to him from the agent, if the limitation of the agent's authority was not disclosed to the buyer. (Semenza v. Brinsley, 18 C. B. [N. S.] 467; 12 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 265, followed and explained.) English Court of Appeal. Ex parte Dixon, 35 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 644.

Assignment of judgment—what it passes.-The assignment of a judgment does not pass a right of action founded on the negligence of the attorney prior to the assignment in obtaining the judgment. Sup. Ct. of Pennsylvania. Morris v. McCullough.

Constitutional law: moneys in hands of State officers cannot be attached. - The plaintiff caused an attachment to be issued against the defendants as non-resident debtors. The only property attached was a sum of money in the hands of the State treasurer of New Jersey, alleged to be due from that State to the defendauts. Held, that as a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent, and therefore money in the hands of the State's treasurer, due to a non-resident debtor, cannot be attached at the suit of a creditor. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey. Loder v. Baker, Arnold & Co. Contract: construction of: surplusage.- In the interpretation of written instruments, words having a meaning cannot be disregarded; the doctrine of surplusage applying not to contracts, but to pleadings. Where a bond prohibited the sale of wine or beer to any "intoxicated, card-playing" person, it was held that the sale must be to one intoxicated and card playing to constitute the act a violation. Sup. Ct. of Iowa. City of Decorah v. Kesselmeir.

Divorce: conditional, does not dissolve marriage.Until a conditional decree of divorce is made absolute, the marriage relation subsists. Sup. Judic. Ct. of Massachusetts. Moors v. Moors.

Infancy: abandonment by, of contract void under statute of frauds.- An infant, who renders services under a verbal contract, which could not be performed within a year from the date thereof, entered into by and between his employer and his parent, cannot abandon the service in violation of the agreement, and recover upon a quantum meruit for the services rendered. Sup. Ct. of Ohio. Abbott v. Inskip.

Legacy: for exact amount of debt.— A legacy for the exact amount of a debt is presumed to be in satisfaction of the debt. Sup. Judic. Ct. of Massachusetts. Allen v. Merwin.

Legacy of shares of stock: computation of value.— Bequests of certain shares of stock were made to living grandchildren by names; and further, testator directed his executors to set aside equal amounts for other grandchildren that might be born within a certain date. Held, that the value of the bequest to the unborn grandchildren was to be fixed by the value of the stocks at the date of the will. Sup. Ct. of Pennsylvania. Re Estate of Clarke.

Mechanic's lien: remedy under, not suspended by taking note.-The taking of a note by the material man from the contractor, with the understanding that it was not to be an absolute payment unless met at maturity, and the discounting of the same by the material man, does not suspend his remedy upon his mechanic's lien. Sup. Ct. of Pennsylvania. Herron v. Graham.

Negligence: contributory negligence, when it does not excuse wrong-doer. The appellants were colliery owners, and had a siding adjoining the respondents' line, on to which the respondents were in the habit of bringing the appellants' empty trucks from their line,

which the appellants removed as they thought fit. The respondents brought such trucks at any time without notice to the appellants. On a Saturday, after working hours at the appellants' colliery, they brought on to the siding a truck loaded to such a height that it would not pass under a bridge which crossed the siding. On the following Monday, before daylight and before work was resumed, they pushed on to the siding other trucks, which pushed the loaded truck against the bridge and damaged it. Held, that there was evidence on which a jury might find the appellants guilty of contributory negligence, but if the respondents could have avoided the accident by reasonable care and diligence they were still liable, notwithstanding the negligence of the appellants. House of Lords. Radley v. London & N. W. Railway Co., 35 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 637.

Negligence: cattle lawfully running at large in public streets: duty of railroad companies as to. - An ordinance of the city of St. Paul provides, that "cows may run at large during the day time, from five o'clock in the morning to nine o'clock in the evening, from the 1st day of April to the 1st day of December." Heid, that this ordinance authorizes the owners of cows to permit the same to make highway use of the public streets unattended, and therefore, that to permit a cow to use a public street in such manner, even though she may be liable to stray upon a railroad track at a crossing, is the exercise of a lawful right, and not per se negligence; and that a railway company, unless expressly privileged by the statutes, is to exercise its right to cross a public street, with reference to this right of the owner of a cow, so that notwithstanding a cow at large and unattended in a public street may be liable to stray upon the track, it is the duty of the company to exercise reasonable diligence to avoid injuring her, with reference to the fact that she is a brute and not a rational being. Sup. Ct. of Minnesota. Fritz v. St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co.

