it other is confessedly a good thing) than to say, that he regards former as wholly an evil. If then God regards sin, as he must cording to Dr. Tyler, as wholly an evil, he must so regard it en compared with holiness in its stead. But to say that God gards sin as wholly an evil, in every instance, when compared th holiness, is to say, that he does not in any instance, prefer sin holiness. Indeed, I know of no stronger or more explicit mode denying the position, which was originally in question between r. Tyler and myself. I shall not here be understood to say, that r. Tyler has asserted in so many words, that God regards sin as holly an evil. But since God regards things as they really are, e position is inseparable from what Dr. Tyler has asserted. And hen the object is to bring about an agreement in opinion, I deem important to exhibit the subject as I have done. Sure I am, that r. Tyler can never affirm, that God prefers sin to holiness, in evry instance in which the former takes place, without suffering the osition that God regards sin as wholly an evil, to drop entirely om his mind.

3. Dr. Tyler in his last letter maintains, that sin under the govrnment of God, is the means of good, simply as an antecedent, he good itself being exclusively dependent on divine agency. He ays, "if I have maintained that sin is the means or occasion of Food, I have maintained, that it is so only by being overruled and counteracted in its tendencies. In this sense only have I mainained, that it is the necessary means of the greatest good."That Dr. Tyler ever presented this view of the subject before, I am entirely unapprised. But this, in respect to the present object, is wholly immaterial. Such is now the view which he gives of sin, and of the manner in which good is made to follow it. What then is the import of this statement? Not that sin results in the greatest good, nor in greater good, than holiness would in its stead, -but simply in good. Not that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, but that it is merely the means or occasion of good. Not that sin is the means of good by having any fitness or tendency to good, but only or simply by being overruled or counteracted in its tendencies; i. e. it is a means of good only as some degree of good is made to follow it, exclusively by divine agency, itself being wholly an evil.-That God brings good out of moral evil, is a position which I have often admitted in the present discussion. And as this is the only sense in which Dr. Tyler considers sin to be "the means of good,' we are as to the thing intended, perfectly agreed.

It is desirable, however, that if possible we should agree also in our use of language. I shall, therefore, advert to the import of a phrase, which I regard as a principal occasion of this discussion. I refer to the phrase, the means of good.'-There are, then, three

relations of an antecedent to a consequent, which should be carefully distinguished from each other, viz., its relation as a part to the whole-its relation as a mere antecedent—and its relation as a means to an end.

1. Its relation as a part to the whole occurs, when its prior existence is involved in the existence of a given result. Thus, if an act of lifting take place, there must be some heavy body to be lifted; because the existence of the body is involved in the existence of its upward motion. No one, however, would call the heavy body, the means of such motion; since its entire tendency is in the opposite direction.-So it is necessary that one should be in the water, in order to his being taken out of it; but his being in the water, is not the means of his rescue. In this sense, sin is a necessary antecedent to deliverance from sin, and to the joys of such a deliverance; since without it, there could be no deliverance from sin, and no joy as the consequence. Sin thus viewed in relation to redemption, is simply necessary as a part to the whole; and cannot be called the means of good.'

2. Its relation as a mere antecedent. In this case, sin is confessedly an evil in all its tendencies; and good is made to follow it, exclusively by a divine intervention, overruling and counteracting all its tendencies. Thus the sin of Joseph's brethren was a mere antecedent to the preservation of the children of Israel. Here of course there is no necessity, as in the preceding case, that the sin should exist, in order that the good may be produced. Omnipotence could have produced it in some other way. Were a man to be placed amid the fire of a furnace, no one, I think, would pronounce the fire, the means of his preservation. Nor, on the same principle, can that which is followed by good, only by being overruled and counteracted in all its tendencies, be properly called the means of good.'

