conscript, on when the lot fell, and fighting our battles wert so marred. For in thee too lay a God-created form, but it was not to be unfolded; encrusted must it stand with the thick adherings and defacements of labor; and thy body like thy soul was not to know freedom. Yet toil on, toil on, thou art in thy duty, be out of it who may; thou toilest for the altogether indispensable, for daily bread.

"A second man I honor, and still more highly; him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable; not daily bread but the bread of life. Is not he too in his duty; endeavoring toward universal harmony; revealing this by act or by word, through all his outward endeavors, be they high or low? Highest of all when his outward and inward endeavor are one; when we can name him artist; not earthly craftsman only but inspired thinker, that with heaven-made implement conquers heaven for us! If the poor and humble toil that we have food, must not the high and glorious toil for him in return, that he have light and guidance, freedom, immortality! These two in all their degrees I honor; all else is chaff and dust, which let the world blow where it listeth.

"Unspeakably touching is it, however, when I find both dignities united; and he that must toil outwardly for the lowest of man's wants is also toiling inwardly for the highest. Sublimer in this world know I nothing, than a peasant saint, could such now anywhere be met with. Such a one will take thee back to Nazareth itself; thou wilt see the splendor of heaven spring forth from the humblest depths of earth like a light shining in great dark

Such is the lot and duty of man. Labor! Labor on in some shape for a life. Labor for thyself, thy household, thy country, the world. There is no respite. Onward, onward, drives the spirit of Commerce-and will elevate you, enrich, ennoble you. Clothe thyself gorgeously, fare sumptuously if you will, but extend the same luxuries of wealth to thy neighbor who possesses not the same means or ability to acquire. What is there now, or ever has been in the world, grand or glorious, that has not been the product of labor either of the body or the mind! The treasures of genius and art are its work; the cultivated fields are its toil; the busy marts, the rising cities, the rich empires of the world, are but the great treasuries of labor. The monuments, castles, towns, and temples, of Europe; the mounds and the buried cities of America, are but the gigantic achievements of labor. Take labor from the world and it leaves it a blank without a history. Labor on then, as the great movements of the world shall direct. If you have genius, develop it. If you have perseverance, prove it. Labor on without wealth if such is your lot. Labor on the more lustily with wealth, for it is a means by which all the world can be conquered from indolence and ignorance-from famine, starvation, and untimely death.

CHAPTER X.

THE TRUE END OF LIFE.

Ir the premises have been correct, and the argument therefrom thus far fair, it will be understood that the greatest blessings in the world for the benefit of mankind have ever been dependent upon trade. Trade promotes civilization and prepares the way for Christianity; trade develops and quick

• Carlyle.

ens the capacity of agriculture and manufactures; trade induces skill, genius and enterprise; trade is the most prominent profession by which wealth can be acquired.

But let not the inference here be, that trade is the end of life-that mere money making is the purpose for which men were created. If any one lives under this delusion, he will ere long find the undisputed contradiction in his moral destruction. "You should be a happy man," said a gentleman to the proprietor of one of the largest mercantile establishments in the world, which he had created himself from nothing. "But I am not," was the brief reply; "I know not the meaning of the term." "How much compensation do you get for your services?" asked John Jacob Astor of an envious man. 66 Merely enough to board, clothe, and shelter me," was the reply. "Well," returned the millionaire," that is the same compensation exactly, that I receive for taking care of so much property."

If the infatuated men who sought so perseveringly after the philosopher's stone had had a particle of philosophy in themselves they must have perceived that their success in making the discovery would have proved their greatest misfortune. The touch of this imaginary stone was to transmute all baser metals into substantial gold. The consequence of such a magical change would have been to make gold valueless. The benefits, however, of this wildest of the world's delusions, were incidentally appearing in the many useful discoveries made in the pursuit of this impracticable discovery.

The pioneers to California confidently expected upon their arrival at the golden gate, to feast their eyes upon glittering mountains of gold. But neither themselves nor the world were destined to such a dire misfortune. Had their deluded imaginations been realized, much better would it have been for them to have remained upon the rock-bound coasts of New-England, for gold dust would have been of no more value than the common sand of the sea shore. The chance for a small increased return for their labor and privations, was the greatest benefit they could receive.

These instances are expressively illustrative of the greatest good to be derived in the pursuit of trade. It is in the gradual development of the merchant's highest and noblest faculties. The small experiences of every-day life, the disappointments, the discouragements, it may be the ruin of his fortunes, are laden with the richest blessings-compared with which gold is dross. If he unfortunately become hastily rich, he must have otherwise had the required discipline, or his fate is to be deplored. The history of accidental or ill-gotten wealth has too often been but the portrayal of corruption, and the speedy downfall of individuals and nations. In Tyre and Sidon the wealth was quickly amassed. Babylon and Palmyra were corrupt with intemperate luxury. Rome, overladen with the spoils of the world, became overwhelmed by her own vices. These and many others are instances of the destructive tendencies of speedy and unnatural accumulation.