Negligence: duty of railroad company as to estrays.— A railway engineer is not bound to stop or slacken his train, when moving in a proper manner, to avoid or give way to an estray. Sup. Jud. Ct. of Massachusetts. Darling v. Albany & Boston R. R. Co.

Real estate: mines: adjacent owners: natural user: water. The appellants and the respondents were lessees under the same landlord of the minerals under two adjacent parts of the same estate. The soil over the mines was in its natural condition impervious to water. The respondent so worked his mine that the surface of the ground cracked and sank, and the rainfall and surface water flowed through the fissures, and found its way into the appellants' mine, which was at a lower level than the respondent's. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the respondent was not liable for the damage so done in the natural course of user of his own land. House of Lords. Wilson v. Waddell, 35 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 639.

A

Real estate: right to build to a wall a servitude. right to "build to," that is, to fasten joists in the wall of an adjoining house, is a servitude, and the extent it damaged the property should be left to the jury. Sup. Ct. of Pennsylvania. Stern v. Sager.

Statute of limitation: vendor's lien on real estate.Where the legal title to real estate has passed to the vendee, and no lien was retained in the deed, the notes given for the purchase-money may become barred by the statute. The implied lien of the vendor is then

also extinguished. Sup. Ct. of Tennessee. Fisher v. Fisher.

Supplementary proceedings: place of examination of debtor. In supplementary proceedings the judgment debtor, whether he be a resident or non-resident, may be examined in the county where he has a place of business. N. Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, First Dep. Anway v. David.

THE BENCH AND BAR.

It is reported that Baron Fitzgerald and

Lord Justice Christian have both declined the Lord Chief Justiceship of Ireland.

The official returns for 1872 show that in the whole of Italy there were only eighteen advocates and solicitors making more than £250 a year, and in the populous provinces of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia only two whose income amounted to £160.

The Rev. Joseph Cook having, in the strict line of duty, asked the question from the pulpit, "What becomes of the wicked?" is answered by a Connecticut man that "they usually practice law for a while, and eventually go to the legislature."

The Hon. R. B. Carpenter, judge of one of the Circuit Courts of South Carolina, has been wrestling with the question of "who's who in South Carolina, and had to go to Washington to write his opinion.

Dr. Isaac Hartshorn, who died in Providence on Monday, ought not to go down "unwept, unhonored and unsung," for the Boston Advertiser says of him, that he was a party in some famous lawsuits, one paying Daniel Webster a fee of $25,000."

Chief Justice Edward G. Ryan, of Wisconsin, is suffering from illness and debility resulting from confinement and overwork in the discharge of his duties, and both houses of the State legislature have passed, unanimously, a resolution granting him leave of absence during the present term of the court.

A Washington correspondent says: "Associate Judge Davis, as soon as the bill constituting an electoral-vote commission passed both houses, notified his associates and other friends, that in the event of his being offered the fifth place in the judicial branch of the commission, under no circumstance would he allow his name to be used in this connection. He considers it indelicate, after being elected senator, to take a position which might be open to criticism, and refuses absolutely to reconsider his decision."

TAXES UPON PROPERTY SOLD UNDER FORECLOSURE.

THE Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Osterberg, appellant, v. Union Trust Co. of N. Y., just decided, hold that while the title of a purchaser at a judicial sale, under a decree of foreclosure, takes effect by relation to the date of the mortgage, and defeats any subsequent lien or incumbrance, a lien for taxes does not, however, stand upon the footing of an ordinary incumbrance, and is not displaced by a sale under a pre-existing judgment or decree, unless otherwise directed by statute. It attaches to the res without regard to individual ownership, and when it is enforced by sale pursuant to the statute, prescribing the mode of assessing and collecting them, the purchaser takes a valid and unimpeachable title. This case was a proceeding by a purchaser at a judicial sale, having in effect for its object the retention of a portion of his bid, sufficient to cover certain unpaid taxes on the property purchased. The purchaser had not only constructive, but actual notice of the existence of the lien of the taxes. The court held that it was the duty of the purchaser to pay the tax. It says: But if the doctrine were otherwise, and if the rule of caveat emptor had no application to this case, we are not aware of any principle which would justify withholding from the mortgagee any of the moneys derived from the sale of the mortgaged property, with a view to the application of them to satisfy such a lien.

LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES OF CORPORATIONS. -IN WHAT WAY ENFORCED.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-OCTOBER TERM, 1876.

HORNOR, plaintiff in error, v. HENNING AND OTHERS. The act of Congress (16 U. S. Stats. 98) under which certain corporations are organized in the District of Columbia contains a provision that "if the indebtedness of any company organized under this act shall at any time exceed the amount of its capital stock, the trustees of such company assenting thereto shall be personally and individually liable for such excess to the creditors of the company." Held, (1) that an action at law cannot be sustained by one creditor among many for the liability thus created, or for any part of it, but that the remedy is in equity. (2) That this excess constitutes a fund for the benefit of all the creditors, so far as the condition of the company renders a resort to it necessary for the payment of their debts.

A

N error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Action against trustees of a corporation to recover debt of corporation.

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, had judgment against him on demurrer to his declaration. The substance of the declaration is that he is a creditor of the Washington City Savings Bank; that the bank had incurred an indebtedness of $850,000 in excess of the amount of its capital stock, with the assent of the defendants, who were the trustees of said bank, by reason whereof a right of action had accrued to plaintiff to have and recover the amount of his debt, to wit. $4,000.

The act of Congress of May 5, 1870 (16 U. S. Stats. 98), authorizes the formation of corporations for various purposes within the District of Columbia by the voluntary association of individuals, who shall pursue the directions of the statute on the subject. Section 4 of that act provides for manufacturing, agricultural,

mining and mechanical corporations, and contains several provisions on the subject of the liability of the stockholders and of the trustees who manage these corporations. One of these is, that "if the indebtedness of any company organized under this act shall at any time exceed the amount of its capital stock, the trustees of such company assenting thereto shall be personally and individually liable for such excess to the creditors of the company."

By the second section of an act of the same session, passed June 17, 1870 (16 U. S. Stats. 153), it was enacted that savings banks might be organized under the provisions of section 4 of the act first mentioned, which contains the clause above recited, and it is on the liability of the trustees declared in this clause that plaintiff bases his cause of action.

The demurrer questions the right of a single creditor among many to bring his separate action at law for his own debt and recover a judgment for it against the trustees, though the allegations of his declaration be true.

If there exists an indebtedness of $850,000 in excess of the capital stock (which is alleged to be $50,000), it is clear that there must be other creditors than plaintiff, and as plaintiff's account, filed as part of the declaration, shows that he claims as a depositor in the bank, it is a reasonable inference that there are a great many other creditors, and that most of them are depositors of small sums. Under these circumstances, conceding the liability of the defendants, several questions press themselves on our attention as to the nature and extent of this liability and the mode of its enforcement. Taking the terms of the statute literally, the trustees are liable to the creditors as a body in the full sum of the excess (in this case $850,000) without regard to the amount due them collectively or individually, and though the corporation may be willing and able to pay every debt it owes as it falls due or is demanded. Nor does it matter whether the debts are in excess at the time the suit is brought or not, for "if at any time" the indebtedness exceeds the capital stock, the assenting trustees are liable. Nor by the strict terms of the clause are the defendants liable to a single creditor, if there be more than one, but to all not to each creditor for the amount of his debt, but to all the creditors for the amount of the excess. Yet in the face of this necessary result, if the literal construction be adopted, plaintiff in error maintains that the excess of indebtedness incurred above the capital is to be treated as a penalty, and that any creditor can sue for that penalty without regard to the rights of the others. If the action is to recover a penalty the defendants can only be liable to one action and to one penalty, and the recovery by plaintiff, if he had the right to recover, could be pleaded in bar of any other action for the same penalty.

But it is not readily to be believed that Congress intended to make the trustees liable beyond the debts of the bank, which it failed or refused to pay; yet if the excess is a penalty it would be no defense for the directors to plead that the bank was ready and willing and had never refused to pay when demand was made. In fact, while the bank, outside of its capital stock, may have had a million of dollars in its vaults ready to pay, a single creditor, who had never demanded his money of the bank, could sue the trustees.

