finished with France. The disaffection in Russian Poland dictated an advance into that region, with the hope that the inhabitants, inspired by hope of freedom for Poland and hatred of their Russian masters, would turn against Russia. The rest of Austria's forces were concentrated in an advance against Russia in the direction of Kiev.

THE ENGLISH PLAN

The chief immediate assistance rendered by Great Britain, of course, would be the absolute control of the sea and the imposition of a blockade on Germany. The English fleet had been mobilized, and was fully prepared at the outbreak of war to clear the seas of all vessels flying the German and Austrian flags.

The English government had discussed with the French and Russian governments the form of assistance which the British army also would render in case of an invasion of France, and it had been agreed that as strong a British force as possible would be dispatched to France immediately upon the declaration of war by England. Obviously, the area in France assigned the British forces would be along the sea-coast and the extreme west.

THE RUSSIAN PLAN

Russia was naturally to get together as rapidly as possible a vast force for the invasion of Germany. Nevertheless, she was bound to render assistance to Servia, and if possible, prevent Austria from completely overrunning the land of King Peter; and Russian assistance to Servia would be best rendered by a counter-attack upon Austria. At the same time, the threat of the Austrian advance through Galicia and - Poland could not be disregarded, and had to be met even before the advance against Germany could be put into effect. The early mobilization of the Russian army, which the Russian Government seems to have tried to keep secret from both the friends and the enemies of Russia (see page 125), had enabled Russia to strengthen the garrisons of Warsaw and other Russian forts along the Vistula.

The German territory contiguous to Russia was comprised within

the three German provinces of East Prussia, Posen and Silesia. East Prussia projected the farthest into Russia, but its border on Russia was a mass of lakes and swamps which would make an advance into East Prussia most difficult. By natural position, Posen presented the more available road into Germany, but Germany had fortified it with a strong net-work of fortresses against which the Russian advance, stronger in man-power than in artillery, would be shattered. Silesia therefore was the most practicable road for the final Russian attack upon Germany, especially since the Oder Valley was a natural avenue of advance and since an invasion through Silesia would menace Vienna as well as Berlin.

The predominating anxiety of Russia was that of overcoming natural obstacles. Only seven railroads ran from Russia to Germany, and their intercommunication, both by rail and highroad, was scant. Many sections from which the army was to be recruited were without telephone and telegraph, and the notices of mobilization were hence greatly delayed. Supplies had to be transported enormous distances, and the inefficiency of the Russian government also hindered the effective mobilization of the Russian man-power. Under the circumstances, Russia seems to have mobilized more rapidly than had been expected.

THE GERMAN INVASION OF BELGIUM

NOTE-It will be many years after the final signing of the peace terms of the Great War before all the important details of its military and naval campaigns will be known. When the Great War officially ended, only general information was available concerning many of its greatest battles; and much of the strategy, many of the events on the battlefields, many of the results of campaigns were still shrouded in mystery and concealment. Only the more obvious events can be presented by a historian writing near the time of the proclamation of peace.

Indeed, detailed accounts of only the campaigns in the first year and the last year of the War would be of engrossing interest to most readers after the signing of peace. For after the German army had been halted at the Marne and had retreated to entrench itself along the Aisne in the fall of 1914, until the German General Staff launched its tremendous blows in the spring of 1918, the history of the War in northern France and Belgium was the tedious and duplicating history of trench warfare. From the North Sea to the Swiss border, the battle-line was marked by intricate systems of trenches which did not develop any flanking movements, any surprise attacks on a large scale, any enveloping manoeuvres, or any other spectacular methods of warfare. On the Russian front, in Palestine and Mesopotamia, in Africa, in the Balkans, doubtless the campaigns were dazzling in their brilliancy; but less is known of these than even of the campaigns in France and Belgium; and although they were assuredly of tremendous indirect influence upon the final result of the War, yet the final result itself was determined directly by the struggle in the west. Naturally, information concerning the earlier years of the War is more available than information concerning the later years; but enough data are at hand to furnish an account of the entire war elaborate enough to satisfy any but the military expert.

