instant of their creation? True it may be, that modern intolerance is not surpassed by that of ancient times, and for aught we know, that some have been condemned as Pelagians, for denying what Dr. Spring denies, viz. the old doctrine of original sin, and for believing what Dr. Spring believes, viz. that infants commit actual sin at the very instant of their creation. But we have never read nor heard of a condemnatory sentence for mere ignorance for not believing this dogma of Dr. Spring. Among the members of synods, councils and courts ecclesiastic, who have determined the true faith,―among all the writers on didactic and polemic theology, Dr. Spring is the first man who has set forth the personal, actual transgression of known law by new born infants, as an essential article of christian faith, and made the belief of it a term of christian communion.

We are aware that Dr. Spring not only claims that his doctrine is the true orthodox doctrine of depravity-the only "thorough going Calvinism" in opposition to Pelagianism, but that he represents himself as holding substantially the same doctrine with Augustine, as opposed to that of Pelagius. But is this so? Does Dr. Spring in fact hold the doctrine of original sin, as taught by Augustine? So far from it, that he denies Augustine's doctrine of original sin, as directly as Pelagius himself denied it. Augustine's doctrine was the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, in its most absolute form. But Dr. Spring asserts, that he knows of no other sin in the empire of Jehovah but personal, actual sin; the very doctrine of Pelagius respecting the nature of sin. Thus in respect to the thing-the subject matter of this doctrine-Dr. Spring denies all that Augustine affirmed; while in respect to the time when sin commences, he differs as truly and materially from Augustine, as did Pelagius himself.* And yet Dr. Spring would have it believed that he maintains "the thorough-going" orthodoxy of Augustine! Why is this? Will it protect him from the charge of heresy, thus to place himself under cover of Augustine's name, while he denies Augustine's doctrine? May one's orthodoxy pass current, if he will extol Augustine and condemn Pelagius, though his faith accords with that of the latter? An admirable expedient truly? By it, had we not been wanting in wisdom, we might have escaped that load of obloquy which has been so lavishly heaped upon us. On the part of Dr. Spring, we hope this claim of coincidence with Augustine, is merely a proof that he is not well read in dogmatic history.

By these remarks, we do not intend by any means, to call Dr. Spring a Pelagian. But we do say, that if we are Pelagians in denying the old doctrine of original sin as taught by Augustine, and in maintaining that all sin consists in voluntary action, then is Dr. Spring a Pelagian, his pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding.

*

Augustine held that infants are sinner's before they are born.

Nor is it unworthy of notice, that those very opinions, which have brought on us the charge of Pelagianism from Dr. Tyler and others, are the identical opinions of Dr. Spring. Instead then of reprobating us for heresy, he ought to be satisfied to fall under the same condemnation, and to die, if need be, on the same scaffold.

How then, we ask, once more, can Dr. Spring be justified in his denunciation? Is it by the importance of the point at issue? Our error, in the view of Dr. Spring is, that we do not decide that infants begin to sin at the very instant of birth. Let Dr. Spring then tell us the magnitude of our error. He says, "It throws them (infants) out of the economy of redemption. It throws them beyond the reach of the divine influence. It throws them out of the circle of the divine government. It puts them beyond the reach of prayer, and though perfectly innocent consigns them to pain, suffering and death in this world, and beyond the grave makes them-what? and consigns them-whither ?"

