attacks were in mountainous or hilly country, it was inevitable that the point chosen for the German onslaught should be the point where the Russian line in Galicia turned from the Carpathians to the level country to the north.

Dmitrieff's line was behind the Dunajec in front of Tarnow, whence it stretched along the Biala down to the Carpathians themselves. Dmitrieff's army adjoined that of Evarts, on the north, at the Vistula; and the army of Brusiloff, to the southeast, in the foothills of the Carpathians. At the end of April, a sharp thaw had suddenly melted the snows in the Carpathians and the Dunajec as well as other streams were swollen; the Russian position therefore looked strong, especially since Dmitrieff was occupying trenches which had been built several months before and which accordingly were comprehensive and strong. Dmitrieff had behind him the rivers Wisloka, Wistok and San, behind which he could also make stands and which accordingly he considered his second, third and fourth lines of retreat.

On this occasion, the Germans' plan of battle was in sharp contrast to their usual flanking strategy. Von Mackensen was to batter down Russian resistance with his heavy guns, and hence he was going to ram straight into the Russian centre, leaving the flanks to take care of themselves. Indeed, on the wings of the Battle of the Dunajec the Russians constantly drove back the Germans, only themselves to be compelled to retreat by the inexorable advance of the battering ram in the centre of the line.

The great drive was opened on April 28 by a preliminary advance on Dmitrieff's left wing along the Biala, near the junction with Brusiloff's army. A German advance here would flank both these Russian armies and Dmitrieff hastened to support his left with troops withdrawn from his centre. Then, on May 1, the main attack was launched frontally on the southern part of Dmitrieff's line, south of Tarnow. The rain of shells loosed from the German guns had been unprecedented in volume in the east. Before that artillery attack the Russian trenches were leveled, and the Russian forces could not prevent the Germans from bridging the Biala. Completely paralyzed by the heavy fire, the Russian army could not then stop the crack German troops from advancing, and by May 2, the force

Upper Left-Hand Corner-Major-General Leonard Wood, Commander, Department of the East, United States Army, 1914-March 25, 1917, and Southeastern Department, March 25, 1917-August 16, 1917; Commander, Camp Funston, August 16, 1917-.

Upper Right-Hand Corner-Major-General George W. Goethals, Civil Governor, Panama Canal Zone, 1914-1916; General Manager, Emergency Fleet Corporation, April 14, 1917-July 24, 1917; Acting Quartermaster General, United States Army, December 18, 1917-January 7, 1918; Chief, Division of Storage and Traffic and Purchase of General Staff, United States Army, February, 1918-.

Center-General Peyton C. March, Commander, Army Artillery, American Expeditionary Force, 1917; Chief of Staff, United States Army, February 7, 1918-.

Lower Left-Hand Corner-Major General Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal General, United States Army, May 18, 1917-.

Lower Right-Hand Corner-Brigadier General William L. Kenly, Chief, Division of Military Aeronautics, United States Army, April 24, 1918—.

which had made the frontal attack had effected a junction with the force to the south which had begun the engagement on April 28. The combined force then advanced, captured Gorlice, and marched for the rear of the remainder of Dmitrieff's army. The Russian flank had been turned, and to the north also German troops had advanced and had thus driven the Russians back along the whole. line. Resistance was hopeless, and the case became one of sauve qui peut. Dmitrieff's army ceased to exist as an army-it had been reduced to an unorganized procession streaming in panic toward the Wisloka, twenty miles away.

On the Wisloka the Russians made a determined stand for several days. The ever-present Russian reinforcements were rushed up, and the German infantry was halted. But by May 7, the German heavy guns were once more in place and again the Russians were helpless before the downpour of shells. On May 8, the Russians broke once more, the Germans crossed the river and the entire Russian line in Galicia had been torn wide asunder.

Brusiloff to the southeast was thus in extreme danger. The retreat of Dmitrieff had left Brusiloff's right wing unprotected, and the Germans were hastening across the gap to get in the latter's rear. His escape was well-nigh miraculous. It was due to the manoeuvre of sending against the Germans coming down the Wisloka on Brusiloff's rear some reinforcements which had just arrived. The Russian reinforcements succeeded in holding the Germans for a few hours, and in those hours the bulk of Brusiloff's army managed to rush through the noose before it closed. Both Russian armies. were then rushing pell-mell for the San River, more than seventy-five miles from the Dunajec. They had thus avoided complete disaster; but they had retreated almost one hundred miles, they were completely disorganized and their losses in dead and prisoners were very, very high.

By May 12, Brusiloff had reached the San and had taken up positions behind it, positions stretching through Jaroslav and Przemysl ; and what was left of Dmitrieff's army joined itself to Brusiloff's command. To the north, Evarts' army had also retired to a line just west of the Vistula in order to keep in touch with the new Russian