although near enough the Hungarian frontier to protect Hungary from invasion by Russia.

But as Russian Poland projected into enemy country, so the extreme northeastern portion of the German Empire (East Prussia) projected into Russia-again like a fist into a pillow. East Prussia was open to attack from Russia on the east and south, and could be defended only from the west, as it was bounded on the north by the Baltic Sea. But along the border of East Prussia contiguous to Russia stretched a chain of lakes, the Mazurian Lakes, more than two thousand in number, with huge stretches of marshes, which made any invasion of East Prussia difficult. Moreover, East Prussia was as well supplied with railroads as Russian Poland was poorly supplied; and it was further protected by strong German fortresses— Königsburg and Dantzig on the Baltic Sea; Thorn, Dirschau and Graudenz on the Vistula, which forms the western boundary of East Prussia; and a number of connecting subsidiary fortresses.

We have seen that Russia stole a march upon the other great belligerent Powers in ordering partial mobilization as early as July 25; and in addition she proved that her mobilizing facilities had been underestimated. So that Russia was able to strike vigorously at Germany and Austria before the end of August, and thus came very close to upsetting the plan of campaign of the German General Staff. Russia's facilities for mobilization had been made more adequate to the south than to the west of Russia, because of Russia's predominant interest in the Balkans, her plans to open a road to the Mediterranean and Constantinople, her protection of most of the Slavic states in the Balkans and her consequent sharp rivalry with her southern neighbor, Austria-Hungary, and her knowledge that in the event of a general European war she would be invaded from the south by Austria-Hungary before she would be attacked by Germany. Moreover, the Great War arose through a quarrel concerning Servia; Russia had been moved to advance first to the protection of Servia against AustriaHungary; and therefore Russian mobilization seems to have been ordered in the south several days before it became a general mobilization.

Austria-Hungary, on her part, carried through according to fore

cast the part assigned her in the military plans of the Central Powers after the outbreak of war. Leaving but a slight force to proceed with the conquest of Servia, she dispatched the bulk of her army north across the Carpathian passes into Russian Poland. Austria divided her forces into three armies. The main attack against Russia was to be delivered by the army under General Dankl, into which the greater number of the racially heterogeneous Austrian troops had been formed. To the northwest of Dankl, another force had been thrown, but its purpose was chiefly to reconnoitre and to protect communications, as it was realized that the chief Russian forces would come into action against Austria along the eastern instead of the northern Austro-Russian frontier. This realization caused Austria to keep her third army, under General von Auffenburg, within Hungary, along the eastern frontier, to protect Dankl's forces marching toward Warsaw to the northwest from the main Russian armies marching due west from Kiev. Altogether, the Austrian forces numbered in all probability some 650,000 men, a number of the best Austrian infantry and artillery corps having been dispatched to the aid of the Germans in France.

Against Austria, Russia was able, to the consternation and defeat of the Central Powers, to throw more than 1,000,000 men. They, too, were divided into three armies. The first, the smallest of the three, under General Ivanoff, had as its function merely delay to the force under Dankl, while the main Russian armies fell upon von Auffenburg to the southeast. The two main armies, under Russky and Brusiloff, marched straight for the Austro-Russian frontier, disregarding Dankl's army to the north, and making straight into eastern Austria (Galicia) for Lemberg, and incidentally for Dankl's rear. They were therefore opposed by von Auffenburg's army, drawn up north and south before Przemysl and Lemberg. On August 14, less than two weeks after the declaration of war between Germany and Russia, Russky's army crossed the frontier into Austria.

The battle between von Auffenburg's army and the armies of Russky and Brusiloff definitely began on August 23. For several days the Austrians maintained their lines and even gained minor victories, as the two opposing Russian armies had advanced from different bases

and had not yet effected a junction. But on August 28 Russky and Brusiloff captured Tarnopol on the Bug, and thus for purposes of conflict became one army. Von Auffenburg was now greatly outnumbered, but instead of withdrawing in an orderly fashion toward Dankl, he courted destruction by standing his ground. Falling back from the Bug, he entrenched himself in a line stretching through Lemberg. The Russian superiority in troops was then so marked that the Russian commanders were enabled to launch flank attacks against the Austrian trenches. Leaving enough troops to hold the Austrian centre, Russky began to sweep around von Auffenburg's north wing and Brusiloff around his south. Brusiloff was the first to break through. After two days' severe fighting, he captured Halicz at the south end of the Austrian line, which now had to bend sharply back. A few hours later Russky succeeded in driving back the Austrian left. More and more the Austrian line was taking the shape of a horseshoe. A few more hours of resistance would have seen von Auffenburg completely surrounded and cooped up in Lemberg. Retreat became imperative, but he had delayed his retreat too long. So far to the Austrian rear had the Russisan forces advanced that only a narrow gap was left for retirement and into this gap the Austrian forces rushed with a haste which broke up all order. On September 4 the Austrians had to abandon Lemberg and on September 7 further resistance ceased. It was a complete rout.

Moreover, at the same time that he received word of the victory. at Lemberg, Ivanoff to the northwest fell upon the second great Austrian army invading Russian Poland under the leadership of Dankl. A stand by Dankl would have given the victorious armies of Russky and Brusiloff time to march upon his rear. He hastily retired. But the Cossack cavalry shone at breaking up retreats, and before long Dankl's retreat also became a rout. Back across the frontier into Galicia streamed his harassed forces, retiring upon Cracow, while von Auffenburg's forces, prevented from joining Dankl's, retreated into Hungary.

The Russians captured in the neighborhood of two hundred thousand prisoners, vast numbers of guns, and great stores of munitions. and other war material. The fleeing remnants of the Austrian army

I could not hinder a further Russian advance into Galicia, and almost half of this great province of northern Austria-Hungary was open to the Russian forces. Lemberg, a vital railroad centre, was in Russian hands and Przemysl itself was soon invested. The Cossacks drove far into Galicia and even into northern Hungary, laying waste the country-side and destroying much material of military value. The military campaign of Germany's chief ally had been for a time irretrievably shattered.

THE BATTLE OF TANNENBURG

In the regions where hostilities have already been described, the opening campaigns had begun according to schedule. In France, as anticipated, the Germans had launched a terrific drive with the hope of ending French opposition within two months. In the southeast, as expected, Austrian forces had opposed the inevitable advance into Galicia. But the hostilities now to be described had had no part in the scheme of campaign predicted for a general European war, and were in the nature of a most disagreeable surprise to Germany. Profiting by her early and comparatively rapid mobilization, Russia attacked Germany in East Prussia at the same time that she attacked Austria to the northeast of the Carpathians.

We have seen that the entrance into Germany most available for a huge Russian army would be Silesia, to the south of the Russo-German border. But such an advance would be dangerous until at least the threat of a German counter-attack upon Russian Poland south from East Prussia had been ended. Accordingly, the Russian plan was first to scatter German forces in East Prussia by a preliminary invasion by the Russian troops first to be mobilized, to be followed, if successful, by a thrust into Silesia by the main strength of the Russian army.

So unexpected was the Russian advance into East Prussia that it found few German troops stationed in that province to oppose it. Probably less than 200,000 German soldiers were available to oppose the first Russian advance into East Prussia, which began as early as August 17. The Russian forces were divided into two armies, under the command of Generals Rennenkampf and Samsonof, the former