were already dying of starvation. Repeated sorties having proved futile, the officials implored the assistance of the foreign war ships to raise the siege. Tewfik Pasha, the new military Governor of the island, arrived in Canea on Feb. 28. The international fleet took measures, in the first place, to relieve as soon as possible the beleaguered Mussulman populations in the interior, and then to prevent or to localize the armed conflicts between the Turkish Bashi-bazouks and the Cretan insurgents. The insurgent leaders had little or no control over a large number of their followers, whose object was plunder, and who were encouraged in their depredations by the Greek agitators scattered all over the country. A large proportion of the insurgent forces consisted of such marauders, bent on exterminating the Moslem Cretans and appropriating their property, over whom no restraining power could be exercised by the Cretan leaders, while the Greeks had no wish to restrain them. The power of the Turkish authorities over the Bashi-bazouks was much greater, and the officials were held accountable for the misdeeds of the latter, while the Greeks disclaimed responsibility for the acts of the insurgents altogether, and the insurgent chiefs stated their inability to control the rougher part of their forces. Every man and boy on the island was provided with arms. The Greek regulars assisted and directed the insurgents in all their military operations, both with advice and leadership. The admirals insisted that nothing could be accomplished toward restoring order and tranquillity on the island until the Greek forces were withdrawn. While they remained it was impossible to get the self-government offered to the Cretans by the powers to the knowledge of the native inhabitants of the island. The admirals on Feb. 28 issued a proclamation declaring their purpose to oppose any hostile acts by Greeks, Turks, or Cretans by having war ships at any point where disturbances might occur. War ships were sent to relieve the beleaguered garrisons at Selino and to bring off the refugees. The insurgents in March captured Fort Stavaros, commanding the village of Cadano, or Kandamos. The garrison and refugees numbered 3,700 souls, and these would all have been massacred had not Col. Vassos induced the insurgents to allow their departure.

Ultimatum of the Powers.-The admirals informed their respective governments that anarchy was increasing, and that they could not answer for the avoidance of conflicts unless they were authorized to prevent the landing of all supplies, and unless the powers obtained from Greece the recall of her troops and fleet. Col. Vassos withdrew his troops from Platania and marched into the interior. The Boule, on Feb. 23, passed the following resolution: "The Greek Chamber, interpreting Panhellenic sentiment and opinion, expresses, in behalf of the sacred rights of freedom and Hellenism in Crete, its deep grief at the unfortunate occurrence of the bombardment of the valiant champions of liberty in Crete by the combined fleet of Christian and civilized Europe." The King of Greece addressed a message to the army saying that in the present critical circumstances he relied on the aid of the nation, the officers, and the army in general, and on no foreign power. On the same day Capt. Tritakis left the Piræus with another band of volunteers for Crete. A force of 600 Greek troops with guns and ammunition had already landed at Chersonesus, in the province of Candia. M. Delyannis made a statement in the Chamber to the effect that, whether the Porte were prevented by the powers from sending re-enforcements or persisted in sending them, the Greek Government had fully decided on the measures to be taken, and would execute them promptly and decisively. On the departure

