shall any government have the power, through the exercise of any right of veto or otherwise, to obstruct the course of control or inspection.

The international control agency shall promote among all nations the exchange of basic scientific information on atomic energy for peaceful ends, and shall be responsible for preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

The international control agency should have positive research and developmental responsibilities in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render the international control agency more effective in promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones. The exclusive right to carry on atomic research for destructive purposes should be vested in the international control agency.

Research in nuclear physics having a direct bearing on the use of atomic energy should be subject to appropriate safeguards established by the international control agency in accordance with the treaty or convention. Such safeguards should not interfere with the prosecution of pure scientific research, or the publication of its results, provided no dangerous use or purpose is involved. Decisions of the international control agency pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by the treaty or convention should govern the operations of national agencies for atomic energy. In carrying out its prescribed functions, however, the international control agency should interfere as little as necessary with the operations of national agencies for atomic energy, or with the economic plans and the private, corporate, and State relationships in the several countries.

(b) Affording the duly accredited representatives of the international control agency unimpeded rights of ingress, egress, and access for the performance of their inspections and other duties into, from, and within the territory of every participating nation, unhindered by national or local authorities.

(c) Prohibiting the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic weapons by all nations parties thereto and by all persons under their jurisdiction.