short distance back from that frontier and parallel to it is the Isonzo River, and back of this stream the Austrians had long been digging trenches and rolling up large guns, so that their position was one of considerable strength. Indeed, throughout 1915, Italian endeavors to carry the Austrian position failed. Even attempts to shell Gorizia, the important Austrian fortress on the Isonzo, came to naught. However, coincidently with dispatching a force along the Adriatic, Italy had sent a force northward into the mountains to gain and to hold the passes there, lest the Austrians descend from them to attack the army along the Isonzo in the rear; and the Italian army achieved marked success in gaining and in holding the mountain passes to the north of the Isonzo line. (See Map, page 605.)

BULGARIA DECIDES

After the first German drive in France and the first Russian drive in Galicia had slackened, the belligerents were given a breathing space in which to look around them. Their looks soon fell upon the Balkans, and by the beginning of 1915 both the Entente and the Alliance were busily pulling wires in the Near East to gain new partnerships or to prevent new oppositions. We have seen that the Treaty of Bucharest, which closed the Second Balkan War in 1913, had laid down political boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula with cool disregard of nationalistic and racial boundaries. We saw that Bulgaria especially had been penalized and almost completely deprived of the fruits of the victory of the Balkan League over Turkey in the First Balkan War. Even more than Italy, Bulgaria seethed in 1915 with nationalistic longings to redeem its Irredenta and to bring under its rule a large portion of its nationality over which an alien flag flew.

In the competition for Bulgaria's allegiance, the Entente Allies were at a disadvantage as compared with the Central Powers. Many of the "unredeemed Bulgarians" were in Serbian territory; and obviously Bulgarian ambitions could be realized only at the expense of Servia, one of the Entente. Moreover, as traced in Volume I, there was keen rivalry between Bulgaria and Russia, another of the

Entente, in the Balkans, a rivalry which had inclined Bulgaria to the camp of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Bulgaria had even negotiated a large loan from Germany.

At this time, the Entente Allies were feverishly endeavoring to win over Greece, as well, to their side, but a large section of the Bulgarian nationality was also under Greek rule, and hence Greek and Bulgarian interests were diametrically opposed.

The primary element working in favor of the Entente Allies in Bulgaria was the rivalry of Bulgaria and Turkey. Their interests conflicted especially over a railroad. This railroad ran north from Dedeagatch, the one good Bulgarian port on the Aegean Sea. But between Dedeagatch and Sofia the railroad ran through Turkish territory, and Bulgaria was persistently demanding that this small strip of Turkey be ceded her for the furtherance of Bulgarian economic interests.

The Entente's endeavors in the Balkans were centred chiefly around an attempt to resurrect the Balkan League of 1912 and to lead it once more to war against Turkey. Sir Edward Grey evidently.hoped that common hatred of the Turk would induce the Balkan states to forget their own selfish ambitions. But the scars left by the Second Balkan War proved still too raw for a new Balkan alliance and the Turk, moreover, was not so dangerous nor so oppressive in the Balkan Peninsula as he had been in 1912. The Balkan states therefore looked with coldness upon the project for a new Balkan alliance and Bulgaria continued to try to pull her own chestnuts out of the fire.

The final success of the German diplomats in Bulgaria was presaged early in 1915, when Bulgaria obtained from Germany a large payment on the loan already negotiated. In the summer, the German statesmen finally prevailed upon Turkey to cede altogether to Bulgaria the strip of Turkish territory along the railroad coveted by Bulgaria, and that serious obstacle to participation by Bulgaria in the War on the side of the Central Powers was removed.

In May, the Entente Allies definitely submitted offers to Bulgaria in return for Bulgarian assistance, but were not able to make these offers sufficiently alluring to win over the Bulgarian government. Indeed, it seems probable that as early as July, 1915, a secret alliance