Nor can we believe that an act intended for the benefit of the creditors generally when the bank proves insolvent, can be justly construed in such a manner

that any one creditor can appropriate the whole or any part of this liability of the trustees to his own benefit, to the possible exclusion of all or of any part of the other creditors. But such may and probably would often be the result if any one creditor could sue alone, while there were others unsecured.

We are of opinion that the fair and reasonable construction of the act is that the trustees who assent to an increase of the indebtedness of the corporation beyond its capital stock are to be held guilty of a violation of their trust; that Congress intended that so far as this excess of indebtedness over capital stock was necessary, they should make good the debts of the creditors who had been the sufferers by their breach of trust; that this liability constitutes a fund for the benefit of all the creditors who are entitled to share in it in proportion to the amount of their debts, so far as may be necessary to pay these debts.

The remedy for this violation of duty as trustees is in its nature appropriate to a court of chancery. The powers and instrumentalities of that court enable it to ascertain the excess of the indebtedness over the capital stock, the amount of this which each trustee may have assented to, and the extent to which the funds of the corporation may be resorted to for the payment of the debts; also the number and names of the creditors, the amount of their several debts, to determine the sum to be recovered of the trustees, and apportioned among the creditors; in a manner which the trial by jury and the rigid rules of common-law proceedings render impossible.

This course avoids the injustice of many suits against defendants for the same liability, and the greater injustice of permitting one creditor to absorb ail, or a very unequal portion, of the sum for which the trustees are liable; and it adjusts the rights of all concerned on the equitable principles which lie at the foundation of the statute.

Counsel for plaintiff cites a number of adjudged cases, mostly from the courts of New York, in which it is held that an action at law may be maintained against an individual stockholder in favor of an individual creditor under the statute of that State that makes the stockholder liable to the amount of his stock when the corporation is insolvent. But there the liability of the stockholder is several, and is limited to the amount of his stock, a fixed sum easily ascertained. It is held in those courts, however, as stated in The Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Ibbotson, 24 Wend. 473, that chancery has a concurrent jurisdiction; and in the case of Van Hook v. Whitlock, 3 Paige's Ch. 409, it was said that the remedy at law is a very imperfect

one.

Without deciding whether we would follow those decisions in a similar case arising in this District, it is sufficient to say that there is an obvious distinction between the liability of stockholders to the amount of their stock, which is a part of the obligation assumed when the stock is taken and which is an exact sum, ascertainable by the number of shares owned by the shareholder, and the case of the managing trustees jointly liable for a violation of their trust to all the creditors of the corporation who may be injured thereby.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, under the identical form of words which we are construing in the present case, it has been repeatedly decided that the only remedy is a suit in equity, in which all the creditors are parties, and that even in equity

one creditor cannot sue alone, but must either join the other creditors or bring his suit on behalf of himself and all the others. And while the case is considered in reference to remedies afforded by the statute, it is placed on the solid ground that the fund, by the statute, consists of the excess of all debts over the capital, and that there are various parties having several and unequal claims against the fund, which exceed it in amount. A demurrer to the action at law was sustained on these grounds in The Merchants' Bank of Newburyport v. Stevenson and others, 10 Gray, 232. See, also, Crease v. Babcock, 19 Metc. 501; 5 Allen, 398. The same principle is held by this court in the recent case of Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, which we think disposes of the one before us.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is, accordingly, affirmed.

National Bank as collateral security for a loan; this being the condition of the note. On May 31, 1866, an attachment was served on Myers on behalf of the plaintiffs, who were creditors of Strong. On June 8, 1866, Ould & Carrington purchased the note of Strong for value, without notice of the attachment, and on the same day they presented an order from Strong, directing the bank to deliver to them the said note. They were informed that the president of the bank was out of town. Some days thereafter, in an interview with the president, Ould & Carrington were informed that the debt was nearly paid for which the note was pledged, and that the note would be delivered to them but for the attachment. The debt to the bank was afterward fully paid. In a controversy between Ould & Carrington and the attaching creditors of Strong, the court held that the former were entitled to the note.

FINANCIAL LAW.