Of material wealth "we brought nothing into the world, and can carry nothing out of it." There is something, however, that will be carried out, that is, the character which has been forming in the pursuit of wealth.

The narrow, selfish, miserly spirit that grows on accumulation—the nervous, peevish, fretful temper, that can bear no opposition or disappointment— the inflated nothingness, which estimates all things by dollars and centsthese go with the soul of which they are a part, constitutionally and spiritually. As do also all the carefully acquired virtues that belong to the per

fect man. To this end it is important that each day of life should be a day of improvement. Habits of thought and study are to be assiduously cultivated. Business itself may be conducted in such a manner as to invigorate, enlarge, and elevate the mind. A man's thoughts must travel beyond the counter and desk. The merchant, if he would be faithful to himself, like the lawyer, the physician, and the clergyman, must extend his researches beyond the province of his own profession, and bring the contributions of all regions of thought to build up himself in the strength of intellectual manhood.

If any one pursues business in the neglect of mental or moral culture, he sacrifices the great end of life to the comparatively worthless means. He may gain money and lose knowledge; he may gain the splendor of houses and equipage and lose the accomplishments of the gentleman; he may gain a material estate and lose a spiritual empire; he may "gain the whole world and lose his own soul."

JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW.

ACTION FOR A TRESPASS, AND APPLICATION FOR AN INJUNCTION.

In a late number of the St. Louis Intelligencer we find the following report of a decision of the Cole County (Missouri) Circuit Court, on application for an injunction by a land-owner (Robert R. Jefferson) against (Thomas L. Price) one of the contractors on the Pacific Railroad.

The first point made by the plaintiff was, that the charter only permitted the company to take one hundred feet for roadway, and that while there was authority to go outside of this 100 feet and take from the adjoining land any earth, stone, gravel, dirt, timber, &c., necessary to construct the road, yet there was no authority to deposit dirt and rubbish on the adjoining land. To this was answered, that the charter authorized the company to take, in addition to the 100 feet, such other width of roadway, in cases of excavations and embankments, as might be necessary for the preservation of the road. And it was shown by the Chief Engineer that the excavation from the tunnel would require a width of road bed five hundred feet wide and eight hundred feet long, and that this extra width was necessary for the construction and preservation of the road-that he had given orders to have such extra width staked out, and land plots to be made and placed in the hands of the land agent of the company, that he might have the same condemned according to law. It was further shown that the width of the road bed differed according to the ground passed over. Where the country was level 100 feet was sufficient-where there was heavy cutting and filling, or tunneling, extra width was required.

It was, secondly, contended, that even admitting the company had a right to condemn this extra width, yet they had no right to enter on the plaintiff's land without first making compensation. To this it was answered that the company had a right to occupy the plaintiff's land as an incident proceeding to acquire the title--that there was no violation of any constitutional right of the plaintiff; for the word "taken" in the constitution had reference to the final appropriation of the title, and that the party's title was in no case affected, although the occupation of the contractor was absolute for the time--that the company was bound to proceed in a reasonable time to have the land appraised and make compensation; and that if they delayed an unreasonable length of time to do so, their occupation would be adjudged wrongful from the beginning, and the party could recover for all damages sustained by the previous occupation. It was shown, in

connection with this point, that the company had used every exertion to have not only this but all other lands condemned--that portions of the line had not been finally located yet, and on such portions where a final location was made, the engineers were engaged in finding the land lines and making the maps so as to furnish the land agent with proper descriptions.

Another point made by the plaintiff was, that the damage was irreparable, and an injunction was always grantable in such cases. It was shown by the company that money could compensate the plaintiff; that, moreover, the destruction of houses, orchards, graveyards, &c., which would be inhibited in cases between private persons because the injury would be deemed irreparable, had no application to railroad companies; that anything could be removed by a railroad company, because the necessities of the age required that these great works should be as straight as possible, and if the doctrine of "irreparable injury " applied, railroads would not be built. It was also contended that there was a manifest difference between waste and trespass; that injunctions were grantable freely in cases of waste, but not in trespass--and that this, upon the plaintiff's own assertions, was not waste. Many other points were discussed which it is not necessary now to mention.

Judge Miller listened to the argument with great patience--took a note of the authorities cited, and, after a full consideration, decided to refuse the injunction.