The amount of this imposing statement is, that if infants are not sinners at the moment of their creation, they are thrown out of the economy of redemption, so that the great truths of justification and regeneration, the duty of prayer, etc., can have no application to them. We answer in the first place, by asking what if all this be so? What if those of the human race who die in very early infancy, never truly and properly come under the moral government of God in this world? In respect to many of our race, who do come under the moral government of God in the present life, its rich provisions of grace and mercy, through their perversion, only become the occasion of augmenting their guilt and endless ruin. What then if God, to avert these evils from one class of the human race, before they become accountable subjects of his moral government in this world, translates them to another, that they may never partake in the pollution of sin, but wake up there in the beauty of holiness: To Dr. Spring's interrogatory-" makes themwhat? and consigns them-whither ?" he can now discover at least a possible answer. And how can he show, that such a dispensation does not accord with every principle of God's moral gov ernment, and every truth of his word? How can he show, that such a dispensation would not be far better in respect to those who die in early infancy, than one in which they should become sinners, even under an economy of redemption? How does Dr. S. know, or how can he prove, on his principles, that this entire class of human beings are not lost forever? According to his scheme, they all deserve this fearful doom, nor can Dr. Spring show, if his views are right, that it is not actually incurred without one exception. What, we then ask, is there so desirable in being sinners under an economy of redemption? What superior excellence pertains to the scheme which makes every infant at the very instant of his creation, a sinner deserving endless death?

We answer in the second place, that all the difficulties which

according to Dr. Spring, pertain to one class of human beings on our scheme, pertain to another class of human beings on his scheme. Infants, who die before birth, are on his scheme thrown wholly out of the economy of redemption,' without one cheering hope concerning them. Such infants, he admits, commit no sin. To them therefore the great truths concerning justification, regeneration, prayer, etc. can, on his own principles, have no application. How then will Dr. Spring dispose of this class of human beings? Will he say, they are annihilated? But what is the difference between one of these human beings the moment before and the moment after birth, that its annihilation or its immortallity should depend on that event? We know that Dr. Spring says, that "God has breathed into its nostrils the breath of life, and it has become a hiring soul;" i. e. an immortal soul. Unfortunately however for this argument, to prove that an immortal soul is created at this precise moment, it would prove that "every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and every thing that creepeth upon the face of the earth," has an immortal soul. See Gen. i. 30. But says Dr. Spring, they are not children-they are not human beings before birth. We reply, that they are children-they are human beings before birth. The word of God always rcognizes them as human beings-as children before they are born. Vid. Gen. xxv. 22. Rom. ix. 11. et al. The law of Moses recognizes them as human beings; so does the law of the land, and all correct usage of language. We put the question then back to Dr. Spring,-What is the difference between throwing human beings, children out of the economy of redemption, by annihilation, a moment before and a moment after birth? If one of these classes of children is annihilated, why is not the other? If the one is immortal, why is not the other? Let Dr. Spring fairly answer these questions. Let him assign some reason for including one under the economy of redemption, which will not include the other; or for excluding the one which will not also exclude the other.

We answer in the third place, by asking, how Dr. Spring's doctrine relieves this subject of its difficulties? St. Paul decides, that "without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." This is unqualified language; as broad and universal in its import as any which asserts the necessity of justification through the blood of Christ, or of regeneration by the divine Spirit. If any passages of scripture are supposed to assert, that infants cannot inherit eternal life, except as pardoned and renewed sinners, the passage just cited, with many others, asserts with equal explicitness, that they cannot, without faith in God as a rewarder. În view then of the nature of this faith, involving as it does the kowledge of the existence, character, and relations of God, we ask, can infants who are born at one moment and die the next, actually exercise this faith? Will Dr. Spring assert that

they can? If not, then on his own principles, this class of infants are lost forever. Indeed, if they cannot exercise the requisite faith, how can they achieve the equally difficult work of putting off the old man and putting on the new? Is not the change in regeneration the sinner's act; is it not a moral act, involving the knowledge of God, of sin and of holiness? If new-born infants cannot exercise faith in God, how can they love God, or turn from sin to holiness,—how can they be regenerated even through grace, without the requisite knowledge of right and wrong? And if these things are impossible, then let Dr. Spring take up his lamentation over them, as outcasts from God's mercy. It is his own doctrine, that "makes them-what? and consigns them-whither?" If newborn infants are sinners, and cannot believe in God as a rewarder, then as an inspired apostle is true, none of them according to Dr. Spring's principles, can be saved. His scheme of making infants sinners for their own benefit, and to avoid throwing them out of the economy of redemption, throws them into the lake of fire. What peculiar excellence pertains to such a scheme, to commend it to our adoption?

