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tation of the ratio of 15 to 1 while the actual market ratio was 35 to 1, he contended, would shatter for a time at least the export trade of India, would gravely affect the relations between the state as landlord and the cultivating classes, would diminish the receipts from the state railways, and would give a shock to commercial and social relations by a sudden increase in the value of the rupee from 16d. to 23d., to be followed in all probability, if the anticipations of the bimetallists were not realized, by as rapid a fall, probably to 9d. or even lower. The whole cost and risk of the experiment would be substantially borne by India alone, as France and the United States have a certain stock of gold on which they can rely if the new system were to break down, whereas India, reduced to a monometallic silver basis, would be unable to help herself. Moreover, the change in prices, to which France and the United States look with hope, would be injurious to Indian interests. India had to face her own difficulties, and saw her way through them after twenty years of monetary disturbances, if her efforts are not hampered by extraneous interference. The measures adopted to introduce a gold standard in India were at length approaching final success; the defects urged against the transition system could therefore be waived and the policy of linking India financially with Great Britain, the country to which she was most closely bound, by commercial as well as political ties, ought not to be weakened. An international agreement for the adoption of bimetallism such as was contemplated by the Indian Government in 1892 was not in question. The project of a conference put forward by the American envoys extended only to a compact which France and the United States were provisionally willing to enter into in consideration that the Indian mints were opened and that some assistance was given in other ways. This the Indian Government considered too narrow a basis, even from the point of view of the bimetallists, affording no security for the permanence of the new arrangement in the two contracting countries, which might be upset by such incidents as an effort to retain gold when other nations pour in silver or by the temporary adoption of a paper currency. That help would be given by a limited addition to the use of silver by countries outside the agreement was not considered worth counting upon, as it would have scarcely an appreciable influence in raising the gold price of the cheaper metal. The Indian Council recorded as its unanimous and decided opinion that it would be most unwise to reopen the mints as part of the proposed arrangement, especially at a time when India was to all appearance approaching the attainment of stability of exchange by the operation of its own isolated and independent action. Lord Salisbury, on Oct. 19, in an identic note to the United States and French ambassadors, indorsed this conclusion, pointing out that the Government of India could hardly be expected to give up the policy which for four years it had been endeavoring to make effective in the absence of substantial security that the system to be substituted for it was practically certain to be stable. If, owing to the great divergence between the proposed ratio and the present gold price of silver or to any other cause, the legal ratio were not maintained the position of silver might be worse than before and the financial embarrassments of India greater than any with which it had as yet had to contend. Even were these arguments less strong than they appear, the Government of India could hardly be compelled to make a second important change in Indian currency within so short a time as four years at a time of exceptional difficulty and suffering. In these circumstances the British Government was unable to accept the first proposal of the United States rep

resentatives, and as this was, in its opinion, and also in that of the representatives of the United States and France, by far the most important contribution which could be made by the British Empire toward any international agreement, it did not feel it to be necessary to discuss the other proposals at present. The British Government was desirous to ascertain how far the views of the American and French governments were modified by the decision arrived at and whether they desired to proceed further with the negotiations.

The Supreme Court.-The result of the work of the United States Supreme Court for the past year is given below. The number of cases on the docket for the term beginning in October, 1896, was 834. Of these 447 were disposed of during the term. The number actually considered by the court was 338. Among the cases of general interest decided were the following:

South Carolina Dispensary Cases.-The cases of Scott vs. Donald and Gardner vs. Donald, decided Jan. 18, 1897, involved the validity of the State dispensary law so far as it relates to the seizure of liquors imported into the State by private citizens for their own consumption. The court, in an elaborate opinion, declared that the provisions of the law forbidding the importation of such liquors by any one except certain State officials appointed under the act was in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. This decision does not affect the merits of the law as a whole, but applies to the features that bear on interstate commerce. Justice Brown delivered a dissenting opinion, holding that the act of Congress of Aug. 8, 1890, declaring that intoxicating liquors transported into any State and remaining there for sale or consumption should be subject to the operation of the laws of the State, applied, and permitted the traffic to be regulated in such manner as the several States shall deem best for the public interest.