TRUST FUNDS IN HANDS OF BROKER. — MORTGAGE TAKEN BY NATIONAL BANK TO SECURE FUTURE LOAN ULTRA VIRES- OWNERSHIP OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

IN

the case of Ex parte Cooke, recently decided by the English Court of Appeal, (35 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 649), a trustee instructed his stockbroker to sell for him a sum of consols, which he informed the broker he held as a trust fund, and to invest the proceeds of sale in the purchase of certain railway stock. The broker sold the consols for cash, and received in payment a check which he paid to the credit of his current account with his bankers, and he bought the railway stock for the next settling day. On the settling day, the railway stock not having been paid for, the broker was declared a defaulter on the stock exchange, and soon afterward he filed a liquidation petition. The principal claimed to have the balance which, at the time of the failure, was standing to the broker's credit at his banker's, appropriated to make good the proceeds of sale of the consols. The court held that as the broker had notice of the trust, the proceeds of the sale retained the character of trust money in his hands, and could be followed by the principal if they could be traced. It was said by Bramwell, J. A., semble, that this would have been so, even if the broker had had no notice of the trust.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case of Woods v. People's Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh, held that a mortgage given to a national bank to secure a pre-existing debt by the mortgagor, and to secure a future loan to him, is as to the latter ultra vires, and that if the mortgaged premises be sold, the proceeds arising therefrom must be applied in discharge of such pre-existing debt, notwithstanding such proceeds arose from a sale by the sheriff. The court also held that an indorser of notes held by a national bank, secured by a mortgage, has a right to have the proceeds arising from a judicial sale of the mortgaged premises by the bank, applied to the payment of such notes in his relief. Fowler v. Scully, 22 P. F. Smith, followed.

In the case of Howe v. Strong, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, a note made by one Myers, dated April 14, 1866, payable August 1, 1866, to S. Strong or order, and by said Strong indorsed in blank, was delivered by Strong to the First

INSURANCE LAW.

CONDITIONS IN FIRE INSURANCE POLICY; EXECUTION
CLAUSE-CONDITIONS RELATING TO PRE-
MIUM NOTE - LIABILITY OF

INSURANCE BROKER.

THE HE Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Manufacturers & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. O'Maley, recently decided, construed the meaning of what is known as the execution clause in a fire insurance policy. The clause in question provided as follows: "This policy shall cease at and from the time that the property hereby insured shall be levied on or taken into possession or custody under any proceeding in law or equity." A mechanics' lien was filed against the house insured, judgment obtained, and a writ of levari facías placed in the sheriff's hands. Just before the date at which the property was advertised to be sold under the writ, it was destroyed by fire. The court held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the policy was not defeated, and said that the condition had special, if not exclusive reference to personal property, which when levied upon is usually seized in fact and remains, until sold, in the custody of the sheriff and his employees, who cannot be expected to guard it with the same degree of care that the owner would. The phrase "levied on" does not mean a technical levy unaccompanied by actual seizure and change of possession, and has no application ordinarily to proceedings by writ of levari facias for the sale of real estate.

In Shakey v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., not long since decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa, a policy of insurance stipulated that if the premium note was not paid at maturity, the failure to pay should terminate all liability, which, however, would be revived by payment within sixty days; that the collection of the note could be enforced by suit; that the cancellation of the policy should be absolute and the whole amount of the premium should be earned, due and payable. The court held that the contract was a valid one, and its conditions could be enforced.

In the case of Murray v. Robinson, recently decided by the Supreme Court of this State at the General Term of the Second Department, the court held, that a broker who undertakes to procure insurance upon property and fails to do so, owes to his principal the duty of prompt notice of the fact, and when he fails to give such notice, he is liable for the whole loss to the principal.

REISSUED PATENTS-WHEN ACTION OF

THER

COMMISSIONER IMPEACHABLE.

IE Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent case of Russell v. Dodge, decide that where a reissued patent is granted upon a surrender of the original, for its alleged defective or insufficient specification, such specification cannot be substantially changed in the reissued patent, either by the addition of new matter, or the omission of important particulars, so as to enlarge the scope of the invention as originally claimed. A defective specification can be rendered more definite and certain, so as to embrace the claim made, or the claim can be so modified as to correspond with the specification; but, except under special circumstances, this is the extent to which the operation of the original patent can be changed by the reissue. In this case the patent was for a process of treating bark-tanned lamb or sheepskin by means of a compound, in which heated fat liquor was an essential ingredient, and a change was made in the original specification by eliminating the necessity of using the fat liquor in a heated condition, and making in the new specification its use in that condition, a mere matter of convenience, and by inserting an independent claim for the use of fat liquor in the treatment of leather generally, the character and scope of the invention, as originally claimed, were held to be so enlarged as to constitute a different invention. The court also held that the action of the commissioner of patents in granting a reissue within the limits of his authority is not open to collateral impeachment, but his authority being limited to a reissue for the same invention, the two patents may be compared to determine the identity of the invention. If the reissued patent, when thus compared, appears on its face to be for a different invention, it is void, the commissioner having exceeded his authority in issuing it. The case of Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 463, was considered and qualified.

