will be the same. Bain v. Brand, L. R., 1 App. Cas. (H. L.) 762. LIBEL. Privileged publication: comments in newspaper on matters of public interest.-To justify the publication in a newspaper of defamatory comments, apart from reports of what passes in courts of justice, it must be shown either that the person of whom the defamatory matter is written was a person whose position and character are of general interest to the whole country, or that the subject-matter dealt with is one of general interest to the whole community. It is not enough to show that the individual fills a public character of a limited kind and in a limited district, or that the subject-matter dealt with is of interest only to a small portion of the public, or to the public in a limited district. The defendants, the proprietors of a newspaper, published a report of the proceedings at a meeting of the board of guardians of a provincial union, containing false and defamatory matter reflecting upon the medical officer of the union workhouse. Held, not privileged by the occasion, though the report was admitted to be bona fide and a correct account of what passed at the meeting. Purcell v. Sowler, L. R., 1 C. P. D. 781. STATUTE OF FRAUDS. Contract of sale by broker: signature in broker's book. A broker, acting for the plaintiff, made a contract for the sale of goods to the defendant, sending a note to each party, but signing only that which was sent to the seller; he, however, entered the contract in his book in which he signed both the bought and the sold-note. The defeudant kept the note which was sent to him without objection until called upon to accept the goods, when he repudiated the contract, assigning for reason that the note sent to him was not signed. Held, that the conduct of the defendant amounted to an admission that the broker had authority to make the contract for him, and consequently that his signature to the sold-note bound the defend IT T is said that good law is never old, and it is very certain that the fundamental principles of jurisprudence were enunciated as clearly and accurately by the courts of a hundred years ago as they are by those of to-day, and that a text-book of the elements is not the worse because it has instructed several generations. It is also certain that when a second edition of a series of reports is demanded it is because there are valuable decisions contained in that series, and the circumstance that a second edition has been issued is more of a recommendation to these volumes than any we could give them. We need, therefore, say nothing as to the merit of the decisions embraced therein or of the manner in which the work of the reporter has been done. To the profession of Ohio Handy's Reports are already familiar, and although less known to the bar outside of Ohio, they are not unfrequently referred to in the briefs of counsel. Among the decis ions of general interest contained in these volumes we will notice only a few. In volume I, Ellis v. Ohio L. Ins. Co., pp. 98 and 119. It is here held that where payment of a forged bill or check is once made by the drawee he is estopped from denying the genuineness of the drawer's signature, and also that to constitute a usage which can be set up by a bank it must apply to the place and not to one or more banks. Miller v. W. F. M. Ins. Co., p. 208. It is held that a policy of insurance is governed by no different rule than that applied to other mercantile contracts and that a false representation will avoid a policy conditioned upon the truth of such representation, notwithstanding it in no way contributes to a loss thereunder. Commercial Bank, etc., v. Bowman, p. 246. It is held that where in a State legislative act incorporating a bank a specific mode of taxation of the bank is provided, a subsequent act providing for a more burdensome form of taxation is in violation of a contract and invalid under the Federal constitution. Swasey v. Laycock, p. 335. It is held that an award will not be set aside for error of judgment as to the law on the part of the arbitrator, although it will for a mistake of law. Isham v. Greenham, p. 358. A common carrier must, if requested, permit the consignee to examine the cargo at the place of delivery before he can demand his freight. In volume II, McIlvaine v. Wood, p. 166. In this case the doctrine that a landlord is not liable for a nuisance created by his tenant is asserted. The editor of this edition has made certain additions and annotations which will be found of use to those having occasion to examine the volumes. AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. The American Law Review, April, 1877. Mansfield Storey and Samuel Hoar, Editors. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. This number of the Review contains but three essays. These are, however, of more than ordinary merit. The subjects are "The Washington Safe Burglary Conspiracy," "The Right of Extradition," and Notes on Coroners." The digests are of English law reports, State reports, and cases in bankruptcy. The book notices are written with the usual care and discrimination. The Summary of Events touches upon many matters of interest to the profession, and will be found very entertaining, as well as useful reading. COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. THE following decisions were handed down in the New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, April 10, 1877: Order affirmed - In the matter of Brady, an imprisoned debtor.- Judgment affirmed - Franklin v. The People; Barnesciotta and ano. v. The People.Judgment affirmed, with costs-Porter v. Waring; Porter v. Porter; Gawtry v. Clarke; Kellam v. McKinstry; Chapman v. Porter; Rockwell v. McGovern ; Rockwell v. Ginnelly; Kline v. The Queen Insurance Co.- Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event Marston v. Gould; Western Transportation Co. v. Hoyt et al.; Dilleber v. Home Life Insurance Co.; Hennesy et al. v. Wheeler et al. Motion for reargument denied, with $10 costs-Anderson v. Acheson and ano.-————— Order granting new trial reversed and judgment on report of referee affirmed, with costs-Cahen v. Continental Life Insurance Co. of New York.—Order granting new trial reversed, and judgment of nonsuit affirmed, with BENCH AND BAR. preme Court three times after a verdict of guilty was rendered, and sentence of death passed; and though the judgment was affirmed each time, the man is still alive! The London Times, in speaking of the attack on the Vice-Chancellor with an egg, says: Such a scene is happily of very rare occurrence. The old law reports, however, give a few cases of the kind, which seem to have been punished with extreme severity. In "Dyer's Reports" (reprinted 1688), for assaulting a witness in court a man was condemned to imprisonment for life, to forfeit his goods, and to have his right hand amputated at the "Standard in Cheape." A case more directly in point is reported in the quaint Norman French of the law courts as follows: "Richardson ch. Hon. Christopher Morgan died at Auburn, Just. de C. Banc al Assises at Salisbury in summer 1631 in this State, on the 3d inst. He was born June 4, 1808, at Aurora, N. Y., was graduated from Yale College in 1830, and was admitted to the bar not long thereafter. He was twice member of Congress, and served two years as Secretary of State of this State. A Boston counselor of great professed piety, thinks it needful to sow seed by all waters, and so has his writing paper branded with Scripture texts. The other day he had occasion to make an application to the Supreme Court in respect to some matter of practice, and he unluckily used a sheet of paper which was headed: 'Ye are all bought with a price." Some malicious wag has been telling that the application wasn't granted. The following is from England : A case of seduction was tried before a well-known judge. The evidence showed a combination of every kind of villainy in the defendant, and as the facts came out, the judge grew red and white, and was fairly boiling when the time came to charge the jury. "Gentlemen of the jury," said he, "it is a perfectly clear case, and a most nefarious one. The defendant has unquestionably robbed the plaintiff, and has basely betrayed his daughter, and abandoned her in a foreign land. I—I only wish it had been my daughter." The effect produced by this speech was not exactly what the speaker intended it to be. IN NOTES. fuit assault per prisoner la condemne pur felony que puis son condemnation ject un brickbat a le dit Justice que narrowly mist, and pur ce immediately fuit indictment drawn per Noy envers le prisoner and son dexter manus ampute and fix al gibbet sur que luy mesme immediatement hange in presence de Court." The Noy herein mentioned was the Attorney-General. Another case reported in the same book (page 188 b, marginal note) records the fact that for striking Sir Thomas Reynolds with a stick Sir William Waller was fined £1,000 and ordered to be imprisoned during the Royal pleasure. The Solicitors' Journal thus speaks of the position occupied by.leading solicitors in England, outside of London. Here in London the heads of the great firms in Bedford-row or Lincoln's-inn are omnipotent in their offices, important at the Law Institution, and of much consideration in the courts; but what does the world half a mile from their offices know of them? In the country it is wholly different. The leading solicitor of a large provincial town, if he be sagacious and energetic, occupies a position, so far as we know, altogether unique. In France the practical separation of the so-called lower branch of the legal profession into two divisions, prevents the occurrence of the same state of circumstances. The avoué, who in many respects corresponds to our solicitor, is not, so to speak, the general man of business of his clients. The notary, who is generally trusted in matters relating to business affairs, although he acts as a conveyancer, is not strictly a practicing lawyer. Our leading provincial solicitor combines the influence of both these classes; and exercises the, to many minds most enviable, prerogative of being at the bottom of every thing. Having been long established in business he is the depository of the secrets of large numbers of his neighbors; he hears in the course of his professional transactions the secrets of others, and he is the trusted adviser in private matters of multitudes of clients. Moreover he knows every one in the district, and knows what most people are likely to think on any given subject; what more natural when any local movement is mooted than that it should occur to the The Macon Telegraph, in speaking of the recent de- projectors to drop in and ascertain what Mr. cision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case thinks about it? In most public undertakings too of Brinckley v. State, says: The case of Brinckley, the there is a period when the layman feels more or less celebrated wife-murderer, has again been before the helpless; when the constitution of a new society has Supreme Court, and the judgment and sentence of to be settled, resolutions to be prepared, or rules death is again affirmed. This ends the case, unless the drafted, the lawyer's services are invaluable; and so Governor should intervene with the pardoning power. it comes to pass that unobtrusively but effectually be Strangely enough, this case has been before the Su-moulds the new institution into shape. the case of Hyams v. Bamberger, decided at the last General Term of the Supreme Court of this State in the First Department, it was held that the fact that an assignee for the benefit of creditors mixes the funds of the trust with his private funds, standing alone, is not sufficient to warrant the appointment of a receiver. A suit with respect to the publication by Pere Hyacinthe of manuscripts given him by the Count de Montalembert, recently pending in France before the Civil Tribunal of the Seine, has been decided adversely to Pere Hyacinthe. An appeal will be taken. ALL communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication. Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, APRIL 21, 1877. CURRENT TOPICS. THE legislature of Pennsylvania has just enacted a law which is a disgrace to the reputation of that Commonwealth, and which can in the long run operate only to the detriment of the class it is designed to protect, while it inflicts inconceivable and lasting injury upon every other class. We refer to the "stay" law, which received the executive approval upon the 23d of last month. Under this law, before any sale of real estate can be made under any legal process, an appraisal of such estate must be had by "six lawful freeholders" of the neighborhood, and if such estate does not sell for two-thirds of the appraised valuation, a stay for one year is to be allowed. That such a law should find favor in a State like Pennsylvania, we confess astonishes us. And the framers of the act seem to have an idea that it is not altogether what it should be, for they provide that its provisions shall not apply to "suits for the collection of interest semi-annually on moneys due the estates of decedents' widows and minors, which suits are hereby authorized to be instituted," nor to claims for labor. The act is probably unconstitutional as to debts already incurred, and it will stand in the way of the creation of new ones. The object of the act is manifested by its concluding clause, which provides that it shall not remain in force longer than eighteen months. It is to afford a temporary relief to debtors, allowing them to retain and use their property for a year at the expense of their creditors. The appraisement being made by the neighbors of the debtor, will in every instance be very much above the real value of the property, which will so render a sale impossible. There is a provision for the payment of interest, but as, in most instances, the land will be insufficient to satisfy the debt, this will be of no benefit to creditors. The law is a dishonest one, and we should not be surprised to find an act repudiating the public debt of the State following it. The liberal construction which courts and juries give to the civil damage law is illustrated in the case of Schmidt v. Mitchell, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Schmidt sold the husband of the other party intoxicating drink. The husband becoming drunk and abusive, was shot by a third party, whereby he died, and his widow VOL. 15.- No. 16. brought suit against Schmidt, under the law, for such death. The jury found in favor of the widow. The judgment was reversed, upon appeal, but the case indicates what strange verdicts are liable to result from this truly remarkable law. The legislature of Connecticut has passed an act providing that the attorneys at law admitted to practice in the courts of that State and resident in any county thereof may organize themselves by the name of "The Law Library Association" for such county, and when so organized shall be a corporation for the belonging to the county, and may adopt by-laws for purpose of holding and managing the law library that purpose, with the approval of a judge of the Superior Court. The libraries are made free for the use of the inhabitants of the State, under the rules established by the associations, and a provision for the support of such libraries is made from the public treasury. We would recommend this law to the attention of the legislature of this State, and also to that of the bar associations, both State and local. In most of the counties of this State there already exists a district or county library. In some places this library is accessible to members of the profession, and is used by them. But in many places it is practically closed against them, being shut up in the court-house or in some private office, and available only occasionally, and by the favor of the one having charge of it. In some counties the library is not cared for, and is plundered, its volumes going to enrich private libraries. This is not surprising, seeing that there is usually no legislative provision for the care of these collections of books, the matter being left to the authorities of the counties, who, as a rule, know nothing about such things. Under the Connecticut system the persons chiefly interested in creating and preserving a county law library would have control of it, and we should have excellent libraries in every locality, accessible to both the profession and the public. A movement of a somewhat unusual nature has been made in the State legislature looking to the removal from office of Justice Balcom of the Supreme Court. By article 6, section 11, of the Constitution, it is provided that "justices of the Supreme Court may be removed by concurrent resolution of both houses of the legislature, if twothirds of all the members elected to each house concur therein." But it is further provided that no removal shall be made "unless the cause thereof be entered upon the journals, nor unless the party complained of shall be served with a copy of the charges against him, and shall have an opportunity of being heard." The alleged reason of the present movement is, Judge Balcom has become mentally disabled, so that he is incompetent to perform judicial duties. The right of the legislature to remove for this reason is somewhat questionable. By the constitutional provision mentioned the power of removal