of the torpedo boats the Greek Government addressed a note to the powers declaring that Greece could not remain a mere spectator of events in Crete, not only from a sense of her duty toward the Christian population of the island, but also by reason of the sentiments she entertains for people of the same race and religion; nor could she remain indifferent when Crete demanded a union with the mother country. The Greek Chamber voted money for the relief of the Cretan refugees, of whom 8,000 had already arrived at the Piræus, many of them in a destitute condition. The English and German cabinets, the two most divergent in their views, consulted as to a collective note conveying an ultimatum to Greece and Turkey. The British Government, on Feb. 25, telegraphed to all the capitals a declaration of the policy it intended to pursue, which was that the establishment of administrative autonomy in Crete was necessary to the termination of the international occupation of the island; that, subject to such system of autonomy, Crete ought to remain a portion of the Turkish Empire; that the governments of Greece and Turkey ought to be informed of this resolution; and that, if either Turkey or Greece persisted in a refusal when required to withdraw her naval and military forces, the powers should impose their decision by force. The Greek forces were to be required to withdraw at once, and the Turkish forces as soon as the new organization got into working order. The settlement now outlined by Lord Salisbury was a plan that had been propounded some time before by Count Muravieff, the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to which Great Britain was the last to give adhesion, Germany having agreed to it at once without reserve, and Austria and France having been the next to accept the proposal. King Georgios and his Cabinet proclaimed their resolve to maintain their present policy, declaring that it was impossible for them to recall their troops from Crete. The popular feeling in Greece was so strong in favor of resisting at all costs the demand of the powers for the evacuation of Crete that the King could not run counter to it without losing his throne. The Greek populace looked upon Crete as already Greek territory, and would not hear of withdrawing the army in Crete, deeming that, if the powers were even unanimously in earnest in making such a demand, Greece had the means of bringing about a general conflagration by making war on the Macedonian frontier, which would result in the advancement of the Hellenic idea and the enlargement of the area and power of the kingdom. The insurgents at Akrotiri sent an answer to the admirals' note, declaring that union with Greece was the only solution that would give definite peace to the island, that autonomy would satisfy neither side, and that Turkish rule was now utterly out of the question. They also made an appeal to the Christian nations of Europe, protesting against the degrading spectacle of Christian fleets endeavoring to suppress the struggle of a Christian nation for liberty when the whole matter could be settled in less than a week by the Greek forces.

The ultimatum of the concert of Europe was presented to Greece on March 2 in the following identical note to M. Skouzes from the Austro-Hungarian, English, French, German, Italian, and Russian representatives:

"I have been instructed by my Government to inform your Excellency that the great powers have agreed upon a common course of action with the object of putting an end to a situation which it did not rest with them to prevent, but the prolongation of which would be calculated to compromise seriously the peace of Europe.

"With this view the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and

Russia have come to an agreement on the two following points:

"1. Crete can in no case, in the present circumstances, be annexed to Greece.

"2. In view of the delays caused by Turkey in the application of the reforms agreed upon in concert with the powers, which now make it impossible to adapt those reforms to a changed condition of affairs, the powers are resolved, while maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to endow Crete with an absolutely effective autonomous administration, intended to secure to it a separate Government, under the high suzerainty of the Sultan.

"The cabinets are convinced that these views can only be realized by the withdrawal of the Greek ships and troops now in the waters and on the territory of the island which is occupied by the powers. We accordingly confidently expect this decision from the wisdom of his Majesty's Government, which can not wish to persist in a course opposed to the decision of the powers, who are determined to carry out an early pacification, which is as necessary for Crete as it is for the maintenance of general peace.

"I will not, however, conceal from your Excellency that I am instructed to warn you that, in case of a refusal of the royal Government, the great powers have arrived at the irrevocable decision not to shrink from any measure of compulsion if, on the expiration of six days, the recall of the Greek ships and troops from Crete has not been effected." A collective note of the same date presented to the Porte announced the decision against Greek annexation and in favor of an autonomous administration, or régime, at which the great powers had arrived, stating that, animated by the desire to assure the maintenance of peace and to see the integrity of the Ottoman Empire respected, they had sought for the means of ending the disorders that have led to their armed intervention in Crete, as well as of putting an end to the presence of the Greek forces in the island, but now recognized that, in consequence of the delay in applying them, the reforms contemplated in the arrangement of Aug. 25, 1896, no longer correspond to the requirements of the situation. A further collective note, dated March 5, notified the Porte that, as the autonomy to be established in Crete implied the progressive reduction of the Ottoman forces, it would be necessary as soon as the island was evacuated by the Hellenic troops to take measures for the concentration of the imperial troops in the fortified places occupied by European detachments.

