were killed in rapid succession. The present moment was intolerable-the prospect appalling. When, at length, Colonel Darke, made a charge with a part of his line; but the enemy, light armed, and nimble of foot, fled before him, as far as he pursued and when he returned, for want of support, and to prevent his being cut off from the main body, they followed him, or pursued in turn. By this time the Indians on the left flank, had broke into camp, and laying aside the gun, with horrid shrieks, and yells, used only the tomahawk. They were, however, now charged by the battalions of Butler, and Clark, and driven out of camp: yet not being pursued, they returned to the attack--and others break into camp, on other quarters; when charged with the bayonet, they retreat; when pursuit was relinquished, they returned. And these scenes, being several times repeated--many lives were lost, but no advantage won. Many valuable officers had fallen; among them General Butler, second in command; while the general, in chief, was incapable of rising from his cot, by,reason of gout. In the mean time, the enemy, changed his place, and mode of attack, or defence, as he pleased--and with equal ferocity, used the tomahawk; or with well directed aim, fired the rifle, as best suited his purpose of destruction. And thus the work of death was done in every quarter of a panic-struck camp. The enemy could but see that the resistance was feeble, and ill directed; they could but perceive, the advantage which they had, by possessing the exterior of the circle, over an adversary, driven to a focus in the centre. Nor were they deficient in design, or execution.

The artillery, which had been several times taken, and retaken, already silenced, could be no longer occupied; every officer belonging to it, being killed, except one, and he badly wounded, was in the power of the enemy.

They however did not know how, nor pretend to use it. So deplorable, was the situation of the remnant of the army, that it became a matter of some doubt, with the surviving officers, whether a retreat was even possible. A few of them got together, there was but little time for debate; it was obvious,

that no reasonable terms of capitulation were to be expected, from an enemy, who gave no quarter: and that therefore, a retreat, or a massacre, seemed to be the only alternative. A retreat was determined on-and the effort was made; by forming the remaining troops towards the right of the camp: from which, by way of the second line, another charge was made; as if to turn the right flank of the enemy-but in fact to gain the road. This being effected, the militia, who had lost their colonel, probably in the first onset of the Indians, immediately broke, and ran--the other troops then followed, in perfect rout--strewing their arms along the way, deaf to every order, and perfectly ungovernable. Thus leaving their camp, artillery, and baggage--most of their officers, and one half of their numbers, either killed, or wounded, to the enemy. The general made his escape on a packhorse, which he could neither mount, or dismount, without assistance.

On the 8th of the month, he reached fort Washington, with the shattered fragments of the army; preceded by many, of the militia, and such rumours and complaints as usually follow disappointed hopes of success, and accompany strong apprchensions of danger, without distinctly knowing who to censure, or whence to expect relief, or find security. These rumours flying to Kentucky, produce great agitation; while both Gen. Scott, and Wilkinson, call for volunteers, to march into the Indian country--in order, as was the first idea, to relieve General St. Clair, supposed to be besieged, in fort Jefferson. The after news of his arrival at fort Washington, and that nothing more was to be attempted, than his remaining force was able to effect--in some degree quieted the public mind; and stopped the march of the volunteers, who had collected at several points on the road, in respectable numbers; with an alacrity, and ardour suitable to the occasion.

The public attention was again turned upon the difference, between mounted volunteers, and regular troops, for Indian wars. This was the second general, of the United States, commanding regulars, as it was said, who had been defeated by the Indians--while the Kentucky volunteers, commanded

by their own officers, had been uniformly successful. Hence regulars, were pronounced unfit for the service--and the cry renewed in favour of mounted volunteer riflemen. This indeed, was a favourite idea, with a certain class of politicians in the country, who have already been designated, and this a most favourable time for pressing it on the people, and on the governmeut. For the war was not finished--and the government, ever to be influenced by the popular voice, would have once more, to decide, in what manner, and by what kind of troops, it should be carried on.

Could the United States, but once be persuaded, to give up the defence of the frontiers--two consequences were to follow-both equally important, and necessary to the final success of the plot. In the first place, the defence of the country would be in the hands of the junto; and in the next place, the government, could have no use for an armed force, and therefore, would have no army. The object in view, was worth a struggle; nor was it abandoned without one.

