ceived more preposterous than the allowance of such a privilege; that there are few claims so absurd; that nothing can be suggested in their favour; but that Quintilian himself could give no colour to this claim. All the privileges which the law of nations confers upon ambassadors, are founded upon the necessity of providing for their security and the convenience of national intercourse; but these important objects are nowise concerned in permitting ambassadors to obstruct the course of justice, and to protect criminals who form no part of their household or train (g). Some Venetians, who had been detected in betraying the secrets of the republic to the French ambassador, took refuge in his house. The Senate sent troops and cannon to storm the house, and compelled the ambassador to surrender them (h). So the States of Holland demanded the surrender of an offender who had taken refuge in the house of the English resident, and that demand was approved by the States General (i). The Duke of Ripperda was seized in the house of the English ambassador at Madrid (j). So Cromwell is not to be blamed, as some have blamed him, for having seized a criminal in the house of the Portuguese ambassador, but because the person seized was one of the ambassador's train, and not subject to English jurisdiction (k). Where the privilege is allowed, it exists only by the concession of the sovereign (7). Where it is usual to allow it, it may yet be abolished at any time; but such abolition must be duly notified, and can only operate prospectively (m). Such a right cannot be prescribed for, for prescriptions must be reasonable (n). At Rome, the privilege hath been claimed, not only

(1) Grot. ii. 18, viii.; Wicq. i. 899, Bynk. F. L. xxi.

(m) Vatt. iv. 106.

(n) Bynk. F. L. xxi.

for the carriages of ambassadors, and for their houses, but also for the adjoining districts. Many Popes attempted to abolish it without success, through the opposition of the diplomatic body. Even Sextus 5 failed in the attempt (o). Some Neapolitan refugees, whom the French ambassador was assisting to return to Naples to renew their plots against the Spanish government, were made prisoners as they were passing out of the gates of Rome in the ambassador's carriage. The ambassador demanded the release of the prisoners, and satisfaction for the insult. The Pope replied, that the privilege of ambassadors does not extend to the protection of criminals; but the matter was compromised, and the prisoners were set at liberty (p). In 1815, the right of asylum was abolished in Rome, except as to persons charged only with misdemeanors (q).

In Madrid, the privilege extended to whole districts, but in 1684 it was signified to all the ambassadors, that for the future it should be confined to their houses, and they acquiesced without much difficulty (r).

An ambassador is privileged to have divine service performed in his house according to any form of worship that is allowed by the laws of his own country, though prohibited in the country wherein he is sent to reside. But this is for the edification of his household, and the privilege extends no farther; for this is all that is requisite for the convenience of the ambassador (s). The claim of Chanut, the French ambassador at Stockholm, to open his chapel to the public, had no foundation in reason or authority. He had as little right to exempt Swedish subjects from prohibitions imposed by the laws of Sweden, as the Queen would have had to apply those prohibitions to his train; and strangers residing in Sweden,

(0) Bynk. F. L. xxi.

(p) Wicq. i. 896.

(q) Martin. Man. dip. 65.

(r) Bynk. F. L. xxi.

(s) Vatt. iv. 104; Wicq. i. 880.

K

and not forming part of the train of the ambassador, were subject to the laws of Sweden during their residence no less than native Swedes. The pretension of Philip 2 to compel the train of Protestant ambassadors to attend mass at Madrid, was equally extravagant (t). The injunctions or prohibitions of municipal law are inapplicable to ambassadors or their train, who are not within the jurisdiction of the state.

Sixthly. Consuls are the mercantile agents of sovereigns, by whom they are appointed to protect the commercial interests of their subjects in a foreign state. They are not public ministers, and have no exemption from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the state wherein they perform their functions (u). They have authority to decide any differences that may arise between their own countrymen (v). But the jurisdiction which they exercise is by permission of the sovereign in whose territories they reside, and his approval is necessary to perfect their appointment (w). The extent of their jurisdiction is determined by treaty, and in eastern states it has sometimes been allowed to an unlimited extent. Thus the treaty of Constantinople between Soliman and Francis 1 provides, that the French consuls at Constantinople, Pera, and all other towns within the Ottoman dominions, shall have exclusive jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over French subjects, and that their sentences shall be enforced by the officers of the Sultan (x). The opinion of Wicquefort and Bynkershoek, which denies to consuls the character and privileges of public ministers, has been recognized by the English Courts.