"In view of the extraordinary gravity of the results that will follow, his Majesty's Government considers it to be its duty to submit to the powers its opinion of the measures decided upon, an opinion which is the result of long experience and a profound acquaintance with the situation in Crete. Impressed by the sentiments that animate the powers, and their solicitude for general peace, the Greek Government will not fail in this duty, since Greece also ardently desires to contribute to the maintenance of peace, and to save from utter ruin the population of an island put to so severe a trial and so often decimated.

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"We believe that the new régime of autonomy adopted by the powers unhappily can not correspond to the noble intentions that inspired it, and that it will suffer the fate of the different administrative systems which at various times and without success have been tried in Crete.

"This is not the first time that Crete finds herself in a state of insurrection. In recent times on more than six occasions the horrors of anarchy have shaken and imperiled her existence.

"If, then, the new régime with which it is proposed to endow her is not calculated to re-establish order in a definitive manner, the Greek Government can not doubt the impossibility of putting an end by means of it to the present state of revolution. Anarchy will continue to ravage the country with fire and sword in its hands. Blind fanaticism will continue its destructive work of exterminating a people which assuredly do not deserve such a fate.

"Before such a prospect our responsibility would be enormous if we did not most earnestly urge the powers not to insist upon the scheme of autonomy proposed, but rather to restore to Crete what she already had at the time of the enfranchisement of the other provinces which form the Kingdom of Greece, and to lead her back to Greece, to which she had belonged since Capodistrias was President.

"In the presence of the recent scenes of massacre. pillage, and conflagration in Canea, in the presence of the frightful anguish which the inhabitants of Crete have suffered, exposed, as they have been, to massacre by the boundless fury of the Mussulman population, who prevented the departure of Christian families for Greece, which has always been a providential refuge for all these miserable beings. our whole country was torn with remorse for the responsibility it assumed last year in inducing the Cretans to lay down their arms. The misfortunes that resulted forbid us to undertake once more such a task, and if we had attempted it our voice would certainly have been feeble. Its echo would not have reached the Cretan people.

"It being the case, therefore, that a new régime of autonomy could not fulfill the noble aim of the powers, it is obvious what would be the situation of the unhappy island from to-day until the estab lishment of this régime.

"If the powers believe it to be their duty to persevere in their resolutions, with the above views, and in the name of humanity, as well as in the in

terest of the island, the pacification of which is the unique object of the solicitude of the powers, we do not hesitate to appeal to them on the subject of the other measures namely, the recall of our military forces. Indeed, if, because of the presence of the united squadrons in Cretan waters and in the conviction that these squadrons will not permit Turkish troops to debark on the island, the presence also of all the ships of the Greek fleet off Crete is judged to be unnecessary, the presence of the Greek army on the island is nevertheless shown to be desirable alike from sentiments of humanity and in the interests of the definitive re-establishment of order.

"Our duty specially forbids us to abandon the Cretan people to the mercy of Mussulman fanaticism and the Turkish army, which at all times has deliberately and intentionally participated in the aggressive acts of the populace against the Christians. Above all, if our troops on the island, who are worthy of all the confidence of the powers, had received a mandate to pacify the country, their desires and intentions would have received promptly the most perfect satisfaction. It would be then, after the re-establishment of order, that it would be possible to learn the desires, freely expressed, of the Cretan people for a decision as to their fate. "The sorrows which have recurred regularly in Crete for many decades past not only do not occur without profoundly agitating the Hellenic people, but they also interrupt social activity, and gravely disturb the economy and finances of the state. Even if we admit that it would be possible to forget for an instant that we share the common religion of the Cretan people, that we are of the same race and bound by ties of blood, we could not in silence allow the powers to assume that the Greek state is able any longer to resist such shocks.

"For this reason we appeal to the generous sentiments animating the powers, and beg them to permit the Cretan people themselves to declare how they desire to be governed."

The Greek envoys abroad were instructed to inform the European governments that Greece was prepared to recognize the temporary suzerainty of the Sultan, to withdraw her fleet completely, and to place the Greek army in command of any military representative of the powers, senior in rank to Col. Vassos, for the purpose of restoring order in the island, if the powers would agree to leave ultimately the decision as to the fate of Crete in the hands of the people.

