THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

THE GERMAN PLAN

Germany's military program was determined by her position between her two chief military foes. With Russia on her east and France on her west, Germany was compelled to divide her forces and to win two campaigns instead of one sweeping victory. The manpower of Russia was far greater than that of Germany, although far less adequately equipped and trained; but the ability of the vast and undeveloped Russian Empire to mobilize and then to concentrate its man-power was a matter of many weeks. With an inefficient government, a poorly-trained army administration, a general lack of supplies and equipment, an absence of carefully-prepared facilities for mobilization and especially for transportation, Russia could present to Germany no immediate fear of invasion.

Germany's distribution of her forces was thus fore-ordained. The vast bulk of her army she could throw against France, dispatching but a small force to stop Russia on the Russo-German frontier. The army of Austria-Hungary would invade Russia and thus assist Germany in holding in check the forces which Russia could command within the first weeks of war. With France crushed, Germany could then turn her undivided attention to Russia; and after Russia had been crushed, there would be ample time to attend to Great Britain. Germany and Austria-Hungary presented a solid block of territory through Central Europe, and could shift their forces from one country to the other without interruption; and the magnificent net-work of military railroads within the German Empire made for extreme rapidity in transposing her forces from the French to the Russian frontier, a distance of little more than 500 miles. On the other hand, it was well-nigh impossible for France and Russia to exchange troops; and in case Great Britain should be involved, the concentration of her

small army in France would be determined by the availability of naval transports.

An aggressive rather than a defensive military campaign was thus superimposed on Germany by her geographical position. Aggression was demanded also by the military creed of the German General Staff, which had long taught the advantage of offense as against defense. But rapidity was superimposed upon Germany no less than aggression. If her campaign against France should consume too long a period of time, Russia would be able unmolested to collect a force which would either overwhelm the German troops on the eastern frontier of Germany, or else require the diversion of strong German forces from the west to the east. Germany's program called for the overthrow of France within six weeks, or at the utmost, two months.

Germany had therefore prepared all her plans for mobilization and concentration with the extreme material efficiency characteristic of the Imperial German Government, and had rehearsed them again and again. Each member of the German army, active and reservist; each sub-officer and commander; each official of the German Government; each cog in the transportation and supply systems of Germany, all had received minute instructions for their disposition when the time for the invasion of France should arrive. No detail was too minute to be overlooked and none was too complicated to be left to the occasion. The brains back of the German army had taken every step necessary to assure a functioning of the German war machine as smooth as that of clockwork. Germany's preparations were aided, moreover, by the fact that Germany would assume the offensive-she knew the course which the early campaign would take; her opponents would be compelled to wait for Germany to disclose the course of her campaign before maturing their own plans.

Germany's plans were aided by the position of Paris. Paris was far to the north of France. It was but 170 miles from the nearest point on the Franco-German frontier. It was but 115 miles from the nearest point on the Belgian frontier. Moreover, Paris was much more than the capital of France-it was the hub of all French activity. It was the seat of finance, the centre of transportation. France was a highly-organized land; unlike a country of the nature of Russia,

France would be well-nigh helpless if its capital were to fall. Furthermore, the chief material resources and mineral wealth of France were in the region between Paris and the Franco-German and FrancoBelgian frontiers; even if the French armies were to elude a capture like that of 1870, and were to retreat south of Paris, German occupancy of Paris would threaten to bring France to her knees with hardly less thoroughness than in 1870.

There were three roads to France open to Germany-through Switzerland; through Alsace and Lorraine; and through Belgium and Luxemburg.

Switzerland lay too far to the south of Germany to be readily available for an invasion of France. A considerable delay would ensue in dispatching German troops the depth of the German Empire. The country between Paris and Switzerland was less valuable in resources than the country between either Paris and Alsace-Lorraine or that between Paris and Belgium. It could be more easily defended. Vast hordes of German troops could not pour from Switzerland toward Paris without reducing at least two of the very strong French forts along the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. Moreover, the Swiss army was capable of opposing a determined resistance, aided by the ruggedness of the country, which would still further delay the German advance. The only element of strength favoring the Swiss route would be its availability to the forces of Austria-Hungary, but the German General Staff had long since determined that the Austro-Hungarian forces must be used to hold Russia in check.