The German plan of attack upon Paris was roughly as follows:About fifteen days would be needed for complete mobilization and concentration. Germany would then have available for war purposes some 2,000,000 well-trained men, of which number about 300,000 would be needed on the Russian frontier to hold back the first Russian advance and a similar number in Alsace-Lorraine to check any French advance in that region. But on each day of mobilization, certain sections of the army would be ready to pour into Belgium and Luxemburg, and they were sent on their way at regular intervals and without

delay. There were always certain bodies of soldiers stationed near the Belgian frontier, and these were dispatched immediately into Belgium, being followed each day by those who were next available for the invasion of King Albert's land.

Obviously, if each quota of the German army to cross the Belgian frontier on a given day were to make straight for Paris, the French army would be enabled to defeat one section of the German army after the other as they came up to the main body of the French troops. The German task was hence to concentrate all the German troops upon Paris at the same time. To this end, instead of heading straight for Paris, the German forces marched across Belgium almost due west, and then suddenly wheeled at almost a right angle, and headed south. The first troops to enter Belgium marched the farthest west; the next troops, not quite so far west; and the last troops marched only slightly into Belgian territory before heading south for France. Thus the plan was so nicely calculated that when the last troops to enter Belgium turned to the south, the first troops to enter Belgium had completed their longer march through Belgium and were also headed south, so that the entire invading German army was marching in an unbroken line upon Paris at one time. (See Map, page 471.)

The first troops to enter Belgium were under the command of von Emmich, to whom was assigned the task of reducing Belgium. The forces attacking France were then subdivided into seven great armies, of which the first five were to march through Belgium and Luxemburg, the others functioning along the Franco-German frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland. The German armies were commanded as follows: First, by von Kluck.

Second, by von Bülow.

Third, by von Hausen.

Fourth, by the Duke of Württenburg.

Fifth, by the Crown Prince of Germany.

Sixth, by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

Seventh, by von Heeringen.

In addition, an eighth army was organized, under the command of von Deimling, to act on the defensive in Alsace-Lorraine against French aggression in that section.

In the direct attack against Paris, the Sixth and Seventh Armies were held by the French near the frontier east of Verdun, and the direct blow at the French capital was delivered by the first five armies. The First Army marched through Belgium west of Louvain, heading south from that point. The Second marched west to a point between Namur and Charleroi, and thence headed south. The Third wheeled from Belgium toward France at a point west of Dinant. The Fourth and Fifth Armies advanced through Luxemburg, and headed south from Charleville and Virton, respectively.

A well-prepared German cavalry force, about 500,000 strong, preceded the infantry. It swept through Belgium at high speed, waiting only for the fall of Liège, and stationed itself in a north and south line paralleling the northwest sea-coast of France so as to act as a screen for the movements of the German army, as well as to act as a reconnoitering force. Much of the secrecy attending the first month's activities of the German army in France and Belgium was due to the effectiveness of this cavalry screen. It is a striking coincidence that the first German troops crossed the Belgian frontier on the same day of the same month and at about the same hour as the first German troops to cross the French frontier forty-four years previously.

There were three great fortresses in Belgium-Antwerp, Liège and Namur. Of these, the first was too far to the northwest of Belgium to be in the way of the advancing German army, and could be disregarded; but Liège and Namur, both on the Meuse, were in the direct line of the German advance, and would have to be reduced before the Germans could pass beyond them.

THE FALL OF LIÈGE

Liège was a kind of natural key-hole into Belgium and France. It was a point at which many great railroad lines converged, including the line leading directly to Paris. It was also a centre of canals and high-roads. It was the outlet of the great plain of the northern German-Belgian frontier, and the inevitable passage-way for large bodies of troops.

Liège had been fortified in 1886 by six primary outlying forts and