Blockade of the Coast.-While England, France, and Italy were disposed to regard the Greek note as leaving an opening for further discussion, the governments of the three emperors insisted on applying coercive measures at once. The attitude of the Greek Government made it certain that a blockade of the Piræus would precipitate rather than avert hostilities on the Macedonian frontier. The powers decided to restrict their action for the present to blockading the coast of Crete, and landing troops for the purpose of pacifying the island and preparing the way for the establishment of autonomous institutions. The blockade was announced to begin on March 21. Before that date supplies were hurried in to the Greek troops on the island, which took up position in Sphakia. Notice was given to Greece to withdraw her war ships. A Greek schooner with munitions of war and volunteers on board was sunk by an Austrian gunboat before the blockade began. The foreign admirals issued a proclamation announcing the conditions under which autonomy would be granted, promising the adoption of measures to regulate the workings of complete autonomy, and guaranteeing to every person, of whatever race

or religion, perfect liberty and security of property. They appealed to both parties to lay down their arms, saying that the powers counted on the cooperation of Christians and Moslems alike to aid in the task that promised order and prosperity. Relief of the Mohammedan Garrisons.-The foreign admirals decided to proclaim the protection of the districts of Selino and Hierapetra. The flags of the powers were hoisted in Selino, but there was danger that the Turkish garrison and the Mohammedan inhabitants would be massacred. The Christians were reported to be exterminating Moslems wherever they went. At Heraklion 60 Moslems were killed in a fight near the gates of the town. The foreign commanders expelled a number of Greek subjects found in the districts under their control, and against this the Greek Government protested. Col. Vassos agreed to rescue Mussulmans at Selino and other places, if they laid down their arms and surrendered as prisoners to be taken to Greece on Greek war ships. The Greek vice-consul was willing to go to Candano to intercede for the captives, if allowed to proceed thither in a Greek war ship. The foreign ships landed 500 men at Selino on March 6, after having negotiated for a long time with the Greek Admiral Reineck, Col. Vassos, and the Greek vice-consul, and only received evasive answers to their demands, while the Greek admiral protested against the obstacles placed by Europe in the way of his action, and Col. Vassos replied that he had no authority over the insurgents. On March 6 the Greek fleet, after receiving re-enforcements, sailed away from Canea. The siege of Candano lasted thirty-five days, during half of which time the place was under constant fire. The place was relieved by a force of 655 European marines with 4 guns, who protected the rescued people on the march to Selino, but was not large enough to prevent many of them from being attacked and plundered by the horde of 7.000 Cretan insurgents surrounding the refugees. The town had surrendered before the arrival of the foreign detachment, and the Moslems narrowly escaped massacre, which was averted by the efforts of Col. Vassos and some of the insurgent leaders. armistice secured by the intervention of the consuls was declared ended by the insurgents on March 8, and an attack was made on Heraklion. Fighting was renewed on March 9 also in the vicinity of Canea, where the Turkish troops and war ships were allowed to fire upon the insurgents. On the same date the leader Korakas attacked Hierapetra. The Greek vice-consul, Baraklis, was expelled from the island by order of Admiral Canevaro, and this act incensed the Christians. The Selino district was at last cleared of Moslems, of whom 600 soldiers and 2,500 natives were brought away under the supervision of the British consul, Sir Alfred Biliotti. The Mohammedans of Sarakina, which was forced to surrender before Candano, were actually slaughtered by the insurgent Cretans. Kisamo contained a Turkish garrison, which still held out, though the town was demolished by a bombardment of the insurgents. Conferences between the admirals of the foreign fleets and chiefs of the insurgents revealed the fact that the Greek admiral never had transmitted to the insurgents the message confided to him offering autonomy to the island. Nevertheless, the insurgent leaders declared that only union with Greece would satisfy them.