The Neutrality Act.-The United States vs. the steamer "Three Friends" was decided March 1, 1897. The steamer "Three Friends" attempted to land arms and ammunition on the island of Cuba in aid of the insurgent forces, and was seized as forfeited to the United States under the neutrality act. The United States district court of Florida decided that the Cuban insurgents were not a people, state, district, or colony within the meaning of act, and that the steamer was not liable to seizure. The opinion delivered by Chief-Justice Fuller construed the neutrality act and held the seizure to have been legal, and the cause was remanded with instructions to resume custody of the vessel. The case illustrates the distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political revolt; between recognition of the existence of war in a material sense and war in a legal sense. Although the political department of the Government had not recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent power engaged in hostility with Spain, it had recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare. Justice Harlan dissented.

Lotteries.-In Douglass vs. Kentucky, decided Nov. 29, 1897, it was held that a lottery grant by a State is not a contract within the meaning of the Constitution.

The Bell Telephone Case.-United States vs. the American Bell Telephone Company et al. was decided May 10, 1897. This suit was brought to cancel a patent issued to the company, as assignee of Emile Berliner, the alleged inventor, in 1891. The cancellation of the patent was sought on the ground that the delay of thirteen years in the Patent Office was fraudulent and through the fault of the telephone company, and that a patent for the same invention had been issued in 1880. The decision

affirmed the decree of the court below and was adverse to the contention of the Government. Its effect is to continue the control of the telephone by the Bell Company for seventeen years from the date of the patent granted in 1891. Justice Harlan dissented, but delivered no opinion.

The Antitrust Decision.-A decision was rendered in United States vs. the Trans-Missouri Freight Association, March 22, 1897. The case arose under the act of July 2, 1890, commonly called the "Sherman antitrust law." The TransMissouri Freight Association consisted of 18 railways west of the Missouri river. A suit was brought in the district of Kansas to enjoin a contract and combination among these companies to maintain rates of freight. The case was decided against the United States in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court sustained the Government's position and held that the law in question applied to common carriers by rail, and that the contract between the members of the association was a restraint of interstate trade and commerce within the meaning of the act. Justices White, Field, Gray, and Shiras dissented, holding that the subject was covered by the interstate commerce act, and that reasonable contracts, although they in some measure restrain trade, are not within the meaning of the antitrust act.

state Commerce Commission, the Court said: "We are unable to suppose that Congress intended to forbid common carriers, in cases where the circumstances and conditions are substantially dissimilar, from making different rates until and unless the commission shall authorize them to do so." Justice Harlan dissented, remarking that the opinion went far toward defeating the object of the interstate commerce law.

In the Interstate Commerce Commission vs. the Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway Company the specific charge in this case was that the railroad company furnished cartage free to merchants of Grand Rapids, and did not furnish similar service to the merchants of Ionia, 33 miles distant. The court held that the act has in view only the transportation of passengers and property by rail, and that when the passengers and property reached and were discharged from the cars at the company's station at Grand Rapids for the same charges as those received for similar service at Ionia, the duties cast upon the company were fulfilled and satisfied. The subsequent history would not concern the Interstate Commerce Commission.

State Laws affecting Railroads.-In St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company vs. Mathews, decided Jan. 4, 1897, the Court sustained the constitutionality of a Missouri statute which gives property owners the right to recover damages from railroad corporations for destruction of property caused by fire communicated from locomotives.

In New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company vs. New York, decided March 1, 1897, the court sustained the constitutionality of the statute of New York passed June 18, 1887, regulating the heating of steam passenger cars, and de

in the absence of national legislation on the subject,
to forbid under penalties the heating of passenger
cars in that State by stoves kept inside the cars or
suspended therefrom, although such cars may be
employed in interstate commerce.
The power of
Congress to regulate commerce among the States
does not impair the authority of the States to make
regulations providing for the public safety.

Functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission defined. On May 24, 1897, an important decision was rendered in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission vs. The Cincinnati and New Orleans Railroad Company, construing the act to regulate commerce, approved Feb. 4, 1887, which created the Interstate Commerce Commission. The opinion was rendered by Justice Brewer. The gist of it is found in the following extract: "Un-clared that it was clearly competent for the State, der the interstate commerce act the commission has no power to prescribe the tariff rates which shall control in the future, and therefore can not invoke a judgment in mandamus from the courts to enforce any such tariff by it prescribed." Justice Brewer asked, "Has the commission no functions to perform in respect to matter of rates?" Replying to his question, he said: “Unquestionably it has, and most important duties in respect to this matter. It is charged with the general duty of inquiring as to the management of the business of railroad companies, and has the right to compel full and complete information as to the manner in which such companies are transacting their busiAnd with this information it is charged with the duty of seeing that there is no violation of the long-and-short-haul clause, that there is no discrimination between individual shippers, and that nothing is done by rebate or otherwise to give preference to one against another; that no undue preference is given to one place against another, but that in all things that equality of right which is the great purpose of the interstate commerce act shall be secured to shippers." Justice Harlan dissented.

ness.

The Interstate Commerce Commission vs. the Alabama Midland Railway Company et al. was decided Nov. 8, 1897. This was another decision limiting the effectiveness of the interstate commerce law. The case arose from an order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission against the railroads charged with violating the "long-and-shorthaul clause" of the law which forbids railroads charging more for a short haul than for a long one where the circumstances are similar. The commission has held that, when lower rates were to be put in operation, the schedule must first be filed with the commission. This was negatived by the decision. On the question whether railroads can meet water competition without the consent of the Inter

In Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fé Railway Company vs. Ellis, decided Jan. 18, 1897, the court held unconstitutional a law of Texas, passed April 5, 1889, requiring railroads to pay to the successful plaintiff attorney's fees not exceeding $10 in certain actions wherein judgments are recovered against them. This law was held to operate to deprive railroad corporations of the equal protection of the laws, and to be within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. This contest over the question of a small fee established an important precedent. It is also interesting as deciding that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Chief-Justice Fuller and Justices Gray and White dissented.

In Gladson vs. Minnesota, decided April 12, 1897, it was held that a State statute requiring railroad passenger trains to stop at county seats is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State, and does not unconstitutionally interfere with inter

state commerce.

The Ohio Tax Law.-In Adams Express Company vs. Ohio State Auditor, the court, by a vote of 5 to 4, upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio law (the Nichols law) providing for taxation of telegraph, telephone, and express companies, and declared the validity of certain assessments made. The law taxed the corporations on the basis of the value of Ohio's share of the stock. It was claimed that the law was unconstitutional as a restraint upon interstate commerce, and that it was taking property of the citizen without due process of law,

and extending taxation beyond the jurisdiction of the State. Justices White, Field, Harlan, and Brown dissented from the opinion of the majority, and held the law unconstitutional.

a clear exposition of the meaning and scope of the expression "involuntary servitude" contained in the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, particularly with reference to contracts with seamen. It was held that Congress has the power to confer upon justices of the peace of the States the authority to apprehend deserting seamen and return them to their vessels, and that the constitutional provision against involuntary servitude does not apply to contracts of seamanship. Justice Harlan dissented.

The Fourteenth Amendment.-The decision in Allgeyer vs. State of Louisiana held unconstitutional a State statute which had the effect of depriving a citizen of the State of his right to contract outside of the State for insurance on his property in the State. While there is power in a State to regulate the business of a foreign corporation within its borders, the fundamental rights of the citizen can not be interfered with. One of these rights is the right to make contracts. In Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company vs. Chicago, decided March 1, 1897, the court declared the potency of the fourteenth amendment to restrain action by a State through either its legislative, executive, or judicial departments which deprives a party of his property without due compensation. A judgment of a State court, even if authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is wanting in the due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment.

