six subsidiary ones. Each of the forts lay about four miles from the town, and two or three miles from one another, altogether forming a perimeter of some thirty miles. The forts had permanent garrisons and heavy equipment, as equipment was considered on August 1, 1914; and the fortress enjoyed a high reputation for military strength. For Liège, accordingly, the first invading German army, consisting of some 200,000 men under von Emmich, made all possible speed; and arrived before the gates of the city and demanded its surrender on August 5, 1914.

For Liège, similarly, the Belgian army made all possible speed. Belgian mobilization had begun on August 1, and was almost completed by August 5; so that a Belgian force, under the direct command of King Albert, with headquarters at Louvain, was available as assistance to the Liège garrison. Belgium had divided its army of some 125,000 men into six divisions. One division was to remain stationary with Liège as centre and another was to remain stationary around Namur. With these two divisions as pivots, the other four divisions were to advance as follows:

The First, from Ghent to Tirlemont.

The Second, from Antwerp to Louvain.
The Third, from Mons to Perwez.

The Fourth, from Brussels to Wavre.

The Belgian army was to hold its positions as long as possible, in the hope of gaining enough time to be reinforced in Belgium by British and French troops. If compelled by the superior force of the German invaders to retreat before British and French assistance could reach it, the Belgian army was to keep its lines of communication into France open and to retreat in good order, to join the French and British forces in France. But in any event, the fortresses of Liège, Namur and Antwerp were to be defended with the utmost vigor, even if completely surrounded and isolated.

Von Emmich's demand for surrender being rejected, the German commander undertook to obviate delay by carrying the town by storm. But the garrison, aided by a large section of the regular Belgian army, was able to drive back the Germans, and von Emmich was compelled

to await the arrival of his heavy artillery on the following day. On August 6, the second day's quota of the invading German army also caught up to von Emmich, and the combined German forces succeeded in flanking the city and threatened to cut off the retreat of the supporting Belgian army. While the German field-guns played upon the forts, great masses of infantry were hurled against the Belgian troops defending the ground between the forts. The Belgians inflicted heavy losses upon the attackers, but the German General Staff had given orders that speed was more precious than life, and the Germans continued to press on. The defenders were greatly outnumbered, and had to be hurried from one gap to the other as the German attacks continued through August 6. Finally, the Belgians were driven between Forts Evegnée and Fléron, and the latter was completely demolished by the following day. The supporting Belgian troops therefore retired and left the defense of Liège solely to its garrison.

1

Before the heavy German guns, the forts of Liège were helpless. Indeed, one of the revolutionizing military lessons of the Great War was that of the helplessness of fortresses before heavy field guns. Verdun itself, months later, was successfully defended against the German attack only by diverting the defence from the fortifications. themselves to heavily-protected trenches in front of them. And Liège was no Verdun. Its forts were largely isolated and unconnected, and their equipment had not kept pace with the latest developments in artillery science; and the German guns were using shells of a destructiveness previously unknown. The garrison, at the utmost numbering 30,000 men, was outnumbered by odds of almost five to one. General Leman, the heroic Belgian commander, soon withdrew his garrison to the forts on the west bank of the Meuse, as the Germans had already crossed the river below the forts. On August 7, the Germans occupied the town, from which the further attack on the forts was directed. The bridges across the Meuse thus fell into German possession. The passage-way south was now open to all the German troops invading Belgium, and von Emmich's forces could proceed with greater deliberation to reduce the rest of the Liège forts. The final attack was opened in earnest on August 10. One after one the forts yielded to the devastating German fire, the garrisons withdrawing to the forts

remaining intact. Fort Boncelles was silenced on August 14, and several days later, the last and strongest of the forts, Fort Loncin, capitulated.

The Belgians had fought with the utmost bravery against overwhelming odds. They had held back the German invaders for almost forty-eight hours, but such delay had not been unforeseen in the German plans. Indeed, it is probable that the reduction of Liège had occurred in less time than had been allowed in the original calculations of the German General Staff. Complete German mobilization and concentration were not completed before August 12, and the full German advance did not get under way until August 14 or August 15; so that, despite the sternness of the resistance at Liège, it can hardly be said to have delayed the German campaign. The true value of the defence of Liège was a moral rather than a military value.

