In Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., recently decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, it was held that where the death of one upon whose life there was a policy of insurance, (1) resulted from an illegal operation voluntarily submitted to by insured to produce abortion, no recovery could be had, because the act on the part of the assured, causing death, was of such a character that public policy would preclude the defendant from insuring her against its consequences. The court say, we can have no question that a contract to insure a woman against the risk of her dying under, or in consequence of, an illegal operation for abortion, would be contrary to public policy, and could not be enforced in the courts of this Commonwealth. See Amicable Ins. Co. v. Bolland, 4 Bligh, 194; How v. Anglo-Australian L. Ins. Co., 30 L. J. Ch. 511; Moore v. Woolsey, 4 E. & B. 243. The St. Louis Court of Appeals in Steele v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., just decided, hold that where an ordinary life policy was issued providing for forfeiture in case the premium was not paid when due, a circular issued by the insurance company, while such policy was in force, declaring that all its continued life policies then in force, or thereafter to be issued, should be non-forfeiting, would have the effect of changing such continued life policy to a non-forfeiting policy in the manner described in the circular, provided such circular came to the knowledge of the assured, and he failed to pay his premiums on the faith of the representations contained therein, and it would be competent to go to the jury as evidence of such knowledge and action on the part of the assured, that large numbers of such circulars were issued and sent to the policy holders, and were piled upon the counter over which assured was in the habit of paying his premiums. Henning v. U. S. Ins. Co., 47 Mo. 430; Horwitz v. Eq. Ins. Co., 40 id. 360; Thompson v. St. Louis L. Ins. Co., 52 id. 470; Pelkington v. Nat. Ins. Co., 55 id. 172. LIABILITY OF EXPRESS COMPANY FOR NEG LIGENCE OF RAILWAY EMPLOYEES. IN the case of President of Bank of Kentucky et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Adams Express Co., recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, a bank in Louisiana shipped by the Southern Express Company some packages of money directed to the plaintiff at Louisville. At the time of the receipt of the packages a "bill of lading" was given by the Southern Express Company to the shipper, containing a provision excusing it and all other express companies by whom the packages might be carried from liability for loss occasioned, among other things, "by the dangers of railroad transportation, or ocean or river navigation, or by fire or steam.” The packages were delivered at Humboldt, Tennessee, to the manager of defendants, who placed them in an iron safe, and deposited the safe in an apartment of a car set apart for the use of express companies, for transportation to Louisville. Subsequently, while the train to which the car containing the packages was attached was passing over a trestle on the line of the Louisville and Nashville railroad, and while the packages were in charge of the messenger, the trestle gave way during the night. The train with the express car was thrown from the track, and the car with others caught fire from the locomotive and was burned, together with the money in the safe. The question in the case was, was the defendant liable for the loss of the money, or was it protected by the stipulation in the bill of lading? It was not disputed that the defendant would have been liable if the loss by fire had taken place through its own negligence or that of its servants, but the question was, was it liable for the negligence of the railroad company over which it carried the packages? The court held that it was, and said that the railroad company was acting for the defendant, and performing a service for it, when transporting the packages it had undertaken to convey, and must be considered their agent, and the exception in the bill of lading did not relieve it from liability. The court, in referring to the course of these companies in attempting to evade liability, said: "We cannot close our eyes to the wellknown course of business in the country. Over very many of our railroads the contracts for transportation of goods are made, not with the owners of the roads, nor with the railroad companies themselves, but with transportation agencies or companies which have arrangements with the railroad companies for the carriage. In this manner some of the responsibilities of common carriage are often sought to be evaded. But in vain. Public policy demands that the right of the owners to absolute security against the negligence of the carrier, and of all persons engaged in performing the carrier's duty, shall not be taken away by any reservation in the carrier's receipt, or by any arrangement between him and the performing company. EVIDENCE ON TRIAL FOR HOMICIDEWHEN THREATS OF DECEASED ADMISSIBLE. N the case of Wiggins, plaintiff in error, v. The People of the United States in the Territory of Utah, recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, it is held that a writ of error from this court to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, is allowed by section 3 of the act of Congress of June 23, 1874 (18 U. S. S. 254), in convictions for bigamy, polygamy, or sentences of death for any crime. The court also held, that in a trial for homicide, where