3. Its relation as a means to an end. It is essential to the nature of a means,' that it have some fitness or tendency to its appropriate end; so that if good is made to follow it, even by some extraneous influence, that good must in some degree depend on the nature or tendency of the thing. That this is the leading import of the phrase in question, I suppose none will deny. In my own view, it is its only proper import.

Now, these obvious distinctions have, I think, unfortunately, been overlooked by many writers on the divine permission of sin. I cannot doubt, indeed, that most of the difficulties which have been supposed to pertain to this subject, have resulted from this very cause. Many divines who would shudder at the thought of representing sin as in any sense a good thing;' who consider it as tending only to evil,' and as followed by good, only by having all its tendencies overruled and counteracted by divine interposition,

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ave still pronounced it "the means of good." The evil would ave been less, had they confined the term 'means,' in this case, o a mere antecedent, which is plainly all they have meant, when hey have spoken of sin as 'counteracted in all its tendencies.' But as this term (at least in its leading import,) involves the idea of endency to its appropriate end, they have been unwarily betrayed nto the flat contradiction of applying it to sin in this its true sense, as well as in the other. Thus the same men who have told us that "sin is wholly an evil," and is followed by good "only as it is counceracted in all its tendencies," have also told us, "that it ends to good"-" that it is calculated for the highest good of he universe" that it has a glorious tendency!!" Nor have they stopped here. Using the phrase "the means of good," to denote a mere antecedent (on which as a means the result in no sense depends ;) and perceiving also that the existence of sin is necessary to redemption from sin, (though it is so only as a part is to its whole,) they have joined together the terms " means" and " sary," and pronounced it, the necessary means of good ;—never considering, that in the only relation in which sin is necessary, it is not 'a means' at all; and in the relation in which they have called it a means' (that of a mere antecedent) it cannot be necessary at all. Having arrived in this way, at the conclusion, that 'sin is the necessary means of good,' and being intent on assigning a sufficient reason for the divine permission of sin, the next step has been to pronounce sinthe necessary means of the greatest good,' in face of the most decisive proof from the very nature of law, that perfect and universal obedience would have produced greater good, than can result from sin, as overruled by the providence of God. Into such errors, have able men been led by overlooking the very obvious distinctions between sin as a part necessary to a whole, as a mere antecedent, and as the means of an end. Whether Dr Tyler agrees with me or not in respect to this use of language, we perfectly agree in the things to which it relates. We agree, that the existence of sin is necessary to redemption from sin; and that sin is followed by good only as overruled and counteracted in all its tendencies. In all therefore that Dr. Tyler says he ever meant by calling sin' the means of good,' or 'the necessary means of good,' we fully agree.*

It may contribute still further to an adjustment of this part of the controversy, to say, that in my view, God would not have adopted the present system, had he not forseen, that he could by his exclusive agency, counteract all the tendencies of sin, and bring good out of the evil. I have supposed, that God may have purposed the existence of sin, although wholly an evil-an evil in its nature, in all its tendencies and relations, because in respect to his prevention, it is incidental to the best possible system of measures and influences; it being also true that by his own exclusive agency he can counteract all the tendencies of sin, and

4. I understand Dr. Tyler now to admit a statement of mine, which is exactly equivalent to another, which was the origi nal object of his attack. The statement which I understand him to admit is this, that God prefers, all things considered, that all men should become holy, rather than continue in sin, under the PRESENT SYSTEM. Dr. Tyler claims, that I have substituted this position for another which he deems a false position; and that by so doing, I have met his reasoning, or rather evaded it.' It is then plain, that Dr. Tyler must regard the position, by which he says, I have evaded his reasoning, as a true position. Otherwise, instead of maintaining that I had evaded his reasoning by means of it, he would naturally have been led to show that I adopted not only another but a false position, and that therefore I had not evaded his reasoning. Besides, while Dr. Tyler represents one of these positions as false, he represents them also as "inconsistent." Obviously, therefore, in Dr. Tyler's opinion, I have substituted a true position, for one which is false. The only question then is whether there is the shadow of a difference between the import of the two positions? This depends on the question, whether to say, that God prefers holiness to sin in every instance in which the lat ter takes place, differs at all from saying, that he prefers holiness to sin under the present system? And to decide this, I have only to ask, in what instance does any sin take place except under the present system! As I can conceive then, of no possible difference, between these positions, and as Dr. Tyler admits the truth of the one, I cannot but consider him as admitting the truth of the other. It Dr. Tyler, however, should think that there is a real difference be tween these positions, still he admits the former to be true. Of course, the only question between us, is, a mere question respect ing the phraseology of the latter. The former we understand in the same import, and in this as a true position, we are agreed; that is, we agree, that God, all things considered, prefers holiness tosin under the present system.