THE FALL OF BRUSSELS AND NAMUR

After the occupancy of the town of Liège by the German forces on August 7, the German cavalry proceeded far into Belgian territory. A number of skirmishes ensued between these forces and the Belgian troops, in some of which the Germans suffered temporary setbacks; but none of the skirmishes was of sufficient importance to be termed a battle. The sharpest took place at Tongres, Tirlemont, Haelen, Diest, Eghezée, Landen, Waremme.

By this time, the Belgian army had completed its concentration, and took up a position behind the Greete River, between Diest and Namur. It was joined by the troops which had fled from Liège, and King Albert cherished ardent hopes that he would be joined also by considerable French and British forces before the full force of the German drive fell upon his small army.

The next Belgian fortress of any strength in the path of the German army was Namur. Namur is southwest of Liège, and is situated nearer the French than the German frontier, whereas Liège is almost on the very border of Germany. Namur is at the junction of the Meuse and the Sambre Rivers, and hence was probably the most valuable strategic position in all Belgium. It was defended by a circle

of four large forts and five smaller ones, which were supposed to be stronger than even the forts of Liège. The garrison had been reinforced against the German advance, had spent a number of days in preparing for defence, was supported by the entire Belgian army; and Namur was expected to give a far better account of itself than had Liège. Belgium had defended her neutrality as staunchly as could have been expected; if she should now yield to superior force and surrender passage-way without further resistance to the German army in order to avoid complete destruction, there would have been none to condemn her; but Belgium was more intent upon saving her soul than upon saving her material goods, and for several days Albert's army succeeded in standing its ground.

By August 18, however, the advance guards of the German Second (von Bülow's) Army had reached the Belgian lines. Of the forces of the Entente Allies, only some French cavalry had been able to join the Belgian army, and Albert had only some 125,000 men to oppose 500,000. Flanking movements of the Germans threatened both to surround the Belgian army and to sever its lines of communication with the French and British; so that only annihilation would result from further resistance before Namur. Accordingly, on August 18 and 19, the Belgian army withdrew, leaving Namur's defence to its garrison and one division of the Belgian army and surrendering Brussels without a blow, and by August 20, the bulk of the Belgian army was safe within the fortifications of Antwerp-safe, but no longer in the path of the German armies marching upon Paris.

Again the German forces had met no unexpected obstacle on their road. On August 19, Louvain was occupied by the German First (von Kluck's) Army, to the north and west of Namur, and on the following day, Brussels, the capital of Belgium, was also occupied. When they reached Brussels and Louvain, the forces of von Kluck had completed their scheduled march due west through Belgium; leaving a force to surround and reduce the forts of Namur, they turned sharply to the south and made directly for France.

The Germans had learned a lesson at Liège, and did not attempt to capture the forts of Namur until the heavy German field guns were in readiness. Indeed, it is possible that the heaviest German guns

had not been used at all upon Liège, but had been shipped directly to Namur. At all events, when the bombardment opened on August 20, it required but several days to silence the Namur guns. Throughout the evening of August 20 and the day of August 21, a terrific steel rain poured down upon the Belgian defenders. The Namur guns were outranged and could not answer the German fire with any effectiveness. During the first evening's bombardment, one fort was blown up by the shell-fire of the attackers, and when dawn broke on the twentyfirst, it was seen that several other forts were but a mass of smoking ruins. The losses among the forces within the forts of Namur were terrific. So heavy was the fire and so impossible any effective resistance that the defenders could inflict little retaliatory punishment upon the besiegers. On the twenty-first, the advance guard of some French troops rushing up to relieve the city arrived in sight of the town, and attacked the Germans; but German flanking movements prevented the arrival of any further French troops and those which had arrived at Namur were compelled to withdraw almost immediately to avoid being surrounded. On the twenty-third, the commander of the Namur garrison ordered a retreat of the troops of the Belgian division which had been assigned to remain at Namur, and with difficulty they succeeded in making their way to Antwerp. Resistance at Namur was feeble by the evening of the twenty-third; on the twenty-fourth, the Germans occupied the town; and by the twenty-sixth, not one gun of the forts of Namur was able to answer the German fire.

Namur was a decided German victory. The fortress had been counted upon by the Allied strategists for a much longer period of resistance, and their plans were hindered by the fall of the fortress within two days and the complete abandonment of further Belgian resistance to the German advance by August 18. The Belgian defeat had been so rapid that there had not been time to destroy much of the Belgian rolling stock or many sections of the Belgian roads and railroads; and the rapidity of the German drive on Paris was all the more accelerated.