A's land and to drive off his employees, and when cited to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt should gravely answer, "Not guilty," and demand a jury. There you would have a court rendering a judgment and granting relief which it has no power to enforce, or the enforcement of which depends on the verdict of a jury. What is the difference in principle between that case and this? None whatever. Take another illustration: Suppose a wholesale house in this city should, for reasons satisfactory to its owners, pay off and discharge one of its employees, whereupon the others should all quit work and walk out. Thus far no rights are invaded. The merchant has discharged one of them, as he had the legal right to do, and the other employees quit, as they had the legal right to do. But suppose all the employees step up and say, "You must close up this house or restore this discharged employee and increase the wages of us all 20 per cent, and if you do not do it you can not open this house or sell these goods, and if you attempt to do it we will dynamite your house and kill you." What is the difference between that case and the one at bar? And will courts of equity grant no relief in cases of this kind, where the employees are insolvent and the injury to be inflicted irreparable? This is anarchy. If the striking miners have any such power as this it must needs be all other citizens have the same power. Let us see. Suppose the plaintiff company ultimately succeeds in filling its mines with nonunion miners until they outnumber the strikers, and are better armed, and are equally as stubborn in the exercise of their rights, and are supported by the influence and sympathy of the local authorities. Suppose at this juncture they advise the local union of mine workers at Huntington that they shall not work in plaintiff's mine until they abandon the union or not work at all, although plaintiff company desires their services and seeks their employment? The exercise of such a power is no higher or greater than the strikers now strive to exercise. The assumption of such a power by a mere handful of men, as compared with the population of this great country, must needs proceed (if it exist at all) from a very high source. It invades the personal liberty of the citizen, sweeps away the guaranties of personal and property rights which our fathers deemed so sacred that they incorporated them into the Federal and State constitutions. Such an assumption of power and right must needs challenge investigation. Where do the strikers acquire it? If they have acquired it, from whence does it come? Who confided it to them? What is this association that it should assume to exercise a power not confided to the States and in contravention of the Federal Constitution? Who shall point out the reasons why so great a power should be exercised exclusively by them? What peculiar qualities have they exhibited of superior intelligence, higher character, and greater sense of right and justice than other persons, which renders them peculiarly fitted for so grave a duty as the exercise of so great a power and the enjoyment of such exclusive rights? No such power as they assume to exercise resides anywhere in this country. In law all are equal, and they, like all others, are amenable to public law, and enjoy no legal rights which others do not possess; and the effort by any body of men to exercise any such power is a criminal conspiracy that should meet with no favor among honest men and good citizens in a free country. (Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed., 817; Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S., 197, 13 Sup. Ct., 542.)

The claim that persons who violate injunctions are entitled, under the Constitution, to a trial by jury, is denied by authority absolutely binding upon this court. In the case of In re Debs, 158 U. S., 599, 15 Sup. Ct., 910, the court, by Mr. Justice Brewer, all the judges concurring, said:

"Nor is there in this any invasion of the constitutional right of trial by jury. We fully agree with counsel that it matters not what form the attempt to deny constitutional right may take. It is vain and ineffectual, and must be so declared by the courts;' and we reaffirm the declaration made for the court by Mr. Justice Bradley, in Boyd 7. U. S., 116 U. S., 616, 635, 6 Sup. Ct., 535, that it is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be "obsta principiis." But the power of a court to make an order carries with it the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that order, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience has been from time immemorial the special function of the court. And this is no technical rule. In order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half of its efficiency. In brief, a court enforcing obedience to its orders by proceedings for contempt is not executing the criminal laws of the land, but only securing to suitors the rights which it has adjudged them entitled to.”

* * *

That case was argued by as great lawyers as are in this country, and was decided by the greatest court in the world. Until it is overturned it must be held to be the law of the land. These defendants must be made to know that the very rights they strive to take away from others the right to work; the right to make their own contracts; the right to follow any lawful occupation at any place in this country; the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are all preserved for them and all others by public law, administered always by courts organized for that purpose. These rights I have mentioned are inalienable rights, belonging to every citizen of the United States, guaranteed by their Constitution.

There is one other proposition which I desire to notice, namely, that where a party of men combine with the intent to do an unlawful thing, and in the prosecution of the unlawful intent one of the party goes a step beyond the balance of the party and does acts which the balance do not themselves perform, all are responsible for what the one does. In other words, in the pursuit by various parties of an unlawful conspiracy each is responsible for the acts and doings of the others.

LAWS RELATING TO STRIKES, BOYCOTTS, ETC.

The statutes of this country which bear upon the subject of this report may be divided into two classes, (1) those designed to directly affect and regulate strikes and lockouts and the conditions growing out of them, and (2) those which were not enacted with this end in view, but which, in cases arising out of strikes or lockouts, have been construed by the courts as applicable thereto and controlling therein. Among those coming within the second class may be mentioned many of the conspiracy laws which practically enacted the principles of the common law upon this subject and contain no special provisions directly relating to the subject of this report; laws relating to unlawful assemblies, mobs, and riots; laws defining and penalizing offenses against railroads and railroad property, which were primarily directed against train wrecking and robbery, stealing of railroad property by tramps and others, malicious mischief, etc., and the United States statutes commonly known as the antitrust and interstate-commerce laws; the statute directed against obstruction of the mails, and the statute providing for the suppression of domestic violence, unlawful combinations, conspiracies, etc.

