upon itself, it goes without saying, have but a relative value, though this may nowhere be expressed, even in the face of the most explicit assurance to the contrary.

An agreement entered into between the strong and the weak has no sense at all. As soon as the strong is confronted by a pressing interest to break such an agreement, the latter is by that fact abrogated and destroyed as though it had never existed. . . . Only he who has sufficient force to threaten the other party to the same extent as he himself is threatened, may on the basis of treaties entered into expect in some measure a lasting state of peace.

Smaller states can therefore exist in complete independence by the side of the larger ones, only in case they can find confederates who can reënforce their power of resistance. But he alone can secure confederates if his existence is of value to others. Hence, the smallness of states is reasonably limited by this consideration. For, a state whose worthlessness for the entire system is plainly evident, which as a confederate is of no importance in the general scheme and in whose existence no one takes an interest, such a state cannot really continue in independence; and as soon as it is drawn into a crisis of conflicting interests of the strong states, it will completely disappear. A relatively small state can prove its right to its existence. only in case its existence is an essential advantage in the balance of the entire system.

2

A further question is as to what significance political treaties may have with regard to the matters therein agreed upon. In view of what we have already said it must be evident that they have not the strict effect of legal obligation.

By nature every state is so constituted that it cannot accept any fetters to its will except on the condition that by its own volition it may cast them off again, of course not whenever it may see fit to do so, for the state possesses no such arbitrary and unfounded right, but only in case its pressing interests demand that it do so.3

A treaty will be observed only so long as it is advantageous, and it is not advantageous so long as there is a force at hand by which its observance may be compelled. . . . Whoever concludes a treaty must realize that he cannot rely upon its being observed.*

War is waged with a view to the treaty of peace which is to be concluded; war has a political aim in view, namely, to

'Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts, pp. 53-54. 2 Ibid., p. 58.

• Ibid., pp. 60-61.

• Ibid., p. 65.

reorganize on a new and reasonable basis all the mutual relations between the states.

War is therefore, in effect, merely a continuation of the usual negotiations between states, but carried on in different form and with different means.

States are not subject to a law of right, and it is vain to attempt to control their action by a so-called law. There is no praetor above them who might sit in judgment upon them; rather war is the only praetor which does not render its judgment with regard to the states according to a code of laws, but according to justice. This praetor is inexorable; he cannot be bribed; there can be no appeal nor escape from his sentence.

The power of the state lies in the discipline, in the virility, in the manliness and in the education of its citizens; the powerful state is the better state; its people are the better people; its culture is the more valuable culture. Whoever succumbs must acknowledge that he has deserved his fate; the victor may say unto himself, not that he was good, but that he was the better one as between himself and his opponent. Chance cannot decide a fight or battle, nor a war. For no defeat, no victory is definitive. All international relations are in constant flux and undergoing a constant change. The defeated party, however low he has fallen, may rise again; the victor, however great his victory may have been, may sink into ignominy. A people must constantly assert itself; it must not permit the fountain of its strength to run dry; on the contrary, it must ever enrich and increase the flow of its strength. . . . The state must be strong. This is its mission and its duty; woe to the state if it neglects this first duty and chases after other possessions at the cost of its might! In the great historic world process that which is weak succumbs because it is worthless, and that which is strong maintains itself because in particular events and at a particular time it is able better to serve the great mission of mankind. Such is the eternal impartiality of world history. . .

1

The nature of things is mightier than mere vain wishes; it neither permits now, nor will it ever permit that the states shall live in friendship and mutual love or that they shall be restricted in their actions by obedience to a compulsory legal organization. From a greater perfection of international law we can, therefore, not expect that international relations could ever be regulated on the basis of right or morality; from such perfection we may however expect 1 Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts, pp. 72-75.

that, more than hitherto, the true interests of the states will be safeguarded and that the relations of honesty and mutuality, based upon a justified self-interestedness will be further developed and strengthened. . .

The international law of contract has no absolute value for the simple reason that no impartial decision and no absolutely correct interpretation of it can be expected.

2

The states do not fight for the "right," nor yet for "ideas," but for their interests, and they bind themselves to "right" in so far as their interests permit. . . . Truth and simplicity alone can ameliorate human institutions and ennoble mankind; if things on earth are to be made better, it will be necessary in the first place to rid international relations of the hypocritical phrase of "right" and of the "sacredness of treaties"; in the second place it will be necessary to recognize expressly that international law has no other guarantees than its own inner worth and its conformity to that which is advantageous for the self-preservation of the states. It can be of value only in case statesmen comprehend the true interests of their states. and in case the propositions of international law correspond to these interests.

