Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental ProtectionCambridge University Press, 18. 7. 2002. - 209 страница All solutions to environmental problems depend on the imposition of private-, common-, or public-property rights in natural resources. The question is, who should own the resources: private individuals, private groups of 'stakeholders', or the entire society (the public). Contrary to much of the literature in this field, this book argues that no single property regime works best in all circumstances. Environmental protection requires the use of multiple property regimes, including admixtures of private-, common-, and public-property systems. |
Садржај
Pollution and property the conceptual framework | 1 |
Public propertyregulatory solutions to the tragedy of open access | 20 |
Mixed propertyregulatory regimes for environmental protection | 45 |
Institutional and technological limits of mixed propertyregulatory regimes | 67 |
The theory and limits of freemarket environmentalism a private propertynonregulatory regime | 85 |
The limited utility of common property regimes for environmental protection | 110 |
The complexities of property regime choice for environmental protection | 130 |
When property regimes collide the takings problem | 154 |
Final thoughts | 178 |
180 | |
202 | |
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Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental ... Daniel H. Cole Приказ није доступан - 2002 |
Чести термини и фразе
acid rain agency air pollution Amendments averting the tragedy benefits California Coastal Commission chapter circumstances Clean Air Act Coase common property regimes common-law compensation Congress conservation easements constitutes Dahlman discount rate economic economists efficient effluent taxes eminent domain emissions allowances emissions reduction emissions trading endangered species enforce Environment environmental protection example exclusion federal free-market environmentalism free-market environmentalists grazing habitat Hahn and Hester individual institutional and technological Justice land trusts legislative limited monitoring natural resources open access open field system Ostrom percent police power preservation private owners private ownership private property regimes private property rights private/individual property systems property-based approach property/regulatory approach public nuisance public ownership public property rights public property/regulatory public rights public/state ownership public/state property reduce regulatory resource management rules Sir Edmund social Stonehenge sulfur dioxide takings technology-based tion tradeable permits tragedy of open transaction costs transferable pollution rights village wildlife