PART III NEUTRAL DUTIES THE PREVENTION OF RECRUITING WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE OF ADDIS AND BLAIR 1 File No. 763.72111R24/30 The British Ambassador (Spring Rice) to the Secretary of State No. 43 WASHINGTON, February 15, 1917. SIR: I have the honour by direction of Mr. Secretary Balfour, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to have recourse to your accustomed courtesy in order to bring the following facts to the knowledge of the competent authority of the United States Government. On July 8, 1915, an indictment was found in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California against two British subjects alleging a violation of section 10 of the criminal code relative to enlisting for foreign service. It will doubtless be within your recollection that the question at issue was the interpretation of the clause in the Neutrality Act as to "hiring and retaining " (section 2 of act of April 20, 1818). It appeared to be the view of the United States authorities that the clause while permitting the collection and despatch to Europe of subjects and citizens of governments which had compulsory military service forbade similar action on the part of British subjects in this country. As soon as I was informed that the matter had been taken up judicially I applied for a ruling to your Department and was informed that the matter being sub judice the Department must await a regular legal decision. In order to obtain such a decision it was agreed that the facts in the case should be submitted to the court without reserve and by consent. I informed you in my note of July 28, 1915, that I had caused British subjects to be informed that all steps taken with a view to assisting British trained men to return to England must cease pending an authoritative decision. I also informed you that my Government, according to its invariable rule, proposed to take no further action till the judicial remedy is exhausted.2 1 See Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, pp. 763, 771, 773. 2 Ibid., pp. 767-769. 535 I venture to bring these facts again to your courteous attention in order that it may not escape your notice that from the date above mentioned-July 28, 1915-till the present moment, this matter has remained undecided. It is unnecessary for me to point out that the fact that no decision has been taken, and no change made in the neutrality laws, has had the practical result of debarring British subjects from the right exercised by other nationals, of assisting other British subjects to return to England for service. In the opinion of Mr. Secretary Balfour the time has now come when it is his duty to invite your attention to the fact that the delay in rendering the legal decision is such as to give a reasonable ground for diplomatic representation and I am accordingly instructed, with all respect, to submit the question, by this official channel, to the consideration of the United States Government. I have [etc.] CECIL SPRING RICE File No. 763.72111R24/32 The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Spring Rice) No. 4917 WASHINGTON, April 6, 1917. EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, in due course, of your note of February 15, 1917, wherein complaint was made as to alleged delay on the part of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the matter of the trial of two British subjects indicted for a violation of section 10 of the criminal code relative to enlisting men for foreign service, i. e., the case of the United States vs. Blair et al. A copy of your note was transmitted to the Attorney General of the United States, and I have now the honor to advise you of his reply, in substance as follows: His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is doubtless aware that a delay in the action of a United States court (if such delay exists, which is denied) affords no "ground for diplomatic representation." British subjects in the United States who violate its laws are entitled to no greater privileges with respect to the courts than American citizens, and the rights of American citizens with respect to action of Federal courts are confined to such rights as enure under Federal statutes and under the Constitution. In the present case, the defendants were tried in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. They were found guilty. The judge rendered a decision (contained in his charge to the jury) construing, adversely to their contention, the statute under which they were indicted. This decision settled the law upon this point, unless and until it should be overruled by a higher court on appeal. After the date of this decision, all persons in this coun try, whether Americans or otherwise, were bound to obey the law as so laid down. Your excellency has stated that the decision "has had the practical result of debarring British subjects from the right exercised by other nationals, of assisting other British subjects to return to England for service," but it should be borne in mind that the facts relative to British subjects are such as to make them liable to the penalty prescribed if they violate the law of the United States. Similar facts with respect to subjects of other nations would make such subjects equally liable to the same penalty. The terms of the law make no discrimination between nationalities; and if it does not have the effect of preventing certain nationals of other countries from assisting other nationals of their own country to return for service, it is because the facts as to these nationals of other countries are not, or have not been, identical with the facts relative to nationals of Great Britain. The statement made by your excellency, in your note of July 28, 1915, that you had "caused . . . British subjects to be informed that all steps taken with a view to assisting British trained men to return to England must cease pending an authoritative decision," is acknowledged as an instruction to your countrymen to obey the laws of the United States; and a decision of the District Court of the United States is (until changed by a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court) an "authoritative decision." The decision of the District Court in the present case simply affirms what has already been decided to be the law for many years prior by other district courts of the United States. Furthermore, the Attorney General desires to point out that in fact there has been in the present case no unreasonable delay whatever, and, moreover, that it has been by reason of the various legal maneuvers of the defendants themselves that decision was not had by the court many months ago. The indictments were filed July 8, 1915. Owing to defendants' demurrers, trial was not had for three months, viz., on October 18, 1915, and a verdict of guilty was returned October 30, 1915. After motion for a new trial by the defendants, sentence was imposed October 30, 1915. The defendants' appeal was not entered and record filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals until December 20, 1915. The defendants (plaintiff in error) did not file their brief until March 16, 1916. The case was argued March 27, 1916, and the Government was granted leave by the court to file its brief, which was filed September 27, 1916. The defendants filed a reply brief October 5, 1916. Decision was rendered in the case by the Circuit Court of Appeals, February 19, 1917, i. e., within four months after the final brief was filed by the defendants. In view of the size of the docket of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, |