Witnesses before Congressional Committees.-The case of Elverton R. Chapman, decided April 19, 1897, involved the power of the United States Senate to compel witnesses to give testimony before its investigating committees. The court refused the writ of certiorari and habeas corpus asked by Mr. Chapman, a New York broker, who refused to testify before a Senate committee, and was sentenced by the lower court to thirty days' imprisonment and $100 fine. His recusancy was committed in connection with the investigation by the Senate of the alleged Sugar Trust scandal at the time of the tarriff bill in 1894. It was contended that the law under which the conviction was had (section 102, R.S.) was unconstitutional. The court held that the Senate, under its constitutional right to censure and expel members, had the right to investigate any alleged improper conduct of Senators, and could compel witnesses to give testimony. It held that refusal to testify was also an offense against the United States. Congress possessed the constitutional power to enact a statute to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to compel them to make disclosures of evidence to enable the respective bodies to discharge their legitimate functions; and it was to effect this that the act in question was passed; but this act did not constitute a delegation of the power to punish for contempt. As to the allegation that the law was in violation of the fifth amendment of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, the court said "it was quite clear that the contumacious witness is not subjected to jeopardy twice for the same offense, since the same act may be an offense against one jurisdiction and also against another; and indictable statutory offenses may be punished as such while the offenders may likewise be subjected to punishment for the same acts as contempts, the two being capable of stand-gress of July 6, 1886, forfeiting a portion of a land ing together."

The President's Power to remove Officers.-The case of Lewis E. Parsons, Jr., vs. the United States was an appeal from the decision of the Court of Claims. It involved the point whether the President, under the Constitution, has the power to remove before the expiration of his term, an officer appointed, with the consent of the Senate, for a term fixed by law. Parsons was appointed by President Harrison, and confirmed by the Senate, as United States district attorney for the Northern and Middle Districts of Alabama, and the law fixed the term of office at four years. He was removed by President Cleveland before the expiration of his term, but declined to yield possession of his office to the new appointee until an order was issued from the United States circuit court requiring him to surrender the books and papers of the office. He complied with the order, and then brought suit for his fees up to the end of his term of office. The court held that the right of removal was an incident of the right of appointment; and that, although the appointment was with the advice and consent of the Senate, the appointing power was in the President, and, in consequence, the right to remove was his; and that the designation of four years as the term of appointment was not designed to give a term that should in all events last for four years, but should restrict the term to that period, subject to the pleasure of the appointing power.

The Thirteenth Amendment.-The decision in Robertson vs. Baldwin, rendered Jan. 25, 1897, is

Oleomargarine.-In re Kollock, decided March 1, 1897, it was decided that the oleomargarine act of Aug. 2, 1886, is on its face an act for levying taxes, and the matter of designating the marks, brands, and stamps is left to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. This involves no unconstitutional delegation of power.

Forfeiture of Land Grants.-In Atlantic and Pacific Railroad vs. Mingus, decided Feb. 15, 1897, the court sustained the validity of the act of Con

grant. It was held that Congress did not intend, by the statutes under which the company received its grant, to vest the lands absolutely in the company without a right to reacquire them on failure of the company to comply with the conditions. When the United States Government grants public lands upon condition subsequent it has the same right to reenter, on breach of the condition, which a private grantor would have under the same circumstances, which right is to be exercised by legislation.

The case of United States vs. Winona and St. Peter Railroad Company, decided on the same date, involved the construction of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, providing for the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads, and the act of March 2, 1896, which confirmed titles of bona fide purchasers and extended time for bringing suit.

The celebrated land-grant case of the Southern Pacific Railroad vs. United States, decided Oct. 18, 1897, involved nearly 1,000,000 acres of land and indirectly determined the title to more than 3,000,000 acres. The lands in southern California were those granted by Congress in 1866 to aid in the construction of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad. As the railroad was not constructed the grant was forfeited by act of Congress in 1886. The Government's claim was upheld after a litigation which has been pending about ten years.

Several important cases were decided in the court on appeal from the Court of Private Land Claims. One of these, United States vs. Sandoval, in which the opinion was rendered by Chief-Justice Fuller,

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