An

In the blockhouse at Malaxa, an hour's march from Canea, the Turkish garrison still held out. Provisions had been brought on March 7 by a party of 600 men from Canea, which was divided on the return march and the smaller division driven back into Malaxa with fearful loss. On March 24 the insurgents, who had made no impression on the

stone fort with their rifles, battered down its walls with artillery furnished by Col. Vassos and assisted by his officers. The Turks were compelled to evacuate the position, and they would have been annihilated had not the Greek officers interposed to prevent a massacre. When the Greek artillery fired on Malaxa the foreign war ships shelled the insurgents. In the fighting the Turks lost 60 and the insurgents 200 men. The town of Malaxa was afterward occupied by the international forces. Malaxa was one of the fortified places that the foreign admirals had declared in a proclamation to be needed to maintain security and order, and hence must not be fired on; otherwise they would use force against the attackers. The other forts included in the injunction were Kisamo. Suda, Retimo, Candia, and Hierapetra. Several Greek vessels bringing volunteers and munitions from Greece were seized when they attempted to run the blockade. The signatory powers agreed to land 600 soldiers each to restore order in Crete. Notwithstanding the presence of their troops, warfare, rapine, and pillage went on in every direction. The international forces were powerless to preserve order even in the coast towns. The insurgents captured all the positions surrounding Canea except Butsunaria, which was guarded by international troops, lest they cut off the water supply. Christian and Mohammedan refugees were starving in the mountains. Before the end of March the admirals called for, and the powers decided to send, each a further battalion of 600 men. The insurgents shut up in the Akrotiri peninsula begged food from the war ships, but it was denied them. When the insurgents attacked Izzedin fort at Suda, on March 28, the Italian war ships fired upon them. Another determined attack was made on March 30; the foreign ironclads bombarded the attacking force, and finally landed troops to occupy the fortress. On the same day there was fighting at Retimo and Heraklion. In a two days' battle at Spinalonga the Turkish garrison met with a heavy loss, and was finally compelled to flee to an island. A vessel bringing ammunition fell into the hands of the insurgents. A British war ship revictualed the forts at Kisamo after shelling the insurgents, who had nearly undermined the fortifications. At Kisamo the war ships fired 80 shells into the camp of the insurgents because the latter fired upon boats that were taking Mohammedan women and children from the fort to the ships.

Withdrawal of the Greek Troops.-The Russian consul had several interviews with the insurgent chiefs, who emphatically refused to accept autonomy. Later the British, Austrian, and Russian admirals met by appointment near Candia a large delegation of insurgents, but their spokesmen were Greeks, who declared that the Cretans would have annexation or death, and wanted to turn out all Turks and Moslems. The Christians had already taken possession of much Moslem property in the country districts, and hoped, under Greek auspices, to acquire the property of the Moslems in the towns also. The foreign occupation at Canea embraced an area of 25 square miles, within which limit food was furnished to all inhabitants in need of it. The area was guarded by 10 companies of Turkish regulars and 8 companies of irregulars, which were re-enforced from the city whenever engaged. The foreign admirals were strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, of whose behavior they spoke in the highest terms, Admiral Harris praising them as second to no European troops in discipline; for if they were withdrawn, the European troops would have to act as supports for the Bashi-bazouks, liable to be drawn into their skirmishes, and if the latter were also withdrawn then the international

forces would be likely to come into conflict with the insurgents and would have besides to restrain and control the large Moslem population behind them, as well as the disbanded irregulars.

On April 3 a collision occurred between the insurgents at Akrotiri and a party of 400 Bashi-bazouks that had stolen out of Canea, and the latter, only a part of them being armed, lost 50 dead and wounded. On their return they were disarmed by the international troops. The insurgents had received permission to go from Akrotiri into the interior of the island, and the purpose of the Bashibazouks, most of whom were refugees from Candano and Selino that had obtained arms surreptitiously, was to block their passage. The same class continued to pillage the environs of Canea. There was little food in the island except in the camp of Col. Vassos, which was provisioned for three months. The Mohammedans on the seacoast suffered more severely than the Christians in the interior. Steamers bound for Crete with provisions for the foreign fleet and the Turkish troops were boarded at the Piræus by armed Cretans and their friends, who threw the cargoes overboard.