JUDGE NEILSON'S ARTICLES ON CHOATE.

THE

HE Independent, of February 1, speaks as follows of Judge Neilson's articles: "A recent number of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL contains an article which is the first of a series from the pen of Judge Neilson, Chief Justice of the City Court of Brooklyn, upon Rufus Choate, one of the greatest of American lawyers and at the same time one of the best and purest of American citizens. The judge could hardly have chosen a better theme for his facile and able pen. He is himself an eminent lawyer, as well as an accomplished judge, whose name the country has learned to respect, and by the habits of his mind in thorough and hearty sympathy with his theme. The first article contains a graphic sketch of various points of similarity and contrast between Mr. Choate and Lord Macaulay, especially as disclosed in the recently published work of Trevelyan. The American lawyer and statesman does not suffer by comparison with the British essayist. While his equal in brilliancy and far his superior in legal knowledge, he is shown in the incidents cited by Judge Neilson to be much the finer, purer, and lovelier model of the true man. The first article, written in the usual clear, compact, and forcible style of the judge, gives a good promise of what is to come. We congratulate the readers of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, standing as it does at the head of the law journals of this country, upon the pleasant and

profitable service they are about to receive from one so competent to render it and upon a subject which cannot fail to be one of interest. We should not be surprised if Judge Neilson, now that he has gotten his hand in, should at last end in making a book. Books are sometimes born in this way."

JURISDICTION DEPENDENT ON AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT — INTEREST AND

IN

COSTS EXCLUDED.

Western Union Tel. Co., plaintiff in error, v. Rogers, just decided by the United States Supreme Court, the question whether interest or costs can be taken into account in determining a jurisdictional amount, under the statute of February 16, 1875, arose. The court say, that before the act of February 16, 1875 (18 Stat. 316), increasing the sum or value of the matter in dispute, necessary to give this court jurisdiction, from two to five thousand dollars, after May 1, 1872, it was held that we had no jurisdiction in cases where the matter in dispute was two thousand dollars and no more, and that in determining the jurisdictional amount "neither interest on the judgment nor costs of suit can enter into the computation." Walker v. U. S., 4 Wall. 164; Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. 73. The act of 1875 simply increases the jurisdictional amount. No other change is made in the old law. The judgment in this case was rendered May 8, 1875, for five thousand dollars and no more, except costs. It follows that, according to the practice established under the old law, this writ must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

BOOK NOTICES.

Reports of Cases at Law and in Chancery Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Illinois. By Norman L. Freeman, Reporter. Vol. LXXV. Containing the remaining cases submitted at the September Term, 1874. Printed for the Reporter. Springfield, 1876.

THIS

HIS volume is similar to its predecessors, and contains a large number of cases of no great importance, intermingled with some of value. The decisions are not very recent. none later than those submitted in September, 1874, being given. Among the cases of value we notice the following: Laidlou v. Hatch, p. 11, where it is held that the promise of a railway company to pay out of what it may become indebted to a contractor for work on its road. the sum that such contractor may owe a sub-contractor for work done, is within the statute of frauds, and if not in writing, is void. Pulman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, p. 125, where it was held that when a passenger was wrongfully expelled from a sleeping car by the conductor, who acted through a mistake in judgment, and who used no violence or abuse, the passenger was entitled to recover only the price he paid for his ticket and a reasonable compensation for the trouble and inconvenience he suffered by being deprived of his berth. Tooke v. Newman, p. 215. Here it was decided that where a person applies to equity for relief against a usurious contract, he must offer to pay the principal due and the legal rate of interest, before the court will take jurisdiction. Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, p. 292, is a case upon the subject of taxation of corporations. The court say that while, where the capital stock of corporations is taxable, the shares of stock are not subject to taxation in the hands of shareholders, if the latter are erroneously assessed therefor,