The importance which Dr. Spring claims for his scheme in respect to the duty of prayer, deserves a more particular notice. He maintains, that if infants are not sinners at the moment of birth, "they are beyond the reach of prayer.'-To the heart of parental piety, we know how grateful is this service of faith and hope in behalf of infant offspring; and far be it from us, to diminish the confidence of christian parents in their covenant God, or their expectations from him. What then is the comparative tendency of the two schemes in this respect.

Here it is obvious, from what we have already said, that all the disheartening tendency which Dr. Spring ascribes to our view in respect to new-born infants, belongs to his scheme in respect to children not yet born. Nor can we help asking Dr. Spring, Why all this anxiety to provide some ground of hope for human beings the instant they are born, and yet an equal anxiety to proscribe all supplication for them as human beings, until that moment arrives? Did Dr. Spring never pray for his own children, while they were yet unborn? Why this violence to parental love and piety, denying even humanity to this class of children; and why this attempt to silence the voice of prayer in their behalf, by giving them up, if they die, to hopeless annihilation? Surely there is little to commend such a scheme, either to those christian parents who regard this class of children as already sinful and condemned, or to those who hesitate to admit, that their immortality depends on the

transition of a moment.

But what is the ground on which Dr. Spring's inference as to his New Haven brethren rests? It is simply this, that they do not know that new-born infants are sinners. This is the ground and the sole ground, on which he denies the propriety, on our scheme,

in

of prayer in their behalf. Take it then on Dr. Spring's scheme. Admit that infants become sinners when they are born, or when the soul is united with the body, or when they have attained maturity enough to have a soul,' what sure criteria does Dr. Spring possess of determining the precise instant, when the event thus described takes place, and when of course prayer can be properly offered in their behalf? It is not enough that there is in fact such a point of time. The moment, the very instant must be known, or all the uncertainty, when they become proper subjects of prayer as sinners, exists on Dr. Spring's scheme, which exists on ours. Unless this main point can be settled, we may pray too soon, or may pray too late and the child may die and fail of the grace of God and eternal life, through our incompetence to ascertain the instant in which he begins to siu. But who can suppose that such a question must be decided,—such an instant of time be determined on, to justify our intercessions and our hopes for our new-born offspring? But we deny Dr. Spring's principle altogether. There is no such necessity of fixing the moment when sin commences, as Dr. Spring maintains. Assuming then the immortality of the new-born infant, which Dr. S. admits, is there no real blessing which can be invoked in his behalf, unless we know, that he has in very deed already sinned against God? Suppose he is destined to an early grave, may we not at least ask the blessing of sanctification in his behalf, without deciding, or being able to decide, whether he has already sinned? Can God confer no blessing worth the asking on any of his creatures, except on those who by actual sin, have incurred his wrath? Is it really to be desired is it what every pious parent must even wish and pray for,-that the child should sin and fall under condemnation, that a fit theme of supplication in its behalf, may be furnished? Or may we yield this object of our tender regard to the disposal of our heavenly Father, with the delightful anticipation of an answer to our prayer, that he may hereafter awake in the purity and joys of a glorified spirit? Or, suppose he is to live in this world, and is soon to commence his accountable existence in sin, still can we neither ask, nor God confer, any real blessing on this object of our love, unless we can first decide that he has already sinned? Do the prayers of christian parents for their new-born offspring, invariably and without exception proceed on this assumption, that the latter have knowingly sinned against God? Do they in fact believe that a child the moment after birth is qualified, by the knowledge of sin and of duty, to exercise repentance? True it is, we cannot pray for the instantaneous conversion of a child from sin to holiness, unless we assume, that he has sinned. But in view of the facts acknowledged on all hands, that he will soon become a sinner, and perish forever without the grace of conversion, may we not supplicate this blessing? Can we ask for no blessings from the author of all good, except such as we know can be instantaneously conferred? May we never ask for the rain of heaven,