CHURCH, RUINS

An excellent idea of the devastation wrought by German shells upon some of the stateliest cathedrals of Europe is given in the accompanying illustration. The upper panel shows the interior of a church at Cambrai after bombardment. In the large central panel is given a striking evidence of the effect of bombardment, in the mass of stone and brick which is all that is left of the once magnificent cathedral at Albert. The lower interior is that of the cathedral at Arras, and the remnants of the church in the lower picture are those of the largest house of worship in Vancourt.

Belgian frontier. From all parts of the German Empire, German forces could be rushed to and discharged on the very soil of Belgium with a rapidity which France could not hope to equal. Moreover, both in Belgium and in northern France there were extensive railroad lines and highways which could be used for the transportation of German troops as soon as Germany should overrun those regions and should repair whatever damage might have been done to the railroads and their rolling stock by the retreating Belgian and French forces.

In the fourth place, there were practically no military strongholds on French soil near the Belgian frontier which could impede the progress of the German army. Trusting that a German advance would be launched via Alsace-Lorraine, France had established on the Belgian frontier only one fortress of considerable strength, Maubeuge. (The other two fortresses to the north, Dunkirk and Lille, were too far to the west to impede the German advance.) Even if the German fieldguns should be unable to reduce Maubeuge, the German army could surround it and with only brief interruption proceed "nach Paris." Moreover, there were none of the protecting connections between the Belgian and the French fortresses to the north that existed between the four strong fortresses on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier.

In the fifth place, much of France's mineral strength, especially coal, lay in northern France. If the first drive for Paris should fail, and if the war should settle into a struggle of attrition, Germany would be able to utilize France's mineral resources. And even if in the end the German armies should be unexpectedly driven out of France, there would still be opportunity to destroy many of the mines, factories and farms from which French succor would be drawn.

Germany was playing for big stakes-her conception of her campaign was on a fitting scale.

THE FRENCH PLAN

As geographical considerations imposed an aggressive plan of campaign upon Germany, they would seem to have imposed a defensive campaign upon France. Despite the careful preparations made by the French military commanders to withstand a German onslaught,

France realized that her mobilization and concentration would be appreciably less rapid than the German. France's hope lay in Russia, and France's salvation hence lay in preserving merely a strong resistance until Russia should be able to bring her full force into play. At all events, Paris must be safeguarded; and since the Franco-Prussian War a formidable string of fortifications had been erected around the French capital. Similarly, at all hazard, the French armies must avoid being surrounded as they had been surrounded in 1870 and 1871; and they must retreat in good order rather than risk surrender. Realizing no less vividly than the German General Staff the value of speed to Germany's plans, France's policy must be one to delay the German advance as long as possible, and to postpone decisive action to the last possible minute.

To the southeast and southwest, France was bounded by Switzerland, Italy and Spain. An invasion by way of Switzerland was by no means impossible, and France could not leave the Swiss frontier undefended. Even more possible was an invasion by Italy. France hoped that Italy would remain neutral at least in the early days of the war; but, after all, Italy was nominally a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, and there could be no telling how long Italian neutrality would be maintained. Italy would have an eye chiefly to the interests of Italy; and although she might throw her weight into the scales against Germany and Austria if thereby her ambitions regarding Italia Irredenta and the Adriatic Coast might be realized, yet if the Central Powers should unmistakably prove themselves victorious, Italy might join them at the last moment to gain what she could from the defeat of France and Russia and to avoid punishment for not joining Germany and Austria at the very outset of the war. The French were realists, and could point to all modern European history for support of a contention that every European Power would strive to benefit by the plight of the vanquished, no matter what nations might be the vanquished. A considerable French force would have to safeguard the Franco-Italian frontier.

On the other hand, there was little danger of an attack from Spain. The Spanish army was inconsiderable, and in Spain there was always smouldering a social and political revolution which would be fanned.

by war. Nevertheless, France had learned to her cost how unexpected might be the alliances which the German Foreign Office had formed, and she could not leave the Pyrenees absolutely unguarded.

France's policy was determined also by reliance upon British and Belgian help in case the German army should advance through Belgium and Luxemburg. France seems not to have realized how helpless the Belgian fortresses would be against the huge German field guns, and to have counted upon a much greater delay to Germany than Belgium was actually able to inflict. France seems, furthermore, to have anticipated a German advance through Alsace-Lorraine; at all events, when the War actually broke, France threw the bulk of her military strength toward Alsace-Lorraine and left her northern frontier comparatively undefended. Doubtless the French longing for Alsace-Lorraine and the hope of assistance from the oppressed inhabitants of that region helped to determine a French sortie in this direction, especially since the presence of the four great French fortresses on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier would prevent the French forces from being flanked.

THE AUSTRIAN PLAN

The course pursued by the Austro-Hungarian army was determined by the nature of the quarrel which had directly resulted in war. Since the Central Powers claimed that their stand was determined by the necessity of ending the pan-Serbian agitation against Austria-Hungary, it was impossible for the Austrian armies to withdraw from their attack against Servia. Accordingly, one branch of the Austrian army had to continue its Serbian advance.

Austria could count upon Italian neutrality even less than France. Italy's ambitions for territorial expansion were cherished at the expense of Austria, and Austria was compelled to keep her Italian frontier well-guarded, lest Italy take advantage of the situation to occupy the Austrian territory desired by the government of Victor Emmanuel.

For the rest, Austria had to come to Germany's assistance and to hold off the Russian armies as best she might until Germany had