38 the constitution that, when the legislature is called together in special session by the governor, they shall not consider or act upon any subject save that for which they were assembled, or which may have been presented to them by a special message from the governor. Such a provision, it is held, requires that the subject for legislation shall be presented to the legislature by the governor in writing. The business to be transacted at the special session is to be specially named in the executive proclamation or message, but is not to be particularly described in all its details. The legislature cannot go beyond the limits of the business specially named; but within such limits it may act freely, in whole or in part, or not at all, as it may deem expedient. And, where there is no such constitutional restriction, the power of the legislature, when so specially convened, is not limited to considering the special subjects which prompted the call, but they may act on any subject, as at a regular session.35 When the constitution gives the governor power to adjourn the legislature in case of a disagreement between the two houses, it is for him alone to decide whether cause exists for the exercise of his power in this regard, and the courts cannot review his decision.3° Executive Approval or Rejection of Bills. 36 The state constitutions provide that every bill which shall have passed the two houses of the legislature shall be submitted to the governor. If he approves it, he shall sign it; if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the house in which it originated. Under this provision, the bill must be laid before the governor, or the person who for the time being is acting as governor, personally, for his revision; it is not enough that it may be left at his office. Even when a bill, on its passage through the legislature, receives a larger majority of votes than would be sufficient to pass it over the gov ernor's veto, it must be submitted to him for his consideration. 37 He is a part of the lawmaking power of the state, and no act can become a law until he has had the opportunity of considering it. If it seems useless to send to the governor a bill which has already been 88 Manor Casino v. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S. W. 769. 84 In re Governor's Proclamation, 19 Colo. 333, 35 Pac. 530. 85 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82. 36 In re Legislative Adjournment, 18 R. I. 824, 27 Atl. 324. 87 Opinion of Justices, 99 Mass. 636. voted for by more members than would suffice to override his veto, it should be remembered that he gives his reasons for the veto, and those reasons may be sufficient to change the vote in one or the other house when the bill is again considered by them.88 A bill which has been sent to the governor may be amended by the legislature within the ten days allowed him for its consideration, but before he has taken action upon it. But in some states it is held that, when the bill is in the hands of the governor, it is so far beyond the control of the legislature that neither house alone can recall the bill, and it is doubtful whether this could be done by the joint action of both houses." In Colorado, however, it is said that there is no constitutional objection to the legislature's requesting, by joint or concurrent resolution, the return of a bill in the hands of the governor. He need not comply with such a request, but there is nothing to prevent him from returning the bill as requested, for reconsideration and amendment by the legislature.*1 42 The governor usually has ten days within which to determine upon his approval or veto of a bill. In computing this time, either the day on which the bill was received by him or the day of its return is to be excluded; but one is to be included. And, where the last of the ten days falls on Sunday, he may return the bill on the following day. In Vermont, it has been held that when the governor once intentionally and understandingly signs a bill it becomes a law, and it is not divested of that character though he afterwards erases his signature, intending to affix it in another place, but fails to do so.43 But in Illinois the doctrine is that, during the time allowed him, the governor may sign the bill, and then erase his signature, at pleasure. "Until it has passed from his control by the constitutional and customary modes of legislation, he may reconsider and retract any approval previously made." Notwithstanding some difference of opinion, it may be regarded as the now prevalent doctrine that the power 38 State v. Crounse, 36 Neb. 835, 55 N. W. 246. 39 McKenzie v. Commissioner (Tex. Sup.) 32 S. W. 1038. 40 People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269. 41 In re Recalling Bills, 9 Colo. 630, 21 Pac. 474. 42 In re Computation of Time, 9 Colo. 632, 21 Pac. 475. 48 National Land & L. Co. v. Mead, 60 Vt. 257, 14 Atl. 689. 46 of the governor to approve and sign a bill presented to him within ten days previous to the adjournment of the legislature does not cease with the adjournment, but he may sign the bill after the adjournment, and it thereupon becomes a law. Unless the constitution so provides, it is not incumbent upon the governor to return to either house of the legislature any bill or act after it has received his approval and signature; if he reports to either house his approval of the bill, it is a matter of courtesy only. Subsequent approval of an act by the governor does not dispense with requisites which must exist in order to confer authority on the legislature to pass the act.