When war was begun in Thessaly the Greek Government sent a note to the powers protesting that, inasmuch as Greece and Turkey were at war, a continuance of the blockade was a violation of neutrality. The Governor of the island on April 19 issued a manifesto notifying the Greeks to leave Crete within fifteen days, in accordance with the orders of the Porte banishing all Greeks from Ottoman territory. The environs of Heraklion were in April the scene of almost daily fighting between the small garrison of Turkish troops and 5,000 insurgents, with Greek troops among them. When reverses overtook the Greek army in Thessaly the Hellenic Government would gladly have withdrawn from the Cretan adventure if Col. Vassos and others of the ablest officers of the army who were shut up in Crete could have been at home. In the early part of May Col. Vassos made a request of the foreign admirals that the sea and coast blockade be sufficiently relaxed to enable him to embark his troops safely. This the admirals refused to do. They offered to allow the Greek troops to receive supplies of food, a concession that they had already offered to the insurgents. Soon afterward the Greek Government approached the powers with a view of obtaining their mediation. The representatives of the powers advised the Hellenic Government to withdraw the Greek forces from Crete as an inducement to the powers to offer their mediation. According to this advice the Hellenic Government asked for the free passage of a ship to take the troops back to the Piræus. Col. Vassos had already departed secretly, and others were allowed to leave in small parties before the permission was given formally. The Cretans did not appear dismayed by the loss of Col. Vassos and the Greek volunteers, but continued to attack the Turkish outposts. The international troops, by arrangement with Col. Vassos, had some time before considerably extended their zone of occupation. The six powers made on May 11 the offer of mediation with a view to obtain an armistice and smooth the difficulties existing between Greece and Turkey, imposing the condition that the Hellenic Government should declare that it would proceed to recall its troops from Crete, adhere formally to autonomy for Crete, and accept unreservedly the counsel that the powers should give in the interest of peace. The Greek Government accepted all these conditions. The troops began to leave Crete immediately on three Greek steamers which had been captured during the blockade and were released for the purpose of taking the troops back to Greece. Col. Staikos, the Greek com

mander, was incredulous, and refused to embark until he received orders direct from Athens. The Cretans were dismayed, and were at first inclined to resist the embarkation of the Greek troops. Their political excitement soon began to die out when they realized the futility of hoping for annexation. Restoration of Order.-The departure of the Greek forces led to an increase of lawlessness on the part of both Christians and Mussulmans. The admirals were not willing yet to have the Turkish garrison withdrawn, as they had not the force to prevent the massacre that would follow, and moreover did not wish the European troops to come into conflict with the insurgents. In Heraklion there were 1,500 European troops holding the fortifications, while 3,500 Turkish troops formed the military cordon and guarded the 50,000 Mohammedans in the city against the 60,000 armed insurgents who invested the place and added to the sufferings of the half-famished Moslem peasants huddled in the town by frequently cutting off the water supply. Of 107,000 Mohammedans in the island, 67,000 were in receipt of relief from the Sultan.

