of Bulgaria. It seems, however, more than doubtful whether she will be able to continue in this attitude. Wedged in between the mighty Russia and a considerably enlarged Bulgaria, Roumania will no longer be able to continue an independent policy, but in all probability will either completely fall under the influence of Russia or join the Balkan union. In either case she can hope for nothing more from the Triple Alliance, and forced by necessity, she will more or less side with our enemies.

Because of all these conditions the danger of a general war has been increased. The strained relations alone which exist between Austria and Serbia may possibly lead to such a war. But, even if that struggle may for the moment be settled, the Austro-Serbian contentions will continue, and it can scarcely be thought that the powers of the Triple Entente will not exploit the advantageous position in which they now find themselves, supported and urged thereto by public opinion, and attempt to force their orders upon Germany. It would be but the logical and natural consequence of their combined policy. There is still hope, of course, that it might be possible to use the opposing interests of Russia and England, arising from the Balkan question, in such a manner that coöperation against Germany on the part of these two powers might be prevented. Such a solution is, however, not probable. For this reason a far-sighted and cautious policy must take into account the possibility of a military conflict. Up to the present time France and Russia have not considered the present moment quite favorable for waging war. The unexpected Balkan events have totally altered their position also. Under these circumstances, it behooves those who conduct our foreign policy to watch out.

All the weak-spirited adherents of a "small policy," who ever and anon attempt to depress the justified claims of our people, who warn us to be moderate in our aims, who do not wish to know anything about a real world policy, and wish to see Germany persist in the narrow sphere of action of a Continental power, these adherents will, under the momentary circumstances, certainly assert themselves in order to prove that Germany has no sort of vital interests to look after in the Balkans and to warn against every attempt to any energetic action. Do not desire anything! Do not strive for anything! And above all, do not risk anything! These represent the watchword of those Philistine politicians who wish for peace above all things, even if the greatness and future of our Fatherland must be sacrificed 'Bernhardi, Unsere Zukunft, pp. 147-150.

for it. They will certainly not fail to point emphatically to the dangers of a war against superior opponents and demand that the Government should through "moderate" conduct avoid the war, no matter what the circumstances, instead of preparing for it by energetic action. .

Our enemies would even deprive us of our position of power which we have won through two victorious wars, and the world-wide trade, which increases our national wealth from year to year. Even as they would not that Frederick the Great should have "Silesia" nor the "hundred millions in his treasury, even so would they now pull us down and in its germ stifle our world-importance.

Our claim to world importance may certainly lead to a war similar to the Seven Years' War; but we shall be as victorious in that war as Prussia's heroic king was in the Seven Years' War. That is my absolute and joyous confidence.

Our future lies in our own hands.

The weak-spirited will discuss the financial question and complain that we cannot afford to spend the money necessary to wage such a war. I believe that in case of need we can provide the necessary money through a domestic loan. .

It seems absolutely criminal, in the tremendously wealthy Germany, to talk of financial difficulties when the future of the state and of the nation is at stake.

Germany does not lack money for the purpose of asserting its position; but we must have the courage to will great things and the active force to attain great things.

Every one of us must do a man's work; all true Germans must, as one, and willing to sacrifice, gather around the Emperor, and be ready at all times, with treasure and blood, to serve the honor, the greatness, and the future of the German people: through battle to victory!'

(n) Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856-)

We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Bel

gium, as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxembourg and Belgian governments. The wrong -I speak openly-that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought-how he is to hack his way through. .

1

I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began an harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's government was terrible to a degree; just for a word-"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded-just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. . .

1 Speech of the Imperial German Chancellor in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. (London Times, August 11, 1914).

At the session of the Reichstag on August 27, 1915, the Imperial German Chancellor is reported to have said:

"On the part of Germany no attempt has ever been made to justify the German invasion of Belgium through subsequent allegations of guilty conduct on the part of the Belgian Government." (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, August 28, 1915, p. 1.)