is given, but it must be for cause, and there must be charges made against the incumbent. The statement that a man is sick would hardly be called a charge against him, and we do not believe that it was designed to confer upon the legislature power to oust from the judicial office except for conduct which amounts in effect to a dereliction of duty. A judge may indeed become unfitted for the performance of his official duties from mental weakness, and this circumstance may create great inconvenience, but the same result might follow from an attack of rheumatism or fever, yet in the latter event no one would think of instituting a movement for his removal. The design of the framers of the Constitution was to render the judiciary independent of the other branches of government during good behavior. To guard against the contingency of physical and mental weakness upon the bench, a limitation of age was supposed to be sufficient. If the present attempt should be successful and Judge Balcolm is removed, there will be no restraint left upon the power of removal. If the legislature can remove for insanity or mental weakness, it can for bodily infirmity, whether permanent or temporary, and it will be easy enough to find excuses for any exercise of the power. Every one has heard the story of the two methods of dealing with an adverse judicial decision, which were: first to appeal or second to swear at the court. One method or the other is usually resorted to, the choice being regulated by the taste or ability of the attorney or the means of the client. Where a case reaches the court of last resort, however, and is decided, the unsuccessful party has no longer the chance to vindicate his cause by the first method, so if he desires to continue the fight he must resort to the last. The defeated suitor of the present day, however, does not always confine himself to the comparatively harmless though eminently satisfactory panacea of profanity, but sometimes resorts to more questionable and discreditable practices. He is not satisfied with denunciation, but adds thereto the venom of slander, and seeks to blacken the reputations of those who compose the court by false tales of corruption and bribery. Of such a character is the attempt made in the columns of a daily newspaper a day or two ago to implicate Judge Folger, in the disreputable practices that prevailed during the official career of Mr. William M. Tweed. That individual having prepared a statement, setting forth the particulars of his ever famous distribution of the public funds where they would do the most good, the newspaper we have mentioned took occasion to give what it claimed to be a summary of the statement and mentioned Judge Folger among those sharing in the distribution. There was no shadow of excuse for this charge, his name appearing nowhere in the original statement. It was (and the newspaper itself has since admitted it to be false) a pure fabrication and could have been published with but one object, namely, to cast discredit upon our highest State court. It has not had that effect, for nobody believed it, and the prompt repudiation of it as forming a part of the confession of Mr. Tweed, by the gentleman having that document in charge, compelled the newspaper in whose columns it appeared to hasten to make a denial. We trust the matter will not be left here, but that the party causing the libel to be published will be exposed and punished. The bills of general interest introduced in the State legislature during the past week are these: Directing the publication of monthly reports of the business of banking institutions; classifying the departments of the State government; to prevent losses of life by fire in hotels. One bill provides that every proprietor of a hotel or boarding-house shall keep a knotted rope in all rooms above the second story sufficiently long to reach to the ground; another, that he shall furnish a metallic ladder to each room. Among the bills upon which progress has been made the one relating to the taxation of stockholders of banks is the most important. This bill, in some degree, places holders of this kind of property nearer upon an equality with those of other kinds, but does not do full justice. There is, however, a strong probability that it will not pass. The Committee of the Whole in the Assembly have decided to report in favor of the passage of a bill, which has already passed the Senate, giving women the right to hold office as school trustees, and the bill will probably become a law. A statute just enacted (chap. 65) is designed to reach the frauds which are frequently perpetrated upon farmers by the sale of patent rights. It requires every note given for a patent right to bear on its face a statement that it is so given, and makes the failure to comply with the provisions of the law a misdemeanor. Notes given for the purchase-price of patented articles are excepted from the operation of the statute. The law is perfectly useless so far as preventing the fraud aimed at is concerned. The true way to stop this kind of business is to give the maker of notes obtained by fraud a right to defend on that ground, even against an innocent purchaser, and if it be established that such maker is not a trader, to require that the holder show that he took the paper for value, and that there were no circumstances connected with the transaction which would put a reasonable man upon inquiry. NOTES OF CASES. N the case of State v. Boogher, decided at the March Term of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (3 Cent. L. J. 321), the defendant was prosecuted for a criminal libel upon a corporation. There were five counts in the information, each charging a separate offense. The jury found the defendant guilty upon three counts, assessing the penalty upon one count a fine of $50, upon another a fine of $100, and upon the third two months' imprisonment, and he was sentenced to pay $150 fine and be imprisoned two months. The counsel for the defendant, on appeal, claimed that the imposition of cumulative penalties was error, citing Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559; 19 Am. 211. The court, however, said that the Supreme Court of Missouri appear to have come, many years ago, to an opposite conclusion from that arrived at by the New York Court of Appeals as to what was the common law of England upon this point. Storrs v. State, 3 Mo. 9. The Missouri doctrine appears to be upheld in Rex v. Jones, 2 Campb. 