Many times shots were fired at foreign officers. The insurgents on recommendations from their Greek friends refused to accept autonomy except on condition that the Turkish troops be previously withdrawn. A policy of firm conciliation was demanded by the situation in order to undo the mischief wrought by the intrigues of the Greek patriots. The Greek consul, army officers, and naval officers had fostered the idea of an insurrection in favor of replacing the Turkish by the Greek Government, and the international naval force, by permitting munitions of war to be landed under their eyes and by taking no effective steps to check the actions of Col. Vassos's forces inland, gave countenance to the assertions of the Greek officers that the powers, in spite of protocols and proclamations to the contrary, would suffer the revolution to be consummated. The Cretans, both Christian and Mussulman, unsupplied with any information but what they received through the Greeks, had the evidence of their own eyes as to the presence of the Greek troops, Greek guns, and Greek flags successfully attacking Mussulman positions and sacking, burning, and pillaging the villages of the Mohammedans. Hence the prospects of a peaceful settlement that seemed fair when the international fleets appeared in overwhelming force in the latter part of February, at which time the chief desire of all parties except the Greeks appeared to Admiral Harris to be for peace and good government, soon were lost, and the peace party disappeared in the background. The Christians as a whole had no sentimental desire for Greek rule; they wanted, above all, a government that would maintain law and order among the various factions. With the progress of anarchy and demoralization the Christian and Mohammedan combatants alike grew in love with the excitement of battle without much danger to life and with the pleasures of idleness, so that it would take long years before many of them would care to return to agricultural toil. The Cretan Moslems, who had lost most and had most to lose by revolution, professed themselves ready to accept any form of autonomy or government by the great powers, but not Greek rule, which they declared they would resist to death, if necessary. The rougher element of that party became troublesome after the departure of the Greek troops, the last of which were taken away by Col. Staikos on May 23. There were 35.000 Mohammedan refugees crowded into Heraklion, many of whom, lacking the necessaries of life or fodder for their cattle, made raids into neighboring districts, which resulted in conflicts with armed bands of Christians. On May 29 armed

bands of Mohammedans from Heraklion burned the village of Kalivia and killed 14 persons. This raid exasperated the Christians, who had petitioned Col. Chermside, commanding the British and Italian troops in Candia, to restrain the Mohammedans from trespassing beyond the neutral zone established round Candia, which they themselves undertook to respect. They could not be convinced that the Ottoman authorities and the international troops occupying Candia did not connive at the sortie. Some persons who were arrested in connection with the raid were forcibly rescued by their coreligionists of Heraklion, after which the other prisoners were sent to Canea. The active insurgents were still bent on continuing the struggle for union with Greece. A provisional government was proclaimed at Alikianu under the presidency of a prominent chief, Hadji Michali, who said that he had been intrusted by the departing representatives of Greece on their embarkation at Platania with the task of maintaining order and security. He thanked the natives of the province of Kydonia for their orderly and willing submission to Greek authority. The first measures that he proposed to adopt were the enrollment of a strong body for the defense of the positions between Malaxa and Platania and the constitution of a communal police, whose special care would be the protection of the Mohammedan property that had escaped pillage or destruction. He recommended the convocation of a general assembly to consider the situation and adopt such further measures as might be necessary. In a second proclamation he appealed to the Christians to show moderation and discipline by respecting and protecting the property of the Mohammedans and by living at peace with them, declaring that the struggle entered upon by the Cretans was not directed against their Mohammedan brothers, but against an incapable and unworthy government. The proclamations were carefully worded so as to avoid the least reference to the questions of autonomy or annexation. The Cretan committee at Athens again began to dispatch volunteers to Crete. One band was captured with a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition on board a vessel. Vessels bringing back islanders to their Homes were permitted to land these, but no munitions. Some of the most influential insurgents who had left the island to fight as volunteers in the Greek army wrote to urge their brother Cretans to submit to the inevitable and accept an autonomous constitution, warning them against the policy of the Cretan committee in Greece, which would prefer that Crete should remain under the Turkish pashas rather than that it should be granted autonomy under international guarantees. While the districts of Canea and Retimo were kept in order by the international forces, disturbances continued to occur at Candia, where the Turkish garrison was powerless in the face of the large Mohammedan population, which was compelled to go outside of the protected zone to obtain pasture for the cattle, and thereby came into constant conflict with the insurgents. A series of raids culminated on June 26 in an attack on the village of Kani Kasteli by 1.000 Bashi-bazouks, who killed more than 25 Christian villagers and returned laden with booty, which was openly sold at auction in the town. The foreign garrison was insufficient to protect Christian houses in the town from plunder by this lawless Mohammedan element. The Ottoman authorities were entirely impotent. The treasury was empty, no taxes having been collected for more than a year. The gendarmerie, who had received no pay for that length of time, were confronted with starvation and threatened to mutiny. In Canea Mohammedans who had taken possession of Christian houses