[52] the amount collected from the owners of land We perceive no error in the judgment of the UNITED STATES, Appt., v. STATE OF ALABAMA. [No. 1058.] mem 129 US 39, UNITED STATES, Appt., STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. [No. 1059.] APPEALS from the Court of Claims. Af Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion the court: of The questions presented in these cases are covered by the decision in the case of United States v. Louisiana; and, in conformity with it, the judgments in them must be affirmed. So ordered. BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS AND Reported below, 23 Fed. Rep. 849. Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112 (30: 1122); Mr.Thos. F.Withrow, for appellant, cited Nat. Bk. of Cleveland v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74 (30: 877); Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112. (30: 1122). Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin ion of the court: This is a motion to dismiss an appeal because the decree appealed from is not final but interlocutory only. The case is in substance this: redeem the prior mortgage. A bill was filed by a junior mortgagee against CHARLES E. SIMMONS, Trustee, ET AL. Submitted Oct. 11, 1887. Decided Oct. 24, 1887. In none of these parties shall redeem from the APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United mine is due on the second mortgage, and States for the Southern District of lowa, third, the balance, if any, to the inortgagor. [53] of determining the amount necessary to be paid by any of the parties in making redemption, as herein provided," the cause be referred to a master to find and report" the amount due on both the first and the second mortgages in accordance with certain principles of accounting which were specifically stated. The whole then concludes as follows: "This decree being interlocutory, it is ordered that said cause stand continued for further order and decrce." From this decree the appeal was taken. The case is reported as Simmons v. Taylor, 23 Fed. Rep. 849. The rulings at the last term in Parsons v. Robinson, 122 U. S. 112 [30:1122] are decisive of this motion. The right of the junior mortgagee to redeem the prior mortgage has been established by the decree appealed from, but the amount he must pay has not been determined. The validity of his lien as security for the amount due on his mortgage has been declared, but what that amount is has not been fixed. His right to a sale of the mortgaged property in case the debt is not paid has been settled but such a sale cannot be made until a further order to that effect is entered. The litigation has not been ended; the terms of the redemption have not been fixed, and the foreclosure sale awaits the further judicial action of the court. In short, nothing can be done towards carrying the decree into effect until the "further order or decree" for which the cause was continued. This is shown more than once on the face of the decree, and consequently the decree is in fact, what the court took care to say it was, "interlocutory" only, and not final for the purposes of an appeal. It is suggested in the brief of counsel for the appellant that the cases of First Nat. Bk. of Cleveland v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74 [30: 877] and [55] Parsons v. Robinson, supra, are in conflict, but this is a mistake. In Shedd's Case there was a decree of sale absolutely and without reserve, which could be carried into execution at once and when a purchaser acquired title under it, he would have held as against all the parties to the suit, no matter what might be the rulings on the other questions in the case which were reserved for further adjudication. The language of the decree, as shown at page 84 [881], was to the effect that the whole property be sold as an entirety, *** and that upon a confirmation of the sale the purchaser be entitled to a conveyance freed and discharged of the lien of the mortgages, receiver's certificates, costs, expenses, etc.' Such a decree was surely final for the purposes of an appeal within the rule as stated in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U S. 6 How. 201 [12:404], where it is said, at page 204 [405]: "When the decree decides the right to the property in contest, and directs it to be delivered up by the defendant to the complainant, or directs it be sold, or directs the defendant to pay a certain sum of money to the complainant, and the complainant is entitled to have such a decree Carried immediately into execution, the decree the the parties pursuant to the decree passed." To the same effect are Ray v. Law,7 U.S.3 Cranch, 179 [2:404]; Bronson v. La Crosse & M. R. R. Co. 67 U. S. 2 Black, 524, 531 [17: 359, 360] and Thompson v. Dean, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 342 [19: 94], in which last case it is said, p. 345 [95]: "In this case the decree directs the performance of a specific act, and requires that it be done forthwith. The effect of the act when done is to invest the transferces with all the rights of ownership. It changes the property in the stock as absolutely and as completely as could be done by execution on a decree for sale. It looks to no future modification or change of the decree." If a sale had been made under the decree as it stood in Shedd's Case, title of the purchaser would not have been overthrown or invalidated, even by a reversal of the decree; and consequently the title of the defendants to the lands would have been extinguished, and their redress upon the reversal, [56] would have been of a different sort from that of a restitution of the land sold." Such was the language of this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Story, in Whiting v. Bank of U. S. 38 U. S., 13 Pet. 6, 15 [10:33, 37], in reference to the effect of a sale under a decree of foreclosure and sale, and there cannot be a doubt of its correctness. It was for this reason the decree in Shedd's Case was held to be final in the sense of a court of equity for the purpose of an appeal. But in Parsons v. Robinson, we held