Engineer William Horth of the second section, however, testifies that he saw the rear lights of section No. 1 at the same time that he saw those of Patten; that it did not appear to him that he was more than 500, or at the most 600 feet from the rear of section No. 1 when he saw Patten.

It is perhaps also proper to say that the porter of the rear car of the first section states, though not under oath, to the authorities of the railroad, that Patten did not go back immediately upon the stoppage of the train, but after having left the train went toward the forward part and then back. The probabilities that Patten did not go as far as he states that he did, and possibly thinks that he did, are evidenced by the fact that the second section did not more reduce its speed, if not entirely stop, before colliding. Had Patten reached 1,180 feet from the first section it would seem that the second section should have reduced its speed to a rate not to have done such serious damage. Either Patten was not back to the point that he says he was, or the brakes of the second section did not operate properly. There is nothing to show that the latter was the fact.

Engineer Horth, immediately upon seeing Patten, reversed his engine, and, as he states to the Board, stood on the step while he pulled the lever of the sand-box to be sure that the wheels should catch, and there remained until the collision occurred. He was severely injured both legs being broken.

There is nothing in the evidence to show positively that any blame rests upon Horth, unless it be that after passing Yost's station he encroached upon the five minutes interval which he should have allowed between his train and the preceding one.

There is considerable conflict of testimony upon this point. The station agent at Yost's, Joshua Suits, testifies that the first section passed at 11.26, and that he so posted it: that the second section passed at 11.35. This would have made nine minutes interval, and would have justified Horth in maintaining his schedule speed. Horth's fireman, however, John Slater, testified that the figures posted at Yost's were 11.31. This would have given but four minutes interval. If such was the fact, Horth should have diminished his speed after passing Yost's. The conflict on this subject, however, is such that the Board is disposed to believe that Horth was at least five minutes behind the time of the first section. His conduct in remaining at his post, and sprinkling the sand on the track in the face of great danger was highly commendable.

CONCLUSIONS.

After a careful consideration of all the circumstances attending this accident, the Board is of the opinion that the principal cause thereof was the rule of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company permitting these sections to be run at as close an interval as five minutes. It is to be considered, however, that the company only adopted this rule after its adoption by the time convention. This body consists of the general superintendents or general managers of a large number of the railroads of the United States. A special committee made up of the representatives of the prominent roads of the country, formulated the rule after long consideration.

In view of this accident, however, the Board is of the opinion that the interval of time is too short. If for any cause the train in advance cannot stop instantly, but consumes, say a minute and a half, in coming to a stop, it leaves but three minutes and a half for a brakeman to get back to signal the following train. On a slippery or stormy night with his lamps, it is quite possible that he cannot make more than 1,200 feet in this time. This is too short an interval of space for a train at high speed, under all the circumstances, to be from the preceding train.

That a local train can with safety leave a station five minutes after the departure of an express train, is undoubtedly true, but the Board is clearly of the opinion that an interval of not less than ten minutes should be required between passenger trains of the same class in the same direction, or sections of the same train following each other, unless a block system be used.

The Board has been investigating the matter of block systems, but has not yet sufficient data to express a positive opinion upon the subject.

Such a system upon the New York Central road exists between the Grand Central depot and Spuyten Duyvil. The Board is of the opinion that it might be extended, with benefit, as far as Croton, between which point and New York the trains are very numerous. Whether it be necessary to extend it the whole length of the road, the Board at present is not prepared to express an opinion. There is no doubt that very considerable delay in the movement of trains would ensue, unless the block stations were close together, in which case the expense of management would be very great. It is also to be considered that if such a system be essential for safety on the tracks of the New York Central road, where there are two freight and two passenger tracks, it would be still more so on every other railroad in the State. The Board would not feel justified in taking such a radical step as this until satisfied that such system was essential for the safety of travel.

The Board deems that if the ten-minute rule be adopted, with the present system of blocking the road by time indicators at the stations as hereinbefore described, there would be little or no danger from rear collisions, if the rules of the company are strictly enforced.

The Board recommends,

RECOMMENDATIONS.