3

All civilized peoples wishing to live in peace have evident need of a code of international law, generally recognized, and apt to cover any and all cases of disputes that may arise between them. But such a code must be restricted to the field within which falls the real international law in its narrower sense, and not attempt to reach, in each concrete case, into the field governed by temporary treaties. It is difficult to draw the line of demarcation in this matter; such a code must not lose sight of the fact that international law is a very precarious thing; it must not attempt to bind the states absolutely and for every case that may arise; for in the presence of the necessity of self-preservation, all rules of international law disappear.

There is no promising prospect that war can be certainly prevented once and for all; this can be accomplished neither by a law, nor by the discretion or the goodwill of a person, nor by any institution, however excellent it may be. It is however a reasonable and most important aim of all human endeavor to prevent wars, except where they cannot be avoided.

The weak neighbor sharpens the appetite of the stronger and he 'Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts, p. 84.

2 Ibid., p. 89.

'Ibid., p. 91.

Ibid., pp. 93-94.

will certainly disappear if he is in the way of the stronger and if the proper opportunity to attack presents itself. Small states,-we do not even refer to minor states, for minor states have never been real states, but have always, through a fiction, been merely looked upon as such, small states should not exist at all; they are a danger to peace; they are the bone of contention of the strong states; they are the natural cause and theaters of wars and through their desire to exist, they are constantly engaged in intrigues to keep apart from one another and in constant conflict all other great states which might do injury to them.

All there is left for the small states to do is to get together and constitute themselves into a federation on the basis of equality, or to join a stronger state under whose hegemony, or even, when the existence of such a state in full independence is by exception a need of the entire system of states, to surrender a part of its political sovereignty and become neutralized, in other words, to renounce foreign politics. Neutralization, moreover, is something precarious; the ever present question in this respect is as to whether or not in a pressing conflict, its recognition can be safeguarded.

It is necessary, therefore, that the states should, as far as possible, do everything to develop their power. An army as large as possible, with soldiers as intelligent as can be, with the best trained officers and disposing of all auxiliary means procurable through science, worth, and practice, all these are an assurance to the state that it will not be heedlessly attacked. Rid the world of all the armies which are now ready to do battle, and social life will be the same as in the middle ages, before there were standing armies, and war will incessantly govern between the states, as feud reigned between the members of the state in the middle ages. Standing armies alone are a guarantee for a lasting state of peace; without them the balance of power is not possible, and therefore no real negotiations, no honesty and reciprocity can prevail. The institution of the standing armies alone saves the world from barbarism. In the world of culture, armies can only be increased, never diminished. They will increase to the uttermost limits of possibility, even to the point when it will no longer be possible to secure the means for their maintenance and when their existence will sap rather than protect the productive strength of the nation. Hence, to make war the exception and peace the general rule is a problem which is identical with that other problem: to make the armies as large as possible and as inexpensive as possible. This problem can be solved only with a standing army just

large enough to furnish the framework for its enlargement, with the entire population armed back of it, so that all who are physically fit may be disciplined in the use of arms from their youth up and for a short time trained in real military technique, and able through the years of vigorous manhood to strengthen, in case of war, the power of the Fatherland.

The actual facts of history go to prove that, other conditions being equal, the people which possesses the better universities, the better scientific laboratories and public schools is, in a military sense, the fitter and stronger. The strength of people in war is in general only the expression for its moral and intellectual capacity and for the healthiness of its institutions, in the home, in the community, and in the state.

An army of professional soldiers or an army of mercenaries is ever at the command of the caprice of the ruler; an armed people can be put into action only for the true and for the highest interests of the Fatherland.

Even as a military organization which permits of the highest development of power is the surest guarantee for peace, so the realization of the ever recurring project of a general disarmament is the greatest imaginable danger for the peace of the world. For, taking things as they are, it is a fact that might can be held in check only through might; so soon as the fear of a foreign might ceases the possibility of negotiation for peace also ceases. The voice of the negotiator exerts a proper influence only in case it is backed by the necessary number of bayonets and guns in order to make it respected. Mirabeau justly answered a deputation of Quakers who came to him with a petition seeking to secure peace through disarmament: "It is weakness which causes war; universal resistance would mean universal peace."

1

(j) Gustav Rümelin (1815-1889)2

Is politics, that is to say, is the self-determined administration of all the affairs of the state subordinated to the law of morality, or shall it follow independent laws of its own? And, accordingly, are their actions permissible in politics, but forbidden by moral law, and vice versa? '

'Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts, pp. 109-114.

2 Ueber das Verhältniss der Politik zur Moral-Reden und Aufsätze von Gustav Rümelin, vol. 1. (Freiburg, n. d.),

Ibid., p. 144.