An invasion of France via Alsace-Lorraine then seemed the most practicable plan. The German fortifications in Alsace-Lorraine were very strong, and the German troops could march directly into Germany without delaying to crush the resistance of either a Belgium or a Switzerland. But there were serious drawbacks to the choice of the Alsace-Lorraine route. In the first place, the Vosges Mountains stretched along almost the entire Franco-German boundary in five high ridges which would render assistance of incalculable value to defenders and would present great difficulties to invaders. In the second place, so probable had been the Alsace-Lorraine route, in view

of the German guarantee of Belgian neutrality and the certainty of strong Belgian resistance to a German invasion, that France had expected and had prepared for a German invasion by this route; and Germany would be aided immensely by the surprise and the consequent disarrangement of the French plans occasioned by the choice of any other route. In the third place, in anticipation of an invasion by way of the Franco-German frontier, France had fortified it heavily. To the north lay Verdun, near the Luxemburg border; and to the south, near the Swiss border, lay Belfort; and between them lay Épinal and Toul, four fortresses strengthened by every device known to the French High Command and prepared for the very purpose of resisting such an attack as Germany was contemplating. Finally, remembering that speed was necessary to the German plan of campaign, as much as possible of the German fighting strength had to be rushed into France with the minimum delay, and there was at least the possibility that the Alsace-Lorraine frontier was too narrow to permit the dispatch of so many troops in so short space of time as was necessary to the German program.

The chief factor militating against an invasion of France by way of Belgium was a moral one. In 1839, Germany had joined with the other great Powers in guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, and German violation of Belgian neutrality would be a violation not only of international law but also of international morality. But, as has been seen, Germany was under the domination of that system of thought which maintains that necessity knows no law and that the ends justify the means; and the availability of Belgium for the German attack upon France presented itself to the German Government as a problem of a merely material nature. Conceivably, violation of Belgian neutrality would involve Great Britain in the war; but developments in 1905 and 1911, as well as the secret agreement between France and England in 1912, of which Germany was doubtless cognizant, must have convinced Germany that England would rally to the support of France irrespective of the violation of Belgian neutrality. Moreover, the army which England would be able to throw into the field. at once would be puny in comparison with the vast invading hordes of Germans; and if Germany succeeded in overwhelming France within

six weeks or two months, the direct military opposition of England might well be disregarded as being outweighed by other factors favoring invasion of France by way of Belgium.

Similarly, the Belgian army numbered only between 100,000 and 150,000, and was poorly trained. True, there were several Belgian fortresses of reputed strength, but Germany understood that in reality their defences were antiquated, and recent artillery experiments had convinced the German General Staff that even the strongest fortresses could oppose but a feeble resistance to the huge German field pieces. Again, it would be necessary to violate the neutrality of the independent duchy of Luxemburg to pass through Belgium on the way to France; but Luxemburg maintained no army whatsoever, and could not delay the advance of the German army for one minute.

There were other telling factors favoring the choice of the BelgiumLuxemburg route. In the first place, the country was, on the whole, low and level, and was hence admirably suited for the manipulation of great forces on a great scale. The German plan called for a wide sweep of the German cavalry to cover the operations of the infantry, and cavalry could be manipulated over level country as it could not be manipulated over hills and mountains. And through and from Belgium, two great river valleys led almost directly to Paris-the valleys of the Meuse and the Oise. (See Map, page 471.)

In the second place, the invasion of Belgium, with the resistance of King Albert's forces, would give Germany the pretext necessary to annex Belgium after the war, provided that the German plans should be carried to fruition. The possession of the Belgian sea-coast would not only enable Germany to establish submarine bases along the extreme southern shore of the North Sea, but would also serve as points of departure from which to attack England after France and Russia should have been crushed. The possession of Antwerp would be of invaluable aid to German commerce. And with Holland thus surrounded, Germany would be able after the war to enter into negotiations forcing The Netherlands to surrender control over the mouth of the Rhine.

In the third place, Germany in recent years had been developing an extensive net-work of military railroads leading directly to the