witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; and in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; that he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of

the land.

"11th. That no person shall for any indictable offence be proceeded against criminally by information; except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service, in time of war or public danger, or by leave of the court for oppression or misdemeanor in office.

"12th. No person shall, for the same offence, be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb; nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his represcutatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him.

"13th. That all courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of law; and right and justice administered, without sale, denial or delay.

"14th. That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the legislature or its authority.

"15th. That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.

"16th. That all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption great; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

“17th. That the person of a debtor where there is not strong presumption of fraud, shall not be continued in prison after delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.

"18th. That no ex post facto law, nor any, law impairing contracts shall be made.

"19th. That no person shall be attainted of treason or felony

by the legislature.

"20th. That no attainder shall work corruption of blood, nor except during the life of the offender, forfeiture of estate to the commonwealth.

"21st. The estates of such persons as shall destroy their own lives, shall descend or vest as in case of natural death, and if any person shall be killed by casualty, there shall be no forfeiture by reason thereof.

"22d. That the citizens have a right in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes by petition, address or

remonstrance.

"23d. The rights of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state shall not be questioned.

"24th. That no standing army shall in time of peace, be kept up without the consent of the legislature, and the military shall in all cases and at all times be in strict subordination to the civil power.

"25th. That no soldier shall in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

"26th. That the legislature shall not grant any title of nobility or hereditary distinction, nor create any office the appointment of which shall be for a longer time than during good behaviour.

27th. That emigration from the state shall not be prohibited.

"28th. To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, WE DECLARE, that every thing in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws contrary thereto or contrary to this constitution shall be void."

Such was the first constitution of Kentucky; and although extinct, yet venerable.

It is to be observed, that antecedent to the formation of the constitution, an immense mass of information had been presented to the public mind in newspaper essays, and in books, on political subjects. Among which, "The Federalist;" a publication containing a series of essays, by Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, illustrative of the constitution of the United States, merited, and obtained, a distinguished pre-eminence. While, in addition to these, may be mentioned, the constitutions of the states; as storehouses, or fountains of information, from which to draw constitutional provisions.

If the constitution of Kentucky, could be ascribed to any one man, it should, doubtless, be to Colonel George Nicholas; who took the lead in the convention: to which he was justly entitled, by his superiority of talents, and acquirements; in the use of which, he was known to be liberal. The resemblance observable in the constitution of Kentucky, to that of the United States, may be accounted for, by his admiration of the merits of the original, and the distinguished part, which he had taken in the convention of Virginia, in favour of its adoption..

Excepting, however, the provisions for forming the senate, a striking imitation--and the original jurisdiction given to the court of appeals, also a similitude--the constitution of Kentucky, resembling, likewise, in its general arrangements, that of the United States; and in its details, those of the several states--is in reality, the genuine offspring, of the local circumstances, and habitual modes of thinking, and acting, common to a majority of the people of the country, at the time. The result of principles, inculcated, and imbibed, in the revolution, brought with the emigrants, and here cherished, and propagated, from the first, to the last, settlement. It was made for present use, rather than futurity-for the then condition of the country, more than for one materially different, which was to ensue in the course of progressive population, and change of circumstances; in short, it was the result of feeling, not of foresight of prépossession, rather than a full knowledge of the subject.

It was a representative democracy-instead of a real republic, as all governments, should be. It contained, nevertheless, most of the essential 'principles, and material parts, of a good constitution; but defective in some; with others ill assorted; the checks inadequate-and the balance, erroneously cast, or badly adjusted--whence the preponderating weight is on the wrong end of the scale-beam.

To admit, what should not be denied, that the people of mature age, in every country, possess the right of framing, and adopting, a constitution of government, for themselves; and yet to suppose, that because the majority, is to rule, that therefore, it is not to be restrained, would at once be surrendering the minority, of the same people, to be treated as slaves, or sacrificed, in their rights, and interests, by the ruling majority, at its will, and pleasure.

While all history shews, that power in the hands of a majority, unchecked by constitutional provisions, is as subject to be abused, as when in the hands of a few, or in those, of a single despot. It is not the number of individuals who hold, the supreme power in the state, but the quality of that power, connected with the personal interests, and character, of those who exercise it, which exposes it to abuse, or renders it safe, as to others. For those who hold, and exercise the governing power, whether one, a few, or the many-whether, the king, the aristocracy, or the democracy, will take care of themselves-and by consequence, will take care of those who possess a similarity of interests, and of feelings. It is those who are dissimilar in these respects, that are injured by being neglected; or remembered, but to be oppressed. In a government where the whole power is engrossed by one man--as there can be none else in a situation similar to his own, none can be safe, as the laws prescribed for his safety, extend to no other, in his dominions; or he may oppress all others, by laws, which will not affect himself. So, may, an aristocracy—and so may, a democracy, under the majority, unrestrained, by actual checks, and real counterbalances, in the exercise of power. For it will be found in every numerous society, that laws which may suit

extremely well, the interests and feelings of the actual majori ty, of the community, may be in direct hostility, with those of a minority. As for example, if it were ascertained, that a majority, as individuals, did not possess over one hundred acres of land; and the revenues of the state, were by law, ordered to be raised on those who held over that quantity; here, the majority, would exempt itself, and throw the burthen of sup-. porting the government, on the minority: who at the same time, might, by law, either positive, or tacit, be excluded from every public office, and from every influential situation in the state. The same thing, in principle, and to various subjects, and different effects, may be applied, again, and again; of which' our own laws, may even now furnish examples.

Hence, it is not sufficient, that a constitution should recognise, and establish, the rule of governing, by majorities; but it should also, ordain actual checks, and restraints, upon the exercise of power, by such majority; in every instance, and in every department.

It is, therefore, in the nature and efficacy of these checks, that we are to look, for the perfection, or imperfection of a constitution, no less than in the positive division and regulation of the power itself.

Nor has the constitution of Kentucky been wholly inattentive to these principles-but unfortunately, after recognising some of those which were primary, it has but imperfectly developed, or regulated, them; giving too much effect to some, and too little to others; whence, the operation is unequal, and erroneous. Thus, having adopted the division of the legislative body, and essayed to give to the senate a greater degree of permanency, wisdom, and virtue, than could be required in the house of representatives; by reducing the number, increasing the age, protracting the term of service, and providing electors of the senators; the whole beneficial effect of the arrangement, is defeated, by placing the choice of the electors, at the disposal of the same equally qualified voters at the age of twenty-one years, who were to choose the representatives. And thus results, that homogencality, between the two branches of the