Barluit, the commercial agent of the King of Prussia, claimed to be privileged as a public minister. He had a

(t) Wicq. i. 878, et seq.

(u) Wicq. i. 133; Bynk. F. L. x. xiii. p. 165; vid. Clarke v. Cretico, 1 Taunton, 106; Kent Comm. i. 43.

(v) Wicq. ibid.; Vatt. ii. 34; Valin. Comm. i. 9, xii.

(w) Mart. Man. Dip. 28; Kent. Comm. i. 42; Valin. Comm. i. 9, iii. (r) Flass. Dip. Franc. i. 368.

commission as agent of commerce from the King of Prussia, directed, not to the King of England, but to all persons whom the same should concern. His commission was to do and execute whatever his Prussian Majesty should think fit to order, with regard to his subjects trading to Great Britain, to present letters, memorials, and instruments concerning trade to such persons and at such places as should be convenient, and to receive resolutions thereon. What creates my difficulty, said Lord Talbot, is, that I do not think he is entrusted to transact affairs between the two Crowns; his commission is to assist his Prussian Majesty's subjects here in their commerce, and so is the allowance. Now this gives him no authority to intermeddle with the affairs of the King, which makes his employment to be in the nature of a consul. And though he is called only an agent of commerce, I do not think the name alters the case. Indeed, there are circumstances that put him below a consul; for he wants the power of judicature, which is commonly allowed to consuls: also, their commission is commonly directed to the prince of the country, which is not the present case. But at most he is only a consul. It is the opinion of Barbeyrac, Wicquefort, and others, that a consul is not entitled to the jus gentium belonging to ambassadors (y). The question of the privilege of consuls was afterwards most fully discussed in the case of the consul of the Duke of Oldenbourgh. The question, said Lord Ellenborough, in delivering the judgment of the Court, is reduced to this: whether this defendant is entitled to the privilege of immunity from arrest, as belonging to him in his mere character of consul. He certainly is a person invested with some authority by a foreign prince; but is he a public minister? There is not, I believe, a single writer on the law of nations, nor even of those who have written looser tracts on the same subject, who has pronounced, that a consul is eo nomine a public

(y) Barbuit's case, C. T. Talbot, 281.

minister; and unless he be such, he is not within the comprehension of the act of Parliament.

It has been truly said, that the act is declaratory of the common law and of the law of nations; and hence it has been argued that he may be entitled to this privilege by the law of nations, though he is not expressly designated in the act. That may be so; although it is not very probable, that when the act of Parliament was passed for the purpose of laboriously and comprehensively exempting, as far as possible, all persons, who stood in any relation to foreign states, which would entitle them by the law of nations to be exempted; it should have omitted to designate any persons whom it meant to include. Therefore, upon the fair understanding of the statute, the question is, whether he be a public minister? If he be, he is protected by the act, his arrest being in prejudice of the rights and privileges of public ministers. But supposing the defendant to be one of those functionaries, who may be entitled to the privilege of the law of nations; how does the case stand upon the usage as it exists under that law? In several books referred to in the course of the argument, and principally in Vattel, 11, 2, 34, of consuls, I find it laid down thus: "Among the modern institutions (and therefore this institution of consul is not like that of the legates of old, of whom and of whose rights the Roman history is full, but according to Vattel, it is of modern date, and even in modern times in Grotius, who is very learned and laborious in his chapter on the subject of legate, the name never once occurs ; and in Molloy there is not a word about consuls: but to proceed with Vattel) among the modern institutions for the utility of commerce, one of the most useful is that of consuls, or persons residing in the large trading cities and especially in foreign sea-ports, with a commission empowering them to attend to the rights and privileges of their nation and to terminate misunderstandings and contests among its merchants. When a nation trades largely with a country, it is requisite to have a