there was no decree of sale which could be "carried immediately into execution;" that no order of sale could issue until the court had "given its authority in that behalf;" and that "further judicial action must be had by the court before its ministerial officers could proceed to carry the decree into execution." In this consists the difference between the two cases; in Sherid's Case there was actually a decree of sale; iu Parson's Case there was not. So, here, there has been no actual decree of sale; and the mo tion to dismiss is granted. Where the law, under which town bonds in aid of a railroad purport to have been issued, has been de clared void, and the bonds are sought to be supplication for the town meeting shall be made by ported by another law which requires that the ap twenty voters and taxpayers, and the record does not show that any of those who signed the application for the meeting at which the vote was taken were taxpayers, a recovery cannot be had upon them. [No. 876.] Submitted Oct. 11, 1887. Decided Oct. 24, 1887. Itates for the Northern District of Illinois. Affirmed. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United must be considered as a final one to that extent, and authorizes an appeal to this court, although so much of the bill is retained in the circuit Action against the Town of Dayton on town court as is necessary for the purpose of adjust-bonds purporting to be issued by it under the ing by a further decree the accounts between Act of February 18, 1857, which Act has been [59] declared void by reason of its not appearing by the legislative journal to have been passed as required by the Constitution. Plaintiff claimed to be a bona fide holder and to recover under the Act of March 6, 1867, which was in force on May 1, 1869, when the bonds were issued. A copy of the bond is set forth in the declaration containing the recital that it was issued under the Act of 1857. The Town demurred to the declaration. The circuit court in which the action was commenced sustained the denurrer and dismissed the action and the plaintiff Gilson appealed to this court. Messrs. George A. Sanders and R. W. Haynes, for plaintiff in error: The Act of March 6, 1867, gave ample power for the vote and issue of the bonds in question. Knox County v. Aspinwall, 62 U. S. 21 How. 539 (16: 208); Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 203 (17:524); Marshall County v. Schenck, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 784 (18:559); Lexington v. Butler, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 282 (20:809). Municipal bonds held by bona fide purchasers bought before maturity, in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of any defense, have been held valid, where there appeared adequate legi lative authority therefor; and where a vote of the people is recited on the face of the bonds, the municipality is estopped from denying the election. Warren County v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 104 (24:980); Douglas County v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104 (24:46); Empire Top. v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 87 (25:878); Marcy v. Oswego, 92 U. S. 638 (23:748); Coloma v. Eaves, 92 Ŭ. S. 484 (23:579). The bonds reciting on their face a void Act, that of February 18, 1857, as legislative authority, when the valid Act of March 6, 1867, giving ample power to issue the bonds, was in force, must be chargeable to the officers of the Town, and no loss thereby should fall upon a bona fide holder of bonds purchased without notice and for a valuable consideration before maturity. Marcy v. Oswego, and Coloma v. Eaves, supra. If there was any legislative power in existence, at the time the bonds were issued, for the vote and the issue of the bonds in question, an innocent purchaser had a right to rely upon it, and the bonds are valid. Maher v. Chicago, 38 Ill. 273; Johnson County v. January, 94 U. S. 204 (24:111). Where the wrong Act is recited, the recital of it will be rejected, and the bonds held valid under an existing Act granting the power to issue them. Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227 (28:966); Johnson County v. January, supra; Burr v. Chariton County, 2 McCrary, 603. A municipal bond is valid as negotiable paper under the law merchant, when any power existed for its issue, even though not disclosed upon its face. Questions of form merely, or irregularity, or fraud, or misconduct on the part of the agents of the Town cannot be considered. East Lincoln v. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801 (24:322); Rock Creek v. Štrong, 96 U. S. 271 (24:815). The bonds in this suit appearing regular on their face in every particular, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable. Johnson County v. January, 94 U. S. 202 (24:110); Royal British Bank v. Turquand, 6 El. & Bl. 327; Wilmarth v. Crawford 10 Wend. 343; Alleghany City v. McClurkan, 14 Pa. 83. Mr. G.S. Eldredge, for defendant in error. This case seems to be a wholly groundless attempt to procure the reconsideration of a question which has been heard and conclu sively settled by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the cases of Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160, and Miller v. Goodwin, 70 Ill. 659, and by this court in South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260 (24:154), and Amoskeag Nat. Bank v. Ottawa, 105 U. S. 667 (26:1204). The bonds sued upon were issued under the Act of February 18, 1857, and in pursuance of no other authority whatever. The resort to the Act of 1867 is a mere subterfuge, and can avail nothing. