The International Control of Atomic Energy

Findings

1. Present electromagnetic and diffusion separation plants have in common the following features which are of importance in determining the necessary safeguards:

(a) The complexity and large extent of plants capable of separating significant quantities of U-235

(b) The large amount of material at any time in various stages of concentration in the plants

(c) The difficulty, under the presently available methods of measurement and with present processes, of any strict accounting of U-235 between the input and output materials

(d) The large staff required to operate the plants (e) The absence from the plants of the radiation hazards which provide natural safeguards in certain phases of the operation of reactors.

2. The nature of the plants and the kind of processes to which the material is subjected do not preclude the application of adequate safeguards.

3. The necessary close supervision of the processes and the necessary security measures could only be provided by managerial operation by the international control agency of the whole plant.

Summary

At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of uranium isotopes in the case of isotope separation plants. This is one of the important reasons why there must be internal control of such plants by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operation would still require management by the international control agency.

Chapter 5: Safeguards Necessary To Detect and Prevent the Diversion of Uranium, Thorium, and Plutonium From Declared Nuclear Reactors and Associated Chemical Extraction Plants

Introduction

Reactors may vary greatly in size and design. Present reactors include the large units at Hanford, designed for the production of plutonium from natural uranium, and small reactors for research purposes. Other reactors may be designed primarily for the production of power but may produce nuclear fuel as well.

The chemical plants associated with reactors are for the extraction of the fissionable and radioactive materials produced in the reactors and therefore they introduce the problem of safeguards against the diversion of materials which, even in relatively small quantities, could be used for the immediate manufacture of atomic

weapons.

In this connection, the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee states:

"Production of nuclear fuels is the crucial stage in the operations. the reactors and extraction plants for the production of plutonium or U-233 deliver nuclear fuel, which, under proper conditions, may be used directly for the manufacture of atomic weapons. If, therefore, the strictest safeguards are not taken to prevent the material in the installations producing nuclear fuel from being diverted, the danger is extremely serious.'

Available information indicates that the utilization of U-233 as nuclear fuel, which can be made from thorium by neutron absorption, though less thoroughly explored than that of plutonium, is theoretically possible. It is believed that safeguards similar to those for uranium and plutonium would be required for thorium and U-233.

Some types of secondary reactors use feed material which is so enriched that it must be very closely safeguarded. Except in this respect, primary and secondary reactors which produce nuclear fuel present similar control problems.

Findings

1. The preparation of natural uranium in an appropriate form for insertion in reactors requires safeguards similar essentially to those for the preceding chemical and metallurgical plants.

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Findings

1. Present electromagnetic and diffusion separation plants have in common the following features which are of importance in determining the necessary safeguards:

(a) The complexity and large extent of plants capable of separating significant quantities of U-235

(b) The large amount of material at any time in various stages of concentration in the plants

(c) The difficulty, under the presently available methods of measurement and with present processes, of any

strict accounting of U-235 between the input and output materials

(d) The large staff required to operate the plants (e) The absence from the plants of the radiation hazards which provide natural safeguards in certain phases of the operation of reactors.

2. The nature of the plants and the kind of processes to which the material is subjected do not preclude the application of adequate safeguards.

3. The necessary close supervision of the processes and the necessary security measures could only be provided by managerial operation by the international control agency of the whole plant.

Summary

At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of uranium isotopes in the case of isotope separation plants. This is one of the important reasons why there must be internal control of such plants by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operation would still require management by the international control agency.

;

Chapter 5: Safeguards Necessary To Detect and Prevent the Diversion of Uranium, Thorium, and Plutonium From Declared Nuclear Reactors and Associated Chemical Extraction Plants

Introduction

Reactors may vary greatly in size and design. Present reactors include the large units at Hanford, designed for the production of plutonium from natural uranium, and small reactors for research purposes. Other reactors may be designed primarily for the production of power but may produce nuclear fuel as well.

The chemical plants associated with reactors are for the extraction of the fissionable and radioactive materials produced in the reactors and therefore they introduce the problem of safeguards against the diversion of materials which, even in relatively small quantities, could be used for the immediate manufacture of atomic weapons.

In this connection, the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee states:

"Production of nuclear fuels is the crucial stage in the operations. the reactors and extraction plants for the production of plutonium or U-233 deliver nuclear fuel, which, under proper conditions, may be used directly for the manufacture of atomic weapons. . . If, therefore, the strictest safeguards are not taken to prevent the material in the installations producing nuclear fuel from being diverted, the danger is extremely serious.'

Available information indicates that the utilization of U-233 as nuclear fuel, which can be made from thorium by neutron absorption, though less thoroughly explored than that of plutonium, is theoretically possible. It is believed that safeguards similar to those for uranium and plutonium would be required for thorium and U-233.

Some types of secondary reactors use feed material which is so enriched that it must be very closely safeguarded. Except in this respect, primary and secondary reactors which produce nuclear fuel present similar co

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