2 The British Blue Book (No. 1), d. No. 160; Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, vol. 2, p. 1007.

I was received this morning [August 4] at 9 o'clock by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me: "We have been obliged by absolute necessity to address to your Government the request of which you are aware. It is only with the utmost anguish (la mort dans l'âme) that the Emperor and the Government have seen themselves obliged to come to this decision. For me it is the most painful one that I have ever had to make. Germany has nothing

.

with which to reproach Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct." On August 5 I was received by the Under Secretary of State. Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. He sought no pretext to excuse the violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan of passing through Belgium in order to attack Germany on the lower Rhine. [To all remonstrances he] simply replied that the Department for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilization had been issued all power now belonged to the military authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium to be an indispensable operation of war. (Reports of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Foreign Minister, Belgian Grey Book (No. 2), docs. 25, 51, 52; Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, part 1, pp. 448, 474-477.)

(0) William II, German Emperor and King of Prussia (1859-)

Here it was that the Great Elector, by his own right, created himself the sovereign Duke in Prussia; here his son set the king's crown upon his head; and the sovereign house of Brandenburg thus became one of the European powers. . . . And here my grandfather, again, by his own right, set the Prussian crown upon his head, once more distinctly emphasizing the fact that it was accorded him by the will of God alone and not by parliament or by any assemblage of the people or by popular vote, and that he thus looked upon himself as the chosen instrument of Heaven and as such performed his duties as regent and sovereign. .

Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, without regard for daily opinions and intentions, I go my way.

1 Speech at Königsberg, August 25, 1910; Gauss, The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances (New York, 1915), pp. 280-284.

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On other occasions the Emperor William has expressed the theory of divine right in pithy and telling phrases, such as You Germans have only one will, and that is My will; there is only one law, and that is My law." "Sic volo, sic jubeo." Only one master in this country. That is I, and who opposes Me I shall crush to pieces." (See Barker's Foundations of Germany, London, 1916, p. 120.)

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What William II meant by his statement that he would crush anyone standing in his way is evidenced by the treatment of Belgium.

In 1914 he said in his letter of August 14, to the President of the United States, that it was necessary for strategic reasons to invade Belgium. (Post.) In 1910, as the guest of the King and Queen of Belgium he said, in an address delivered on October 27th at the Royal Palace in Brussels:

"It is with friendliest sympathy that I and all Germany follow the astounding results which have accrued to the untiring energy of the Belgian people in all departments of trade and industry, the crowning display of which we have seen in the brilliantly successful World Exposition of this year. Belgian commerce embraces the whole circle of the earth, and it is in the peaceful work of culture that Germans and Belgians everywhere meet. Their cultivation of the more spiritual arts fills us with similar wonder when we behold to what a conspicuous place the poets and artists of Belgium have attained. May the trustful and friendly feelings, to which in recent times the relations of our governments bore such pleasing evidence, be ever more closely preserved! From your Majesty's reign may happiness and blessing stream forth upon your house and upon your people! It is with this wish, which comes from the very depths of my heart, that I propose long life to your Majesties, the King and Queen of the Belgians! (Gauss, The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances, pp. 291-292.)

39

The following list is, with two exceptions, identical with that published on December 11, 1917, in the Official Bulletin issued by the Committee on Public Information. In the first place, the declaration of Serbia against Germany appears to have been made August 6, instead of August 9, 1914, as stated by the Bulletin. In the second place, that of Japan against Germany appears to have been made August 23, 1914, instead of August 23, 1917, as stated by the Bulletin.

On August 27, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States notified the Department of State that Austria-Hungary had severed diplomatic relations with Japan and that the Austrian cruiser Queen Elizabeth had been ordered to join the German fleet in the Far East. On this information, the Department of State issued a neutrality proclamation, dated August 27, 1914. Neither Government has issued a declaration of war.

Resolution passed authorizing military intervention as ally of England. Official Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1917.

1917.

Military aid granted. Official Bulletin, Dec. 11, 1917.

Allies of Austria also consider it a declaration. Official Bulletin, Dec. 11,