the world upon our resources of food, raw material and manufacture, with our closeness, under modern conditions of transportation and communication, to Europe, it was impossible for us to maintain the theory of an isolation that did not in fact exist. It will be equally impossible for us to keep out of another general European war. We are, therefore, just as much interested in stopping such a war as if we were in Europe. This war was our war. The settlement of the war is our settlement. The maintenance of the terms of that settlement is our business, as it is the business of the other nations. To say that we should avoid it is to say that we should be recreant to our duty to ourselves and to the world and blind to the progress of events. To say that it mixes us up with kings is amusing when we consider the dominance of democracy in Europe.

The superlative expressions contained in the denunciations of Mr. Fess and Mr. Reed and Mr. Borah and Mr. Poindexter as to the dangerous working of this covenant find no basis in a clear understanding of its provisions. The contention that we are to be bound by the decision of the Executive Council on a critical issue of war or peace, of arbitration or no arbitration, of limit of armament or no armament, finds no justification in the covenant itself.

The Executive Council is an executive body only to recommend measures to be adopted by the nations in the matter of the reduction of armament and in the matter of the furnishing of military forces and in other lines of action. The obligation is upon the governments through their usual constitutional agencies (which, in our case, is Congress) to perform the obligations they have assumed. Our obligations are: first, to submit differences to arbitration or mediation; second, not to make war until three months

after an award or a report of a proper settlement and not then if the losing nation complies; third, to lay an embargo or boycott against a covenant-breaking nation; fourth, to keep within an armament Congress agrees to. These are the "bite" of the League.

The fundamental weakness of the attitude of Senator Poindexter and Senator Reed and Senator Borah is that they confine their arguments to pointing out the dangers of this Covenant to the United States, which, as I think I have shown, are comparatively slight, while they utterly fail to tender any constructive suggestions to the conference for a method by which peace can be maintained and the just results of the war can be secured. They are merely destructive critics and are not in search of a solution of the difficulty that we, in common with the other nations at the Paris conference, have to meet and solve. Such criticisms are not helpful. They are apparently prompted by a desire to find fault rather than by the duty of suggesting a remedy.

General Smuts, who recommended the system of mandatories, thought that the League itself could not get up an organization sufficiently effective to conduct these governments, that therefore it ought to employ competent governments as agencies to carry on the governments of these dependencies for the benefits of the people in them and that they should make a report of their trusteeship at the end of each year. In his opinion the principles should be laid down in the treaty or be contained in a charter granted by the Executive Council, so as to make a rule of conduct for the agencies acting as mandatories.

Now, there is nothing in the League that requires any government to accept the position of a mandatory. The South Sea colonies and the Pacific colonies of Germany will doubt

less come under England or under Australia. There are some Northern islands, perhaps, that may come under Japan as a mandatory. Then Palestine and Armenia and Constantinople may come under some other government. They would be glad to have the United States take that, but you will remember that the representatives of the United States said in the Council, that this was impossible, that they could not agree to it.

Now, if they took that attitude in the Council, how unreasonable it is to contend that they would have consented to a league which obliged a member to accept a mandate of this character. You will find nothing compulsory in this provision of the League.

THE PARIS COVENANT FOR A LEAGUE
OF NATIONS1

We are here to-night in sight of a league of peace, of what I have ever regarded as the "promised land." Such a war as the last is a hideous blot on our Christian civilization. The inconsistency is as foul as was slavery under the Declaration of Independence. If Christian nations cannot now be brought into a united effort to suppress a recurrence of such a contest it will be a shame to modern society.

During my administration I attempted to secure treaties of universal arbitration between this country and France and England, by which all issues depending for their set

1 Address delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House on March 4, 1919.

tlement upon legal principles were to be submitted to an international court for final decision. These treaties were emasculated by the Senate, yielding to the spirit which proceeds, unconsciously doubtless, but truly, from the conviction that the only thing that will secure to a nation the justice it wishes to secure is force; that agreements between nations to settle controversies justly and peaceably should never be given any weight in national policy; that in dealing between civilized nations we must assume that each nation is conspiring to deprive us of our independence and our prosperity; that there is no impartial tribunal to which we can entrust the decison of any question vitally affecting our interests or our honor, and that we can afford to make no agreement from which we may not immediately withdraw, and whose temporary operation to our detriment may not be expressly a ground for ending it. This is the doctrine of despair. It leads necessarily to the conclusion that our only recourse to avoid war is competitive armament, with its dreadful burdens and its constant temptation to resort to the war it seeks to avoid.

The most important covenant with reference to peace and war in the constitution of the League is that looking to a reduction of armament by all nations. The Executive Council, consisting of representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and of four other nations to be selected by the body of delegates, is to consider how much the armaments of the nations should be reduced, having regard to the safety of each of the nations and their obligations under the League. Having reached a conclusion as to the proportionate limits of each nation's armament, it submits its conclusion to each nation, which may or may not agree to the limit thus recommended; but

when an agreement is reached it covenants to keep within that limit until, by application to the Executive Council, the limit may be raised. In other words, each nation agrees to its own limitation. Having so agreed, it must keep within it.

Our Constitution contains no inhibition, express or implied, against making such an agreement. On the contrary, for one hundred years we have maintained an agreement to limit armaments between this country and Canada. The evil of competition in armament as between us has been avoided by abstaining from armament altogether. Could there be a more complete precedent for this provision of the Paris Covenant?

The importance of providing for a reduction of armament every one recognizes. It is affirmed in the newly proposed Senate resolution. Can we not trust our Congress to fix a limitation which is safe for the country and to stick to it? If we cannot, no country can. Yet all the rest are anxious to do this and they are far more exposed than we.

The character of this obligation is affected by the time during which the covenants of the League remain binding. There is no stipulation as to how long this is. In my judgment there should be a period of ten years or a permission for any member of the League to withdraw from the covenant by giving a reasonable notice of one or two years of its intention to do so.

The members of the League and the non-members are required, the former by their covenant, the latter by an enforced obligation, to submit all differences between them, not capable of being settled by negotiation, to arbitration before a tribunal composed as the parties may agree. They are required to covenant to abide the award. Should either