the question whether the prisoner or the deceased commenced the encounter which resulted in death, is in any manner of doubt, it is competent to prove threats of violence against the prisoner made by the deceased, though not brought to the knowledge of the prisoner. In regard to this the opinion says that although there is some conflict of authority as to the admission of threats of the deceased against the prisoner in a case of homicide, where the threats had not been communicated to him, there is a modification of the doctrine in more recent times, established by the decisions of courts of high authority, which is very well stated by Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law, $ 1,027: "Where the question is as to what was deceased's attitude at the time of the fatal encounter, recent threats may become relevant to show that this attitude was one hostile to the defendant, even though such threats were not communicated to defendant. The evidence is not relevant to show the quo animo of the defendant, but it may be relevant to show that at the time of the meeting the deceased was seeking defendant's life." Stokes v. People of New York, 53 N. Y. 174; Keener v. The State, 18 Ga. 194; Campbell v. The People, 16 Ill. 18; Holler v. The State, 37 Ind. 57; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; People v. Scroggins, 37 id. 676. BENCH AND BAR. Senator-elect Davis of Illinois is said to be a millionaire. This will partly explain his willingness to sacrifice the comfortable and enduring office of justice at a salary of $10,000 a year for the precarious tenure of a senator at a little more than half that sum. Charles II, and the habeas corpus act of the United States. Under the subject-head of the first book are discussed the general nature of the right of personal liberty, the nature of the limitations thereto, and the statutory guarantees in England and America. Under that of the second book are treated the nature of the writ of habeas corpus and the sources and extent of The friends of Chief Justice Charles Doe, jurisdiction over it, the practice in procuring, serving, of New Hampshire, are urging his claim to the vacant seat on the Supreme Bench of the United States. Judge Doe is an able lawyer, no doubt, but not a "well tuned cymbal" if it be true as Lord Bacon said, that a "much speaking judge is no well tuned cymbal." He is given to writing opinious of extreme length. Fortunately all women have not the same opinion of the legal profession that Coke's second wife had. Burleigh's letter from New York to the Boston Journal, recently said: "We had one minister here who had been a lawyer. His wife sent back some cards left for her, with the note that she married a lawyer and not a minister; that her husband had changed his profession, but she had not changed hers. She should select her own company, and receive only those who were agreeable to her." One of the stories illustrative of the ready wit of the late Senator Nye, of Nevada, is to the effect that he was once engaged in trying a case before a peevish judge in Southern Nevada, and had examined a witness at great length. At last the patience of the judge was exhausted, and he rebuked General Nye for his course, and petulantly asked him, "General Nye, what do you think I am sitting here for?" Nye looked up at the bench, and with a grave countenance, but with a twinkle in his eye, answered coolly and composedly, "You have got me this time, your honor." and returning the writ, and the determination of the issues raised thereunder, the right to bail, and other topics of like nature. Under that of the third book are treated the topics of extradition of fugitives from foreign states and interstate extradition of fugitives. It will be seen that many matters liable to be of practical interest to every lawyer in active business are touched upon. We think, however, the editor of this edition, in preparing it, has not continued his investigations to as late a period as the date of his preface thereto would indicate. In the portion of the work devoted to extradition, the history of that subject as discussed in various cases of importance is given, but there is not one word about the Winslow case, which has been the occasion of so much controversy during the past year. And upon the subject of habeas corpus the case of People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, decided by the Court of Appeals of this State as long ago as April, 1875, was one of the most ably contested and important cases ever decided in this State. Yet the only reference to it is a brief note on page 329, where neither the title of the cause is given, nor the court in which it was decided, nor any other reference On one occasion Lord Ellenborough was whereby one not familiar with it could determine under the necessity of listening to an advocate who had the reputation of being a sound lawyer, but a terrible bore. The question before the court was the ratability of certain lime quarries to the relief of the poor. Counsel contended, at a most wearisome length, that such property was not ratable, because the limestone in the quarries could be reached only by deep boring, which was a matter of science. Well," interrupted his lordship, "as to that, you will hardly succeed in convincing us, sir, that every species of boring is a matter of science." It is said that there was only one man in court who failed to see the joke. On another occasion, Henry Hunt, a noted demagogue of his day, was before him to receive sentence upon a conviction for holding a