** If the governor does not approve the bill, he is to return it, with his objections, to the house in which it originated. This return is usually and properly made by an executive messenger. If the gov ernor, having announced his intention of vetoing a bill, delivers it to the member who introduced it, on his representation that it was recalled by the house for reconsideration, and the member hands it to private interested parties, it does not become a law under the constitutional provision that if the governor shall not return a bill within ten days it shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it. If the constitution gives the governor power merely to return the bill with his objections (that is, to veto the bill as a bill), he must treat it as a whole. He cannot disapprove of one item in an appropriation bill and approve all the 49 If he attempts to do this, the bill will be considered as approved as a whole, and every part of it will become law. When the veto power is given to the governor, it is checked by a provision that bills vetoed by him may be passed over his veto by a prescribed majority of the members of both houses. It is held that a bill, after being so passed over the veto, need not be again signed 45 People v. Bowen, 21 N. Y. 517; Solomon v. Commissioners, 41 Ga. 157; State v. Board of Sup'rs of Coahoma Co., 64 Miss. 358, 1 South. 501. Compare Hardee v. Gibbs, 50 Miss. 802; Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165. 48 State v. Whisner, 35 Kan. 271, 10 Pac. 852. 47 Manor Casino v. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S. W. 769. 48 McKenzie v. Moore, 92 Ky. 216, 17 S. W. 483. 49 Porter v. Hughes (Ariz.) 32 Pac. 165. But in Texas, and perhaps some other states, the constitution provides that the governor may object to one or more items of an appropriation bill and approve the rest. See Pickle v. McCall, 86 Tex. 212, 24 S. W. 265. by the presiding officers of the two houses; such passage makes it ipso facto a law.50 Executive Construction of Laws. The executive is bound to give effect to the laws which regulate his duties, and in so doing he must necessarily put a construction upon them.51 But a mere ministerial officer cannot be allowed to decide upon the validity of a law, and thus exempt himself from responsibility for disobedience to the command of a peremptory mandamus, his disobedience to the law being the cause of his inability to obey the command of the court.52 State Governors under the Federal Constitution. The constitutional functions of the governor of a state are regulated to some extent by the constitution of the United States, and chiefly in relation to matters concerning the intercourse of the states with each other, and to the representation of the state in congress. Thus, by the fourth article of the constitution, a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. Again, the United States is bound to protect each state against domestic violence, when application for federal aid is made by the legislature. But when the legislature cannot be convened, the executive of the state may call for such assistance. All executive officers of the several states are required to be bound by oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States. When vacancies happen in the representation of any state in congress, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. And if vacancies happen in the senate, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of the state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies. 50 City of Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267. 51 U. S. v. Lytle, 5 McLean, 9, Fed. Cas. No. 15,652; State v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373. 52 People v. Salomon, 54 Ill. 39. CHAPTER XII. JUDICIAL POWERS IN THE STATES. 126. System of Courts. 127. Constitutional Courts. 128. Statutory Courts. 129-130. Judges. 131-133. Jurisdiction. 134. Process and Procedure. SYSTEM OF COURTS. 126. The judicial power of each state is vested in a system of courts, comprising, generally, three classes (a) A court of last resort, possessing supreme appel late jurisdiction. (b) A number of courts of equal and co-ordinate authority, each within its territorial limits, possessing general original jurisdiction, civil and criminal. (c) Inferior courts, held by justices of the peace or police magistrates, possessing jurisdiction of minor civil causes and petty criminal offenses. The system of courts, in respect to its details, varies very greatly in the different states, but in its main features there is a marked similarity of plan. The general design is to establish one court of last resort, which shall have final appellate jurisdiction over all the rest, and a series of inferior courts, territorially distributed throughout the state, possessing general original jurisdiction, civil and criminal, together with certain courts of greatly restricted powers, and usually proceeding without a jury, which are intended for the trial and determination of minor causes. The court of last resort is sometimes called the "supreme" court, sometimes the "court of ap peals," sometimes the "court of errors and appeals," and there are some other variations of these names. This court, as a rule, is wested with very narrow original jurisdiction, but with the ultimate |