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin. [61] ion of the court: The judgment in this case is affirmed on the authority of Crow v. Oxford, 119 U. S. 215 [30: 388]. See also Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667, 691 [26:1204, 1213]. It appears on the face of the bonds sued for that the subscription was made under and by virtue of the Act of February 18, 1857, and that the vote of the Town was taken at a special town meeting called upon the "application in writing of fifty legal voters of said Town," which is in accordance with the provisions of that Act. The Act of March 6, 1867, which the plaintiff now claims is sufficient to support the bonds, requires that the application for the town meeting shall be made by "twenty voters and taxpayer.." The record does not show that any of those who signed the application for the meeting at which the vote was taken were taxpayers. It thus appears from the bonds themselves not only that they were issued under the Act of 1857, but that they were not issued under that of 1867. Affirmed. POTOMAC STEAMBOAT COMPANY, Claimant of the Steamer EXCELSIOR, Appt., v. BAKER SALVAGE COMPANY. (See S. C. "The Excelsior," Reporter's ed. 40-51.) arbitrate-excessive recovery. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 541; Ackley School Dist. v. Hall, 113 U. S. 139 (28:956); Moran v. Miami Salvage claim-when not barred-agreement to County, 67 U. S. 2 Black, 722 (17:342); Mercer County v. Hacket, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 83 (17:548); White V. Vermont & M. R. R. 62 U. S. 21 How. 576 (16:222); Thompson v. Lee County, 70 U. S. 8 Wall. 331 (18:178); Marion County v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278 (24:59); Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51 (24:681). cial contract, it is necessary to plead and prove a 1. To bar a meritorious claim for salvage by a spebinding contract to be paid at all events for the work, labor and service in attempting to save the Property whether the same should be lost or saved. 2. A binding contract of that character is not proved by a loose conversation between the respec. [41] tive parties after the salvage service had been partly 3. An agreement to submit to arbitration the 4. Since the Act of 1875, in cases of salvage, as in appears to be too large, unless the excess is so great Submitted Oct. 11, 1887. Decided Oct. 24, 1887. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United Fortress Monroe, left her dock at Norfolk, "As The Excelsior was heading the aforesaid A States for the Eastern District of Virginia. from the quantity she was making in her bull Affirmed. Reported below, 19 Fed. Rep. 436. The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Theodore S. Garnett, Jr., for appellant: The claim for salvage is barred by the The Independence, 2 Curt. C. C. 355. The H. B. Foster, Abb. Adm. 222. The Connemara, 108 U. S. 352 (27:751). The Camanche, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 477 (19:405); The Independence, 2 Curt. C.C. 350; The Salacia, 2 Hagg. Adm. 262. If the libelants refused to refer the amount of compensation to arbitration as agreed, that is no bar to a suit for salvage. Coffin v. The John Shaw, 1 Cliff. 230. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court. This is libel in rem. in admiralty, in a cause of salvage, filed by the Baker Salvage Company, a corporation of Virginia, against the steamer Excelsior and her cargo, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. That court awarded to the libelant, by a decree made on the 21st of of February, 1884, the sum of $5,600, as salvage, being 3 per cent on $160,000, the value of The Excelsior having been found at $150,000, and the value of her cargo at $10,000. 19 red. Rep. 436. The claimant appealed to the circuit court, which, on the 19th of May, 1884, affirmed the decree of the district court, with interest on the $5,600 from the date of the decree of the district court, until paid, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, and the costs of suit. The circuit court found the following facts and conclusions of law: through the hole in her bow, she was promptly "After ascertaining the above soundings and " "December 4, 1882. "Subsequently, Captain Baldwin sent anoth- "Dec. 4, 1882. "The first of these telegrams was received at [42] "The Baker Salvage Company, through the agency of its superintendent and general manager, Captain E. M. Stoddard, at once, and vigorously, set to work in response to the telegrams, to render the aid asked for; and, at or about ten P. M., a fully equipped expedition, under the command of Capt. Stoddard, left Berkeley, opposite Norfolk, at the intersection of the southern and eastern branches of the Elizabeth River, where the wharves of the Baker SalvageCompany are located, for the purpose of relieving The Excelsior. The expedition consisted of the powerful wrecking steamer Resolute, Hobbs, master, with her stationary steam pump, capable of pumping four hundred tons per hour, with the schooner Scud in tow, having on board a portable steam pump capable of pumping one hundred tons per hour, and a "On the afternoon of the fourth of December, full complement of wrecking material and ap1882, at five o'clock, the steamer Excelsior, pliances, the whole manned by a crew of ten Captain T. E. Baldwin, of the Potomac Steam-seamen experienced in wrecking operations, boat Company, plying between Norfolk, Va., and accompanied by a skilled diver, with div and Washington, D. C., touching at Old Point, ing apparatus. Captain Stoddard making all [43] reasonable haste, and in the exercise of his moval of the cargo to Old Point wharf had "The Excelsior's cargo had not been reached sum. "At this point, viz., about seven o'clock on the morning of the 5th, Captain Stoddard began the direct operations upon The Excelsior and her cargo, for their relief. He brought The Scud alongside The Excelsior, for the purpose of removing the steamer's cargo to Old Point wharf, and, placing the diving apparatus aboard The Excelsior, set the diver to work to ascertain minutely the exact extent of the wound that had been sustained by the steamer in the collision; and, while this was going on, he returned to Old Point wharf in The Resolute, and brought off the laborers above mentioned, who had been employed to assist in the removal of cargo, and lumber to be used by the diver in battening up the hole. "Soon after daylight on the morning of the and, the diver completing his work of batten- The diver, who began his operations about [44] [45 |