seditious meeting, and he began a speech in mitigation of penalty, by complaining of certain persons who accused him of "stirring up the people by dangerous eloquence." My impartiality as a judge," mildly observed the Lord Chief Justice, "calls upon me to say, sir, that in accusing you of that, they do you great injustice." BOOK NOTICES. A Treatise on the Right of Personal Liberty and on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Practice connected with it: with a view of the law of Extradition of Fugitives. By Rollin C. Hurd. Second edition, with Notes by Frank H. Hurd. Albany: W. C. Little & Co., 1876. PREVIO REVIOUS to the issue of the first edition of this work there was, we believe, no treatise on the subjects embraced by it other than that contained in a note by Nicholas Hill, Jr., in 3 Hill's Reports, at page 647. The work of Mr. Hurd found acceptance and has remained the standard upon habeas corpus since its first issue. Changes in the statute law to some extent, and the increasing mass of case law, have made a new edition necessary. The work is divided into three books; the first treating of the right of personal liberty, the second of the writ of habeas corpus, and the third upon the law of extradition of fugitives, with appendices containing the habeas corpus act of 31 whether the decision was authoritative or not. We cite these instances only as evidence that the work is not up to the times in this edition. The volume appears to be otherwise carefully prepared, and the statements of law therein, so far as we have examined, seem to be accurate. It is fairly indexed, has a table of cases cited, and is well printed and bound. Reports of Selected Civil and Criminal Cases, decided in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. By W. P. D. Bush, Reporter, Vol. XI. Containing cases decided during the latter part of Winter Term, 1874, on and after March 4, 1875; all of Summer Term, 1875, and part of January Term, 1876. Louisville, Ky.; John P. Morton & Co., 1876. In the preparation of this series of reports there are some things to be commended and some that deserve censure. The cases reported are, as a rule, of considerable value, and are of recent date; and the head-notes are concise and accurate. This is the work of the Reporter, and he is entitled to credit therefor. The volume, however, is printed in such a manner as to make the matter contained therein cover as many pages as possible. This, in view of the present need for condensation in law publications in order to bring them within the reach of attorneys of moderate means, is unjustifiable, and we do not believe it will, in the long run, be found to be to the profit of a publisher practicing it. Among the cases which appear in the volume, we note these: Kuevan v. Specker, page 1. It is here decided that a homestead exemption is not lost by a fraudulent conveyance by a debtor and his wife, to a third party, who reconveyed to the wife of the debtor. Locknane v. Emmerson, p. 69. The words to bear legal interest" were inserted in a note, by the consent of the payee, after a surety had signed it, and without such surety's knowledge. It was held that the surety was released, and that a subsequent erasure of the words inserted did not restore the note to vitality so as to bind the surety. In re Wooley, p. 95. Here an attorney made certain statements in a petition in a proceeding before the court, which the court deemed insulting to it. It was held that the court might revoke such attorney's authority to practice. Gaar v. Louisville Banking Co., p. 180. Here it is decided, that where a debtor, by the terms of a contract, can avoid the payment of a larger by paying a smaller sum at an earlier day, the contract is not usurious; but the difference between the two sums is a penalty. United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, p. 265. In this case it is held that a judgment against one co-trespasser will not per se bar an action against another for the same transaction Patterson v. Commonwealth, p. 311. An act of the State legislature, to prohibit sales of illuminating oil, igniting at a certain degree of heat was here held not an interference with the power of Congress, under art. 1, § 4, of the Federal Constitution, in relation to patent-rights and copy adopted by the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, by order of Circuit Judge Johnson and Judge Blatchford: In actions at law a consent to a reference of the whole issue must likewise contain a provision that judgment shall not be entered until after ten days' notice of the filing of the report of the referee and of the judgment proposed to be entered thereon. After a reference, at any time before the entry of judgment, either party may move for a new trial upon a case or exceptions, and, if such a motion be denied, the motion and the questions involved in it may be entered on the record as if it had been a ruling made upon a trial by the judge without a jury and excepted to in like man ner. When a motion for a new trial is intended to be made the court may extend the time for entering judgment upon the application of the moving party. and may stay all other proceedings until the decision of the motion is rendered. COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. rights. Hansford's Administratri.c v. Payne, p. 381. It THE following decisions were handed down in the is here held that if an apothecary's clerk, in filling a physician's prescription, delivers a poison instead of harmless drug, through gross negligence, the apothecary