Generally speaking, the laws of this class have not been included in those published below owing to their multiplicity and length and also to the indefinite relation of many of them to the subject-matter hereof. The conspiracy laws are, however, all set forth below, even when they contain no direct references to strikes or lockouts, as they have been frequently held to control in cases arising therefrom. The Texas law on unlawful assembly and riot, which contains a direct reference to the prevention of employees from working, is also shown. The United States statutes above referred to, in so far as they have been held applicable by the courts, are also published below owing to the importance and magnitude of many of the cases in which they have been applied and the widespread attention which the hearings and decisions therein attracted.

The laws which properly belong in the first class above noted are all published below, with the exception of the acts providing means for the arbitration of labor disputes, all of which were enacted with the intent to provide a way of preventing threatened strikes or lockouts or of settling the same after their occurrence. Owing to the voluminous nature of these laws they have been omitted here, but owing to their importance some of their prominent features are noted. The following is a list of the States having arbitration laws, together with citations thereto:

California (chap. 51, acts of 1891); Colorado (sec. 307, Ann. Stats. of 1891, and chap. 2, acts of 1897); Connecticut (chap. 239, acts of 1895);

Idaho (p. 319, acts of 1899); Illinois (p. 5, acts of extra session of 1895, as amended by act on p. 75, acts of 1899); Indiana (chap. 128, acts of 1899); Iowa (chap. 20, acts of 1886); Kansas (chap. 28, acts of 1898-99); Louisiana (act No. 139, acts of 1894); Massachusetts (chap. 263, acts of 1886, as amended by chap. 269, acts of 1887, chap. 261, acts of 1888, and chap. 385, acts of 1890); Michigan (act No. 238, acts of 1889); Minnesota (chap. 170, acts of 1895); Missouri (secs. 6354 to 6358, Rev. Stats. of 1889); Montana (secs. 3330 to 3338, Codes and Stats. of 1895); New Jersey (chap. 137, acts of 1892); New York (art. 10 of chap. 415, acts of 1897); Ohio (p. 83, acts of 1893); Pennsylvania (pp. 132, 133, and 290, Digest of 1895); Texas (chap. 61, acts of 1895); Utah (chap. 62, acts of 1896); Wisconsin (chap. 364, acts of 1895); Wyoming (Const., sec. 1 of art. 19), and United States (chap. 370, acts of Congress of 1897-98).

The majority of these statutes provide for the formation of a permanent State board of arbitration before which, by mutual consent, disputes and controversies between employers and employees may be arbitrated. The States whose statutes so provide are as follows: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Utah, and Wisconsin.

66

In addition to the provision for a State board, contained in the statutes of the above-named States, provision is made for the formation of local boards in the case of the following States: Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The statutes of Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Texas do not provide for a permanent board of any kind, but for the appointment of temporary "boards," or "tribunals of arbitration," and courts of conciliation," whenever the occasion for such an institution arises. One of the Pennsylvania statutes is peculiar in that it provides for the formation of a board of arbitration upon the application not only of both the parties to the controversy, but also upon the application of one of them alone. It will be seen that the arbitration under this statute is not necessarily voluntary, but may be forced upon one party at the request of the other, the decision of the board being, under this law, "final and conclusive of all matters brought before it for judgment." The statute of Missouri, above referred to, provides that the commissioner of labor, upon being reliably informed that a strike or lockout is about to take place, shall visit the locality of the dispute and seek to mediate, and, upon the failure of his effort in this direction, shall appoint a board of arbitration, who shall have power to summon and examine witnesses, etc., and to render a decision upon the matter in dispute. This decision, however, has no binding effect upon the parties but its "only effect" is, under the law, "to give the facts leading to such dispute to the public through an unbiased chan

nel." The State of Colorado also has an act providing for an attempt at mediation to be made by the commissioner of labor, though no provision is made for the appointment of a board by him, and its act providing for a permanent State board provides that said board shall always attempt to mediate when it obtains knowledge of a threatened strike or lockout. In this latter provision the statutes of Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Utah, and Wisconsin coincide.

The statute of the State of Kansas provides for a "court of visitation," which, among other powers, has that of supervision of railroads, and to hear and decide upon its own volition all matters in dispute between an employing railroad corporation and its employees in case of a strike.

The United States statute applies only to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and provides for an attempt to be made at mediation by two designated Government officials in case of any controversy between such a common carrier and its employees, and for the formation of a board of arbitration, consisting of the same officials, together with certain other parties to be selected, in case the attempt at mediation fails. This board, however, is to be formed only at the request or upon the consent of both parties to the controversy. The statutes of the first class, as above described, with the exception of the arbitration acts, appear below.

ALABAMA.

CODE OF 1896, VOL. II-CRIMINAL.

CHAPTER 192.-Intimidation of employees, etc.

SECTION 5511. Any person, who, by force or threats of violence to person or property, prevents, or seeks to prevent another from doing work or furnishing materials, or from contracting to do work or furnish materials, for or to any person engaged in any lawful business, or who disturbs, interferes with, or prevents or in any manner attempts to prevent the peaceable exercise of any lawful industry, business, or calling by any other person, must, on conviction, be fined not less than ten, nor more than five hundred dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more than twelve months. [Original act approved February 17, 1885.]

5. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or due administration of the laws; they are punishable by imprisonment in the territorial prison not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. No conspiracies other than those enumerated in this section are punishable criminally.

[Original act approved November 10, 1864.]