131, where Lord Ellenborough says: "In point of law there is no objection to a man being tried on one indictment for several offenses of the same sort." It is the daily usage to receive evidence of several libels and of several assaults upon the same indictment. Many English cases seem to uphold the same rule as to the case of misdemeanors especially, holding that counts for distinct offenses may be joined in the same indictment, and the defendant sentenced as for more than one offense at the same trial. See Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527; Young v. The King, 3 Term R. 98; Rex v. Johnson, 3 M. & S. 539; Reg. v. Cutbush, 10 Cox's C. C. 489; Regina v. Castro, 9 Eng. L. R. Q. B. 350. In the latter case the defendant (the Tichborne claimant) was indicted for and convicted of two distinct offenses of perjury, one committed in the Common Pleas and the other before a commissioner in chancery, and sentenced to several years penal servitude upon each count. The The power of a corporation to guarantee the debt of another is considered in the case of Low v. California Pacific Railroad Co., decided by the Supreme Court of California on the 19th of March last. Central Pacific Railroad Company, under the third section of the act incorporating it, is "capable in law to make all contracts necessary for the construction, completion and maintenance of such railroad, and generally to possess all the powers and privileges for the purpose of carrying on the business of the corporation that private individuals and natural persons now enjoy." This company acquired by lease the railroad belonging to defendant, and in consideration agreed, among other things, to guarantee the payment of the principal and interest of certain bonds issued by defendant. This contract the court held was not ultra vires, but the power to make it was conferred by the section mentioned. The court cite, as sustaining its view, the cases of Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 411; Smead v. Indianapolis R. R. Co., 11 Ind. 104; Stewart v. Erie & West. Transp. Co., 17 Min. 372. These cases, as was shown in the dissenting opinion of McKinstry, J., do not fully support the conclusion arrived at in the principal case. In Smead v. Indianapolis R. R. Co. the charter of the defendant allowed it to connect with other roads, and to "make such contracts and agreements for the transportation of freight and passengers or for the use of the road as to the board of directors may seem proper," and it was decided that an agreement to pay for widening a connecting road was proper. In Stewart v. Erie & West. Transp. Co. it was only held that a railroad company not restrained by its charter may enter into contracts with connecting companies for the purpose of arranging for through transportation over its own and other roads, and in the case of Railroad Co. v. Howard, which comes nearest to the principal case, it was held that a railroad company receiving bonds of cities and counties, issued to aid in the building of its railroad, under authority of law might guarantee such bonds when donated to it. See, also, Bradley v. Ballard, 55 Ill. 413; 8 Am. Rep. 656; Worthington v. Savage Manuf. Co., 1 Gill. 201; Bridgport City Bank v. Empire Stone Dress. Co., 30 Barb. 421; Colman v. East. Count. Railway Co., 10 Beav. 1. In the case of Beck v. Hibernia Ins. Co. of Ohio, 44 Md. 95, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a condition avoiding a fire insurance policy for concealment. The policy in question, which insured certain buildings therein particularly described, against loss or damage by fire, provided that the conditions thereunto annexed should form part of the instrument, and were to be resorted to in order to explain the rights and obligations of the parties to it. By one of the conditions it required every applicant for insurance in the company to state any incumbrance that might exist on the property to be insured; and by another, it declared that "if any person insuring any building or goods in this office shall make any misrepresentation or concealment, such insurance shall be void." Prior to and at the time the policy was issued, there were two mortgages on the insured buildings, the existence of which was never communicated to the insurance company or its agent. A loss occurring, this action was brought upon the policy. The court held that the failure to disclose the existence of the mortgages avoided the policy and defeated the action. as sustaining the decision, Bowman v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 40 Md. 620; Hutchins v. Cleve. Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Ohio St. 477; Gahagan v. Un. Mut. Ins. Co., 43 N. H. 176; Putten v. Mer. & Farm. Ins. Co., 38 id. 338; Bowditch Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Winslow, 3 Gray, 415; Same v. Same, 8 id. 38; Penn. Ins. Co. v. Gottsman, 48 Penn. St. 151; Campbell v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 403. But see Hoffman v. Etna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 451; Peck v. New London Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Conn. 575. See, |