First. That the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company amend rule No. 87, so that it will read "Passenger trains running in the same direction must keep not less than ten minutes apart unless some form of block signal is used."

Second. That the railroad company take into consideration the subject of equipping the entire line with block signals, and particularly that portion between Spuyten Duyvil and Croton, and submit to the Board of Railroad Commissioners an estimate of the cost thereof, and of the practicability of the same so as not to interfere with the punctuality of service, particularly of local trains.

Third. That all six-wheel trucks be equipped with a brake on every wheel instead of as at present, brakes only on the outside wheels.

ACCIDENT INQUIRIES.

BUFFALO, ROCHESTER AND PITTSBURGH.

February 21, 1889-C. H. Perkins was injured while attempting to drive over the tracks at Wyoming. The company, in response to inquiries, said that the crossing was not protected at the time of the accident, and that the view was, in one direction, somewhat obstructed.

DELAWARE AND HUDSON CANAL COMPANY.

October 5, 1888-Four miles east of Otego, John Williams was injured on a highway crossing; it is said that his horse became unmanageable and ran in front of engine. In reply to inquiries the company said that the crossing was not protected by either gates or a flagman, but the view was entirely unobstructed for some distance.

October 20, 1888 - Train No. 8 collided with a West Shore train in the Albany freight-yard at 9.11 A. M., and slightly injured C. F. Duston, of Brockton, Mass. The Board wrote asking who was responsible for the West Shore train so running, and what, if any, action had been taken. In reply, Superintendent Hammond said that the collison was due to the carelessness of man in charge of West Shore train, and that the circumstances had been referred to the officials of that road. A copy of the above letter was then sent to J. D. Layng, general manager of the West Shore, with a communication from the Board, asking for circumstances of collision, etc., and the following was received in reply:

Answering fully your favor of November twentieth, with regard to the collision between West Shore, and Delaware and Hudson trains at Albany on October twentieth, I do not accept as a fact the statement that Mr. Hammond made with regard to the matter. We have undoubted evidence that the station master of the Delaware and Hudson told the train men of the West Shore train to back up into the yard, and that this had been the practice admits of no denial. I think myself that our train should have been protected by a flag in backing up against an over-due train of the Delaware and Hudson road; but this accident, although insignificant in its character, developed the fact that they had always been working under the instructions of the station master when backing over into the yard against an over-due train. It was fortunate that the accident was not one involving injury to anyone and no great amount of damage to property, while developing as it did the fault in the system, which I state for the information of the Board has now been corrected. J. D. LAYNG,

язино

(Signed,)

General Manager.

October 28, 1888- Mrs. Desmond while crossing the track at Lawrence street, Albany, was struck and injured. Inquiry elicited the fact that the crossing was unprotected on account of its being

Sunday, and that the view was partly obstructed by some cars which were on a side track near the crossing.

November 21, 1888-At the Broadway crossing, Albany, work train with engine No. 125 struck and injured an unknown man.

In answer to a letter, the company said that the view was unobstructed and that the man had been warned by flagman, who was stationed at the crossing.

December 17, 1888-Train No. 23 approaching Waterford Junction collided with train No. 42, injuring Archie Adkins, an express messenger. A letter of inquiry was sent asking who, in the opinion of company, was responsible and what discipline had been administered. The company in reply stated that Engineer E. Smyth, of train No. 23, and C. Daley, signal man, had been dismissed from service, and that Engineer Hines and Conductor Bolster, of train No. 42, had been suspended without pay for thirty days.

January 25, 1889 — Train No. 2 (passenger) ran into a street car at Tibbett's crossing, Green Island, and slightly injured the following passengers: Albert Fribes, B. F. Dingley and John Kennedy, all of Cohoes. Inquiry shows that the crossing has a set of gates and a flagman, but at the time of the accident the dense fog prevented him from seeing any distance up the track; and on this account he notified the conductor of the horse car that he had better not cross until he could determine definitely whether any train was coming or not, but the horse-car employees did not heed his notice.