is liable at common law for the injury resulting thereby. Robinson v. Webb, p. 464. The owner of a lot was held not liable for the negligence of one contracting to build a house on such lot. City of Henderson v. Sandefur, p. 550. Here a city was held not liable for injuries to horses and carriage, resulting from a failure to improve a street, which was not needed for the use or convenience of the public. Commonwealth v. Jackson, p. 679. In this case it was held that, in prosecutions for bigamy, the marriage of the defendant may be established by proof of conduct, declarations, co-habitation, etc. The English and American authorities on the subject are reviewed in the opinion. The volume lacks a table of cases cited. WE RULES OF COURT. E are requested to publish the following rule adopted by the United States Circuit Court, at a term held in Utica on the third Tuesday of March, 1876, Hon. Alexander S. Johnson presiding, regulating service by mail in equity cases: In pursuance of rule 89 of the rules of practice of the courts of equity of the United States, prescribed by New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, February 6, 1877: Motion granted, with costs of appeal up to time of motion, and $10 costs of motion - People ex rel. McGill v. Ryan.Motion for reargument denied, with $10 costs - Eno v. The Mayor; Parsons v. Johnson. Judgment affirmed, with costs - Pierce v. Brown; Augsbury v. Flower; McDougall v. Hess; Devlin v. O'Neill; Morris v. First National Bank; Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. v. Hill; Bloomer v. Morss. Judgment modified by adding the $322.50 which was deducted from Bell's claims, and as modified affirmed, without costs to either party as against the others in this court-Millard v. McMullen. - Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event Simson v. Brown; Wood v. Sheehan.- Appeal dismissed, with costs - The Tribune Association v. Smith.Order of General Term, reversing order of Special Term, affirmed, and appeal from order of the General Term, denying application to dismiss last appeal, dismissed with costs of one appeal only — Wallace v. Castle (two cases). Order of General and Special Terms reversed without costs to either party in this court-In re freeholders of Irondequoit.Order affirmed, with costs-) - Kerrigan v. Force. NOTES. the Supreme Court of the United States, the following THE New York Observer prefaces a lengthy extract from Judge Neilson's first Article on Rufus Choate with the following remarks: "His Honor Judge Neilson, of the Brooklyn City Court, has a remarkable paper in the LAW JOURNAL, drawing a sharp contrast between the character of Rufus Choate and that of Lord Macaulay. The analysis is skillfully and ably drawn, and shows that the writer is as keen at the desk as on the bench."- By an oversight of the printer the name "Carlyle" was printed in the article where Carlisle referring to Lord Carlisle-was written. - T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. have just published, in a very handsome style, the second volume, in two parts, of the fourth American edition, of White & Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity. The first volume, in tains all the additions to the last London edition, betwo parts, was published last year. The work conside the latest American authorities, added by Judge Hare, and the elaborate notes added to the former American edition by Judge Hare and Mr. Wallace. The following rules in bankruptcy have just been The work is in itself almost an encyclopedia of law. rule is hereby adopted by the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York: After the appearance of a defendant, the service of notices and also of motion papers upon such defendant or upon the complainant, except papers to bring a party into contempt, may hereafter be made by mail when the person making the service and the person on whom it is to be made reside in different places within this State, between which there is a regular communication by mail. In case of such service, the notice or other paper to be served must be deposited in the postoffice at the residence of the person making the service, inclosed in an envelope, addressed to the person on whom it is to be served, at his place of residence, and the full postage prepaid. When the service is by mail, under this rule, it shall be double the time required in cases of personal services, except notice of a motion, which may be made ten days before the time appointed therefor, and except service of notice of trial and final hearing, which may be made sixteen days before the term at which the trial or final hearing is to be had, including the day of service. The Chicago Bar Association, at its recent annual 31, 1875, the Probate Court of England granted 40.394 meeting, elected John N. Jewett, President; George probates of wills or letters of administration. The W. Smith and James L. High, Vice-Presidents; Fred-personal property which thus passed into new hands erick Ulman, Secretary, and John S. Quick, Treasurer. -The Quincy, Ill., Bar Association, at its annual meeting, elected for the following year these officers: President, Hon. O. H. Browning; First Vice-President, Wm. Marsh; Second Vice-President, A. E. Wheat; Secretary, Thos. W. Macfall; Treasurer, Henry Asbury. The profession in Nova Scotia are moving for the formation of a Dominion Bar Association, and a meeting was recently held at Halifax to consider the project. The meeting was fully attended, the courts adjourning for that purpose, and the expression of all who spoke