RIGHTS OF CONSIGNEES AND CREDITORS IN POSSESSION UNDER ATTACHMENT LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

We lay before our readers, says the Charleston (S. C.) Standard, an abstract of the following case, which was elaborately argued at the late sitting of the Court of Appeals, and which is of great importance to the commercial community, on account of the principles it decides. As a solemn adjudication upon the rights of consignees and creditors in possession under our attachment law, it cannot fail to be interesting to commission merchants and to business-men generally :

C. T. MITCHELL & Co., vs. A. E. BYRNE.-(Issue in Attachment.)

The plaintiffs had an order from Henry Gore Booth, of Liverpool, in the year 1850, to purchase on his account three thousand bales of cotton, and they completed the execution of the order by the purchase of 506 bales on the 29th August, which they shipped to Booth on the 3d of September. On the 4th, 7th, and 8th September, they drew bills on Booth, which were payable on the 25th November. These bills were accepted by Booth, but protested for non-payment, Booth having become bankrupt before the maturity of the bills. On the 27th and 28th November, Edward Moon, of Liverpool, stepped forward and paid these drafts for the honor of the plaintiffs, C. T. Mitchell & Co., charged them in account with the amount, and on the 29th November remitted the drafts to them and claimed reimbursement by remittance. Moon deposes that he looked to the plaintiffs solely for indemnity; and that he had been repaid and had never met with a prompter return.

The ship Eolus came consigned to the plaintiffs, with a cargo of salt, and arrived about the 25th November, 1850. They entered her at the Custom House and began the discharge of the cargo, which was nearly completed on the 5th of December. On that day the defendant, Byrne, levied an attachment on the ship and cargo, and served a copy on Mitchell & Co., who made a return as garnishees, claiming to hold as creditors in possession. Their declaration contained the common count for money paid, and a count on the bills of exchange. The outlay for the 506 bales of cotton, expenses, damages, and re-exchange, constituted their demand.

At the instance of the attorney of Byrne, an issue was ordered to try the question whether Mitchell & Co. were creditors in possession of the ship Eolus and other funds, the property of Henry Gore Booth, on the 5th December, 1850, or were entitled on that day to have their claim first allowed by virtue of any right or lien under the attachment law.

Upon this issue, the plaintiffs, under the charge of Judge Withers upon

the Circuit, had a verdict for $23,784 50, with interest from the 5th December, 1850.

Upon the appeal, it was contended for the plaintiffs, that they had a right to retain the proceeds of sale of the ship and cargo, as creditors in possession under the attachment act, or by virtue of their lien as factors, for the general balance of their account against Henry Gore Booth.

This claim was resisted on the part of the defendant upon the grounds-first, that the plaintiffs were not creditors of Booth on the 5th of December, because on that day they had no actionable debt against him; and second, that the plaintiffs had not such possession of the ship and cargo as is required by the attachment act, to constitute them creditors in possession.

Judge Frost delivered the opinion of the Court, which established the following points:

1. That the plaintiffs had an actionable demand on the 5th December, and could maintain their count for money paid. That the drawing of the drafts was an extension of credit for the time they hal to run, but that when they were protested for non-payment, (which was prior to the 5th of December,) the plaintiffs had a right to sue as upon an open account for the money laid out and expended for the cotton.

2. That the plaintiffs could also maintain their count upon the bills. That when Moon took up the bills for the honor of the plaintiffs, he held them as endorsee with all the rights of an endorsee, against all the parties to the instru ments; but that when he charged the plaintiffs in account, and remitted the bills to them, and looked to them solely for indemnity, (which he did prior to the 5th December,) he relinquished to them all the holder's rights in the bills. And that it was not necessary that the plaintiff's should have the bills actually in their possession at the commencement of their suit, but it was sufficient if they produced them at the trial, having had title to them at the commencement of the action.

3. That under the attachment acts of 1744 and 1844, a garnishee may retain for his debt all moneys, goods, &c., which have been attached, or are liable to attachment; and that all moneys, goods, &c., are liable to attachment, which may be in his "hands, power, possession, or control."

4. That, touching the question of the possession of the ship and cargo, the case may be rested on the authority of Schepler vs. Garriscan, (2 Bay., 224,) in which it was decided that the consignee of a ship and cargo has a qualified property and constructive possession the moment she comes into port, so that the Sheriff shall not, under a writ of attachment, take the ship and cargo from the possession of the consignee, who claims to be a creditor in possession; and that such a consignee has a lien on them for the balance of his general account against the owner. That a ship consigned to a foreign agent for general freight, is in the "possession, power, or control" of the consignee, so that he can retain her for his debt.

5. That the plaintiffs and Byrne being both creditors of Booth, the contest between them was, which should apply the proceeds of the sale of the ship, in payment of their debt; that the attachment acts placed the garnishee upon the footing of an attaching creditor, and provided that upon his filing his declaration, &c., he should have his claim "first allowed;" and that it would operate great hardship upon creditors in possession, if the law were otherwise, inasmuch as they cannot have served upon themselves their own writ of attachment, and make themselves garnishees to their own action against the absent debtor.

6. That the right of the plaintiffs to retain as creditors in possession being affirmed, it was unnecessary to express any opinion upon their right to retain by virtue of their lien as factors far a general balance of account.

In this opinion, Justices O'Neall, Withers, and Whitner, concurred with. Frost, J.

Justices Wardlaw and Glover dissented, on the ground that Mitchell & Co. had no such possession as entitled them to retain as creditors in possession. Messrs Brown & Porter, attorneys for plaintiffs.

Messrs. Walker & Memminger, for defendant.