February 25, 1889-At Whitehall, the following collision occurred: Conductor Joseph Matthews, with Whitehall yard-train, was working at Lake station switch, north of Whitehall tunnel, when Conductor George E. Terry, with wild train going north, without a flag, ran into the siding and struck the yard engine. In jumping from the engine, T. Dorcal had one foot injured, and J. Starr his back slightly injured. Conductor Terry and Engineer Sullivan both supposed they had passed the switch-engine south of where it was at work. In reply to a communication from the Board, asking what the rules of the company were with regard to yard-train working north of tunnel; who, in opinion of authorities, was at fault, and what discipline had been administered, the company said that in their opinion the Conductor George Terry and Engineer J. Sullivan, of the wild train, were at fault, in not ascertaining before leaving Whitehall where the switchengine was at work, and in not protecting themselves against it. Terry and Sullivan were both discharged. The following copy of rules were also inclosed:

Rights of Switch-engines.

Whitehall The Whitehall switch-engine will have the right to run wild between Whitehall and Lake station, between the hours of 6 A. M. and 7 P. M., daily, excepting Sundays.

Port Henry The Port Henry switch-engine will have the right to use the main track between the south end of the tunnel and the Champlain switch, between the hours of 6 A. M. and 8 P. M., daily, excepting Sundays.

All other wild trains or irregular trains will run subject to the rights of the above engines, unless specially ordered to run regardless of them.

March 3, 1889-Engineer George M. Marland, of Binghamton, N. Y., was fatally scalded in a collision between two wild trains, one and a quarter miles east of Wells' Bridge. Inquiry was made, asking for circumstances in detail; who in opinion of railroad company was responsible, and what, if any, discipline had been administered. In reply, the company said that the collision was the result of wrong train orders given by the train dispatcher (H. F. Walker), who has been dismissed from the service of the company. Further inquiry was then made by the Board, asking for the nature of the wrong orders that were given; also the age of train dispatcher and length of time in service of the company. The following reply was received: "In reply to yours of March twentieth I beg to say, the orders referred to were as follows: To Connors and engineer, Oneonta, 'Run wild to Nineveh,' and to Saxton and engineer, Unadilla, 'Run wild to Oneonta.' Of course, as these were both irregular trains, neither of them was looking out for the other. The mistake was that of the train dispatcher in not providing a place for these trains to pass. Mr. Walker was 32 years of age, and has been in the employ of this company about fourteen years, ten of which have been in the capacity of train dispatcher.

May 14, 1889-At machine shop crossing, Green Island, Noah Hibbard (employee), was killed; caused by engine, on which he was sitting, running into a wagon. Inquiry elicited the fact that the crossing was not a public highway; it was not protected, and the view of the main track from the approach is entirely cut off; but since this accident the crossing has been discontinued.

June 6, 1889-John Sullivan (employee) was killed in a collision at Westport. Collision occurred in the following manner: Wild freight train, going south, left Wadhams' Mills with time to run to Westport ahead of and clear No. 4 ten minutes by the conductor's watch, which proved to be eleven minutes slow. When the train arrived at Westport, and as a brakeman had just alighted to turn a switch, train No. 4 ran around the curve and before it could be stopped collided with the rear of wild freight. The Board wrote asking who, in the opinion of the company, was responsible for this accident besides Conductor Holloran of wild freight; was not L. Lortee, the engineer of freight, also responsible, and what discipline has been administered? The company, in reply, said that they were unable to find anyone directly at fault in the matter excepting Conductor Holloran and the engineer of wild train who they consider indirectly responsible. In response to a later communication from the Board, the company stated that the discipline administered to conductor and engineer of freight was suspension from duty, without pay, for ten days.

June 19, 1889-John Brown (passenger) was injured in a collision at Quaker Street, N. Y. Inquiry shows that collision was caused through the carelessness of the switch tender, who left switch open letting passenger train No. 7 in on a side track where it collided with a freight train. Switch tender has been dismissed from company's

service.

July 9, 1889-A short distance north of Cohoes a gravel train collided with freight train No. 36, killing N. Copiote, an Italian