was cordially favorable to an organization of the bar of the character mentioned. Among the recent deaths of eminent members of the profession we are called on to chronicle are the following: Hon. Daniel Haynes, late Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which took place week before last, at his residence at Hamburg, N. J. He was born seventy-seven years ago, and was admitted to the bar in 1823; he almost immediately took rank with its foremost members, and secured a large and lucrative practice before the courts. In 1843 he was chosen governor and chancellor by the legislature, and was elected governor in 1847, and occupying the executive chair till 1851. Two years later he was appointed one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court, and, being reappointed in 1859, occupied the judicial bench for fourteen years, being, during the same long term, ex officio a member of the State Court of Errors and Appeals. Hon. Daniel M. Christie, one of the most widely-known lawyers in New Hampshire, died at Dover, in that State, a little over two weeks ago, at the advanced age of 86 years. He was born at Antrim, October 15, 1790; was graduated at Dartmouth College in 1815; began the practice of law in Berwick, Me., and in 1823 removed to Dover, where he ever afterward resided. In 1826 he was elected a member of the State legislature, and afterward held a seat in that body during eleven sessions. He was twice offered the chief justiceship of the State, and declined it. Robert Strange, a prominent citizen and lawyer of Wilmington, N. C., died suddenly on the 22d ult., of paralysis. John Wilson, the oldest member of the San Francisco bar, died at Leuson City, Cal., on the 2d inst., aged eighty-seven years. He emigrated from Missouri, where he was a prominent politician, in 1849. English criminal procedure is not always carefully conducted, if the following instance is an example: At the Bristol Quarter Sessions lately, a solicitor's clerk was tried before the recorder, on an indictment charging him with stealing four books. Lewis conducted his own defense, cross-examined the witnesses with some skill, and made a long address to the jury. He was, however, found guilty, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment with hard labor. A few days thereafter, however, the attention of the clerk of the peace was called to the fact that the grand jury had thrown out the bill preferred against Lewis, and he was accordingly brought up from the city jail just before the business of the sessions was concluded. The prisoner, who, in the meantime, had had his beard shaved off and his hair cut close, was put in the dock, and was at once ordered by the recorder to be discharged. During the ten months ending October was sworn under £112,601,280.- The annual returns showing the business done in the Law Courts of England, the jurisdiction of which is transferred by the Judicature Acts to the High Court of Justice, will in future be for the law year, and will end with the close of October. A recent New York paper says: A singular case came before Governor Robinson this evening. L. M. Bates & Co., the large importing firm on Broadway, had a person arrested in New York and indicted by the grand jury, named Phillips, of Pittsburg, who owed them a considerable sum of money for goods obtained, as they claim, under false pretenses. Phillips gave bail on the indictment in $15,000, and the indictment is still pending and untried. On returning home, he made a statement before the grand jury of Allegheny county, to the effect that he was inveigled to New York by Bates & Co., and surreptitiously and maliciously arrested. The jury found an indictment against Bates & Co. for conspiring to bring him to New York for the purpose of indicting him for crime. Governor Hartranft, of Pennsylvania, granted, on the application of Phillips, a requisition on the Govornor of New York, for the extradition of the whole firm for conspiracy to bring Phillips to New York. The Governor peremptorily refused to grant a warrant, and said that he would never sign his name to a warrant to send a person to a foreign State to answer to an alleged crime committed in that State where he had never been. The Washington Law Reporter, in explanation of the statement which we made upon its authority in a current topic in our issue of the 16th of December last, in regard to infanticide in the District of Columbia, says: We are not quite certain from just what report we took the figures cited in the article to which the JOURNAL alludes; it was either from that of Col. Timothy Lubey or that of the health officer, Mr. P. T. Keen. This report we have endeavored to find in order to verify our statement by a reference to the precise language; but as we have been unable to procure a copy, we must confess that the probability of an error is against us and yield to the superior authority of the president of the board, Dr. T. S. Verdi."