But why, it may be asked, was these mounted volunteer expeditions successful? Certainly, not because the officers, or soldiers, were superior to regulars; certainly not, that men, without subordination, and destitute of discipline, are necessarily more efficient, than those who combine both. But the success of the mounted men, is to be ascribed invariably to their vast superiority of numbers--five, ten, fifteen, or twenty, for one, of the enemy, even prevents opposition. This was the case in Scott's, and in Wilkinson's, expeditions. A consequence it is to be confessed, of the feeble, and dispersed condition of the Indians; and the facility, with which such troops move, from place to place, to attack, or to clude pursuit. Was the object to protract the war, by predatory incursions; and renouncing peace, to exterminate the nations, by capturing, and destroying, or detaining, the women, and children, the mounted volunteer scheme, offers a mean equal to the end. In the intermediate time, the warriors, the more exasperated, wage the war with a more determined, and devastating fury. As with them, retaliation is an invariable pursuit: a punctilious point of honour.

The regular army, it is true, wants the facility of movement, which the mounted volunteers possess. Nor can its progress through the woods be concealed from the enemy. So far therefore, from its surprising the enemy, it requires the utmost caution, to prevent being surprised. Besides, the tardiness of its progress, affords time for the enemy to collect his force, and to choose, both the time, and place, at which he will fight. This is admitted; and in reply, it is to be said—the first is to be desired, the last not feared, and all to be foreseen as probable, and guarded against by prudent arrangement, A victory over the warriors, seems at all times necessary to peace---a battle therefore to be desired; and this is the more probable when the enemy are in force. Were it not for the hope and expectation of peace, war would be intolerable. Peace is the only legitimate end of war. Such was the war, in which the United States had reluctantly engaged, and such the termination, which the president, desired it should receive. But there were other, obvious reasons why a regular army should be employed. And which need not be here particularized.

In the mean time, let it be inquired, why the last army did not succeed.

Did General St. Clair, fail to fortify his camp? It was, doubtless, a great omission: but when did a mounted volunteer general, ever fortify a camp? Was the ground on which General St. Clair encamped, well, or ill, chosen? No doubt it was the latter, if it admitted only of two lines, and these no more than seventy yards apart: unless he had fortified. When however, did a general, of mounted men, make a more judicious choice, or a more skilful arrangement of his force? Not that it is intended entirely to approve of the disposition, made by General St. Clair. For as he did not intend to fortify, and knew he was in the enemy's country, his camp should have presented to such an enemy, four equal fronts, containing all his troops; and instead of exposing the militia, beyond the

river, and to the first assault of the enemy-it should have been in the middle of the camp; as a body, out of which to support his lines. And, so far from posting a single company, (as Captain Slough's,) three-quarters of a mile from his camp, it would have been better, to have placed a similar guard in the centre of each line, and sentinels, at proper distances on all sides; with an established order, not to leave their posts while the troops remained in camp.

As to the incidents--the neglect of General Butler to profit of the intelligence of Captain Slough, is so astonishing, as almost to admit, the idea of fatality. And yet, as preordination of particular events, by the deity, would imply a preordination of all the means conducing to them, and exclude all others reduce men to the condition of automatons-baffle all the suggestions of experience, and of prudence, detach the intellect from its natural organization; and place it under the control of a being no way concerned for its good, or ill--and by destroying the choice of the will, and the liberty of action, remove the foundation of responsibility-extinguish the difference between merit, and demerit; and of necessity, abolish the justice of rewards and punishments; such a proposition is inadmissible.

Therefore, resorting to human means, in order to produce proposed ends, or to account for past events; and viewing the conduct of General Butler, as a military man, it is difficult to find an apology for his discharging the men from parade, before he had the country around, scoured by patroles; and before he received the report of Colonel Oldham. These circumstances, added to his failing to make General St. Clair, acquainted with the facts detailed by Captain Slough, place his prudence quite below, or his confidence too far above, the medium, which belongs to a great commander: and furnish to the inquirer, a second step in the progress to defeat. For had the measures been taken, which an ordinary caution dictated, the army could not have been surprised. It may be said, that had Colonel Oldham, obeyed his orders, the surprise