this being the caso they are really greatly higher in proportion than the rates between Dalton and Bristol. There is no unloading of cars at Bristol and no re-handling of the freight there. The car loaded with lumber at Dalton, bound for Roanoke, passes Bristol without stoppage or change. Up to Bristol, a distance of 241 miles from Dalton, the charge upon its freight has been 11 cents per 100 pounds; from Bristol to Roanoke, a distance of 150 miles, the charge upon this freight is 11 cents additional per 100 pounds; and to Lynchburg, a distance of 204 miles from Bristol, the charge upon this freight is the same as to Roanoke, thus completely reversing the rule which has been established as axiomatic by the experience of railroad transportation all the world over in the case of Roanoke and Lynchburg, but most glaringly in the instance of Roanoke. While the rate is joint, it is in substantial effect much the same as charging combined local rates. We inquired carefully of the general freight agent of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company what reason, if any, there could be for this anomalous rate, and could learn of none that could sustain or justify it. A joint rate of 22 cents per 100 pounds upon lumber in car-load lots from Dalton, Ga., to Roanoke and Lynchburg, Va., is, of course, under the surroundings of this traffic, prohibitory in its nature.

It may be or it may not be that after petitioners are allowed reasonable rates on their lumber to Roanoke and Lynchburg, still lumber producers in North Carolina will have some advantages over them, arising from being nearer to Lynchburg and Roanoke. With all that, and however it may be, we have nothing to do. The petitioners are entitled to reasonable rates, nothing more and nothing less.

The conclusion that we have reached upon the evidence in this case is that the joint rates of 23 cents charged by the East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railway Company and the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company upon car-load lots of lumber from Dalton, Ga., to Roanoke and Lynchburg, Va., are each unreasonable, and that 17 cents per 100 pounds. on car-load lots of such lumber from Dalton to Roanoke and 18 cents per 100 pounds on car-load lots of such lumber from Dalton to Lynchburg would be reasonable.

The order of the Commission, therefore, is that within five days after the receipt of this order the defendant companies must cease to charge 22 cents per 100 pounds on car-load lots of lumber from Dalton to Roanoke, and in lieu thereof must charge not exceeding 17 cents per 100 pounds on such car-load lots of lumber; and that within five days after the receipt of this order the defendant companies must cease to charge 22 cents per 100 pounds on car-load lots of lumber from Dalton to Lynchburg, and in lieu thereof must charge not exceeding 18 cents per 100 pounds on such car-load lots of lumber.

After the decision of the case as above the petitioners raised the question whether they were not entitled to have all payments made by them in excess of the rate as now fixed refunded. The application for that purpose was not granted; the Commissioner holding that its order changing a rate was not retroactive, but would reduce the rate from the time of promulgation only.

RIDDLE, DEAN AND COMPANY, Petitioners, v. THE PITTSBURGH AND LAKE ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

Application Filed February 1st, 1888. Decided February 15th, 1888.

I. Rule stated in reference to applications for re-hearings. The Commission will promptly and carefully examine an application for a re-hearing with a view to the immediate correction of any error of law or fact found to exist, but will not direct a re-hearing involving the expense to parties of appearing before the Commission for a re-argument, unless satisfied that such re-argument might have the effect of changing the result of what the Commission has already done. The Statute is construed as dealing with the substance of things, and as contemplating, as far as this is possible, methods of procedure that are speedy and which come at once to the very right of questions arising in the transportation of persons and freight.

II. Where the relation of any carrier to the matter complained of is such that it is in whole, or in part, materially responsible for the alleged grievance, and has direct interest in any investigation of the subjectmatter involved, and the merits of the controversy cannot be investigated and determined in the absence of such carrier as a party, then that carrier should be made a party to the proceeding, and if not a party, no relief can be had against it.

III. The report and findings of the Commission upon the evidence relates only to the ascertainment and presentation of all the material facts necessary to fairly and justly present the merits of the controversy, and the Commission does not report evidence which is only cumulative, or which is immaterial, or irrelevant, or mere details of evidence already embraced in substantial facts stated, upon which the findings and conclusions of the Commission are made.

J. L. Black, counsel for motion.

REPORT AND OPINION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ON APPLICATION OF PETITIONERS FOR A RE-HEARING.

THE COMMISSION:

We have carefully considered the application made in the brief of petitioners' counsel for a re-hearing in this proceeding, and are constrained to deny it on the ground that no argument of counsel upon the evidence could change the result announced in our previous report and opinion by which the petition was dismissed. We feel it to be due to candor as well as justice to say that a re-argument by the

counsel of the parties upon a re-hearing would be a mere waste of time in addition to the unnecessary expense it would cause the parties and the useless labor it would entail upon their counsel. If, upon the whole evidence, we could see it was possible that any argument of counsel could change the result we would unhesitatingly grant the application for a re-hearing.

The main, controlling, and general grounds upon which we decided to dismiss the petition, as set forth in our report and opinion, are not controverted or questioned in the application for a re-hearing, nor, indeed, do we see how they could be, but several particulars are mentioned in which it is claimed we were mistaken in our findings upon the evidence. Two of these we notice briefly, the others having been disposed of in our previous report and opinion in accordance with the weight of the evidence.

No coke, it is claimed, was shipped in vessels from Cleveland or Ashtabula, and this, we think, is true upon a re-examination of the evidence. We were led to a contrary conclusion in our report and opinion by the following language of John Newell, president of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company, on page 10 of his oral examination, before us: "There has been a large demand for coke for the Lake Superior region." Taking this language in connection with all else that was said on this subject by the same witness and the other evidence in the proceedings we are satisfied in using it he really meant by it that there was a larger demand for coke for smelting ore, which was the product of the Lake Superior mines; but that is wholly immaterial. The important fact was the unusual demand for coke and its shipment over the line of the railroad, and this remained the same whether it was taken by vessels at Cleveland and Ashtabula to the Lake Superior mines or not. The evidence. shows that this coke was required in greater quantities than ever before for smelting ore produced in the Lake Superior mines, and that for this purpose it went not only to the mills and furnaces south, but also west of Cleveland, as well as at Cleveland itself, while the shipments of coal during the same period were quite as large, if not larger, than those of coke,

and coal was shipped in immense quantities from Cleveland and Ashtabula in vessels.

In the second place, it is claimed in the application for rehearing that other shippers of coal besides petitioners were demanding cars for coal to Buffalo during the period of which they complain. All the evidence, when considered together, upon this point, evidently refers to the cars of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, and it shows that a few such were furnished at intervals, of which petitioners admit in their petition they received "forty cars," and this is more than the evidence shows that any other shipper received of these, coal cars to Buffalo during that period. So that, upon the evidence, there was no unjust discrimination against petitioners in this respect even by the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company; but, as we have already stated, that company is not a party to this proceeding. The complaint is against the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company, and there is no evidenco that its cars were going to Buffalo or were expected by shippers to go to Buffalo with coal during the period complained of. The evidence shows also that the owners of these mines were quite willing for their coal to go to Cleveland instead of Buffalo, and that they were satisfied when they could get their proportion of cars to Cleveland, and were not disposed to make any issue about not receiving cars to Buffalo. This is, therefore, wholly immaterial to the result we have reached in dismissing the petition, except so far as it tends to further show that petitioners are entitled to no relief upon the evidence before us.

A peculiarity of this case has been that while the complaint is made against the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company the evidence in support of it is mainly directed at the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company in the use of its cars over the line of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad. Regarding this it is unnecessary to repeat here what we have already said elsewhere; but it may not be improper for us to state that where a complaint is expected to be prosecuted against any carrier that carrier should be made a party to the complaint and thus have an