5. Dr. Tyler explicitly disclaims and rejects many if not all those positions, which I consider as involved in the original leading

bring great good out of the evil. This, it is obvious, is widely remote from say: that God purposes sin, as the necessary means of the greatest good, or in other words, because he could not produce as much good without it as with it, provided all had obeyed his perfect law.

That Dr. Tyler should represent me as taking a new position, is somewhat surprising in view of the identity of import in the two statements; but sti more so, in view of the fact, that in speaking of God's preferring holiness to sin, my first reply and throughout the discussion, I have constantly presented this pref erence under the qualification,-" in his present system," """ under the best system." And yet Dr. Tyler asserts that this position is," entirely a new one. which has never before appeared on my pages."

statement, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. I am thus strengthened in the conclusion already drawn viz. that he does not hold this statement in the sense in which I denied it, and which seems to me its only proper import. The Reviewer in the Spectator had maintained, that the following positions are involved in the theory of Dr. Tyler- that those who die in their sins, were created for this sole purpose, that their sins and sufferings might brighten the displays of God's justice and mercy, and thus become the means of the highest happiness of others; that celestial spirits, if they utter truth in their songs, praise God for that peculiar delight, those higher raptures, which they could enjoy only by means of the agonies of others in everlasting fire'-that a benevolent God could not be satisfied with the perfect holiness and perfect happiness of all his moral creatures, but to raise to some higher conceivable perfection the happiness of those who are saved, they must owe it in no stinted measure, to the eternal agonies of the damned.' Of these statements Dr. Tyler says, they are a "caricature" and contain "palpable and gross misrepresentations."* This is asserting, not only that these things are not involved in his statements and representations, but also that they are false, and that he does not hold such opinions. Dr. Tyler then explicitly denies these statements to be true, and even maintains the contrary. That is, he maintains, that the sins and sufferings of the lost are not the necessary means of brightening the displays of God's attributes, and increasing the happiness of others--he maintains, that God could be satisfied with the perfect holiness and perfect happiness of his moral creatures, and that the highest conceivable happiness need not be owing to the agonies of the damned. That Dr. Tyler maintains these things, is to me a matter of unfeigned satisfaction; and what he has before said, which I have supposed to be inconsistent with these positions, I would gladly forget. Here if language can decide the point, Dr. Tyler maintains that the highest conceivable happiness of the universe, is not necessarily owing to the sins and sufferings of the lost; and that God could be satis

* Without commenting on the warmth of Dr. Tyler's language, I would ask whether, it is a thing wholly unknown, that writers who maintain the doctrine that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, represent the brightest possible manifestation of God's perfections and the highest possible happiness of the heavenly world as accomplished by means of sin, and angels and the redeemed, on account of these results, as making heaven ring with hallelujahs! If I mistake not Dr. Tyler himself, in his Reply p. 511, quoted a passage of scripture to support the same doctrine; i. e. what he here pronounces a caricature of his real opinions.

But says Dr. Tyler, "I ask the Reviewer with what feeling he can contemplate the use which is made of these representations, by the enemies of evangelical truth?" Doubtless with regret; scarcely exceeded, however, by that which is felt, that any of the friends of christianity should fairly subject it to such rep