had been perfected between Bulgaria and the Central Powers. At all events, by this time the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli and the utter collapse of the Russian military campaign were giving a gloomy appearance to the Entente cause. However, in August Bulgaria demanded of the Allies that the territory in Servia and Greece inhabited chiefly by Bulgars should be joined to the Bulgarian kingdom. The Allies were willing to meet most of these demands, but the recompense offered Servia was from Greece and was inadequate; and as both Greece and Servia were naturally not in favor of such an arrangement, Bulgaria might well have wondered how reliable and secure were the promises of the Entente. Moreover, at about this time another large payment was made to Bulgaria, by Germany on account of credit extended; and so there was little surprise when in the latter part of September Bulgaria announced a policy of armed neutrality and mobilized her army in order to put that policy into effect. The open participation by Bulgaria in the war was evidently delayed to give the country time to mobilize completely and to attack Servia only when the Germans and Austrians were also in a position to attack Servia in force. Bulgaria's final purpose was so evident that many Entente statesmen advised that Servia attack Bulgaria before the latter could effectively prepare to attack Servia; but Sir Edward Grey refused to invade a country which was still neutral and friendly, if only on paper. However, by October, German and Austrian officers were drilling the Bulgarian troops with such openness that Russia delivered an ultimatum to Bulgaria demanding that Bulgaria cease her intrigues with the enemies of the Entente Allies. Bulgaria's answer was to declare war on Servia on October 14, 1915 and to invade the kingdom of King Peter from the west without further delay. According to the secret bargain between Bulgaria and the Central Powers, Bulgaria was to obtain territory from Servia and from Greece and in addition much of Albania. On October 14, Great Britain declared war on Bulgaria, and Italy and Russia followed the example of their ally on October 19.

THE OCCUPATION OF SERVIA

With the Central Powers assured of the support of Bulgaria, the acquisition of Servia became of primary importance to their interests. Servia lay between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, and Bulgaria adjoined Turkey; so that if the Central Powers should occupy Servia, they would obtain a solid belt of territory through Central Europe— the four members of the new Quadruple Alliance could exchange soldiers, guns, food, and goods without interference-there would be uninterrupted railroad connection between Berlin and Asia Minor through Constantinople-the Central Powers would thus obtain for their products markets which had hitherto been closed to themsimilarly they would be able to draw for supplies upon new sourcesand above all, the fall of Servia would increase the prestige of the Central Powers throughout the Balkans.

Servia had suffered severe losses in the campaign in the winter of 1914 which had resulted in the defeat of the Austrian invaders. Moreover, since that time, typhus had raged fiercely in the land of King Peter, and had laid low many thousands of soldiers. Against an equal or even a slightly superior force of Austrians, Servia might be able to make a stand; but if the Austrians were in overwhelming strength, especially in artillery, Servia's plight would be desperate; and if at the same time Servia should be attacked in the rear by Bulgaria, her case would be hopeless.

The Central Powers delayed the attack on Servia until the rout of Russia in Poland and Galicia was complete, and until Austro-German troops and guns could be readily transferred to the Serbian front, and also until Bulgaria should have completely finished her military preparations. It was therefore not until October that the attack on Servia began in earnest.

By the first day of October, strong Austro-German forces had assembled on the north shores of the Danube and the Save and also

along the Drina River near its junction with the Save. The enemy was ready to cross the rivers into Servia so soon as their artillery had paved the way. The Austro-Germans, under the direct supervision of von Mackensen, were divided into two armies, under Generals von Koevess and von Gallwitz. The Servian commander, General Putnik, sadly outnumbered and fearing flanking movements, placed the bulk of his army of some 200,000 on his wings and left Belgrade and his centre weak.

On October 3, the Austro-Germans opened fire on the Serbian positions on the south banks of the Danube and the Save and on the east bank of the Drina. The Central Powers were employing the same method against Servia as they had employed some months previously against Russia, and with similar results. The Serbians had no facilities to stop the terrific bombardment, and gradually their positions became untenable. On the seventh, the Austro-Germans crossed the river at various points; on the next day, the Serbians were compelled to evacuate Belgrade, reduced to ruins by the bombardment of many months; and on October 9 Belgrade was once more in the possession of the Central Powers. On the next several days, the Serbian army was driven back all along the northern and western lines. And this was the moment chosen by Bulgaria to attack Servia on the east.

The Entente Allies had to some extent foreseen the danger which Servia was facing and had prepared to concentrate men and supplies to be rushed to Servia's support. But men and supplies could be sent to Servia only through Greece and Greece was neutral. At least, Greece was officially neutral; in reality, the country was split into two opposing factions, one pro-German and the other pro-Ally. The Greek king and the Greek court were pro-German; the premier, Eleutherios Venizelos, possibly the most discerning statesman in all Europe, with his government was pro-Ally. Since the Balkan Wars there had been an alliance between Servia and Greece, and Venizelos maintained that that alliance compelled Greece to come to Servia's assistance against the Central Powers. He had mobilized the Greek army and had invited the Allies to occupy Saloniki (from which a railroad ran to Servia) and to send assistance to Servia from Saloniki through