-The Chicago Legal News of January 27 says: "The American Law Register still keeps the name of Judge Redfield at the head of its columns as one of its editors, although the judge has been dead for many months. This is certainly improper. What have you got to say about it, Mr. Register?" Curran was pleading before Fitzgibbon, the Irish Chancellor, with whom he was on terms of any thing but friendship. The Chancellor, with the distinct purpose, as it would seem, of insulting the advocate, brought with him on to the bench a large Newfoundland dog, to which he devoted a great deal of his attention, while Curran was addressing a very elaborate argument to him. At a very material point in the speech, the judge turned quite away, and seemed to be wholly engrossed with his dog. Curran ceased to speak. "Go on, go on, Mr. Curran," said the Chancellor. "Oh, I beg a thousand pardons, my lord," said the witty barrister, "I really was under the impression that your lordships were in consultation." ALL communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication. Communications on business matters should be ad- total repeal of all laws permitting it. dressed to the publishers. boards of supervisors nor local newspapers will regard the limitation. The only way to cut off the waste of public money in this direction is by a If it is essen The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, FEBRUARY 17, 1877. CURRENT TOPICS. tial to give early public notice of the laws, a single newspaper would answer the purpose for the whole State, and the State could afford to send a copy of this to the head of every family for a tithe of what it costs now to publish in local newspapers. In her speech at the opening of parliament on the ⚫ 9th inst., the Queen, in referring to the changes in ΑΜ have a tendency to bring the law and its administration into disrepute, we know of none more efficient than the court of the justice of the peace. Not that this court is, of itself, a discreditable institution, but the transactions which take place in it, or in connection with it, are too often of a character which is not to be commended or even excused. Practice in a justice's court has always, at least in the public mind, been synonymous with trickery and overreaching, and it is the general belief that to a party with a sharp lawyer and a favoring justice success is in every case certain, no matter what may be the merits of the controversy. And this belief does not exist without reason. There is not a lawyer in practice, or, indeed, a business man, who does not know of decisions given by justices of the peace that were not merely erroneous, but grossly so, and known to be so at the time by the justice rendering them, and which could have been rendered for no other than a corrupt reason. Not only are these judicial officers influenced by prejudice, passion or partiality, but many of them actually sell their decisions, and that at a very cheap price. We have known, in this State, a justice to give a decision contrary to what he must have known the law to be, simply for the purpose of compelling an appeal, the result of an appeal being to him just two dollars, which he would receive for making a return. This is not an uncommon incident; neither is the rendering of judgment against a responsible party, in order that the costs of the suit may be collected. Theoretically, the injured party has redress by an appeal and reversal of judgment; but he, in fact, usually secures for the cost and trouble he has been put to only a judgment against a worthless individual. The causes of this state of things are many; but most of them may be remedied, and we trust that some action may be taken this winter by our State legislature in reference thereto. A bill has been introduced in the legislature looking toward a reduction in the expense of publishing the session laws, by limiting the number of newspapers which may receive pay for publishing the laws to two in each county. This will not in the least reduce the expense of publication, as neither VOL. 15.- No. 7. present session, says: "You will be asked to constitute one Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland, and to confer an equitable jurisdiction on the common law courts of that country." As this indicates that the government will favor the measure mentioned, we suppose that Ireland will secure a Code before many months have elapsed. To those who have occasion to refer to the decisions in the Federal courts it must have frequently occurred that a change in the nomenclature of those tribunals might work convenience. At present a court can be described only by a long and cumbrous sequence of words, such as "The United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York," or some other title equally as tedious. It would seem as if names might be devised which would be brief and definite. While it may be of little essential moment what we call things, so that we make ourselves understood, it is always best to apply to such things as we have the naming of short and easily remembered names. Thus may be saved much labor and perplexity. The English statutes are every one of them designated by a short title, which facilitates easy reference, and in entitling their courts, the same idea has not been lost sight of. In this country there has been but little attention paid to what may be called petty conveniences, but such conveniences would be no less useful to us than to others. A bill pending in the legislature, relative to witnesses in criminal cases, promises to remove, in some degree, a wrong in our criminal procedure which has been the occasion of much comment. Under the law, as it now is, if a witness is unable to give bail he is liable to be detained, or in other words, imprisoned until the final trial of the one charged with the offense he has the misfortune to be cognizant of. This, taken with the circumstance that the offender, in the mean time, may be at liberty, renders the administration of justice, to some degree, a mockery. We believe that if the custom of detaining witnesses was done away with it would work no harm, but rather benefit. If there was no require |