It blocked approach to the Argonne and the Marne valleys. Finally, it covered both the invaluable iron region of France to the northeast and the great mines of Alsace-Lorraine to the east. The city of Verdun is situated in a low and broad pocket of the Meuse, which runs through the heart of the city in a north-and-south direction. The city is encircled by a range of high hills-hence its inilitary strength as the centre for fortifications. To the east of Verdun Nature had been especially gracious to the defenders-running north and south parallel to and east of the Meuse is a precipitous, rugged ridge known as the Heights of the Meuse. These heights rise some six hundred feet above the level of the river and are cut by deep glens, which make the capture of each hill practically a separate military undertaking, The Heights of the Meuse-averaging some five miles in width-fall down in steep cliffs both to the Meuse Valley on their west and to the Woevre Valley on the east. These cliffs make ascent of the Heights as difficult horizontally as the transverse ridges make ascent difficult longitudinally. To the west of Verdun there is also a range of hills above the average height of the rest of the hills surrounding the city. These hills run east and west, that is, at right angles to the Meuse and to the Heights of the Meuse, and hence they overlook a large section of the ground on which a concentration might be attempted against Verdun. There were two main railroad lines connecting Verdun with Paris and, in addition, a narrow-gauge line between Verdun and Bar-le-duc. (See Map, page 571.) The French had placed their forts on the strategic points of the hills surrounding Verdun. The circumference of the outer ring of forts was more than thirty miles, and from the easternmost fort across the Meuse valley to the westernmost was almost ten miles. The strongest of these outer forts were as follows On the north,-Douaumont, Thiaumont, Marre, Belle-Épine, Bruyères. On the east,-Hardaumont, Vaux, Laufée, Mardi Gras, Eix, Moulainville, Manezel, Chatillon and Tavannes. On the south, Rozellier, Haudainville, Saint Symphorien. On the west,-Germonville, Bois de Sartelles, Bois du Chapitre, Landrecourt, Dugny, Chana, Choisel, Sartelles. In addition, these outer fortifications were supported by an inner ring of forts of which the most important were Belleville, Saint Michel, Belrupt, La Chaume, and Regret. Altogether there were thirty-six forts comprising the fortress of Verdun. We have seen that Verdun, like the three great fortresses to its south, had escaped capture by the German hosts in their first invasion of France in 1914. But in the case of Toul, Épinal and Belfort, the battle-line had been kept at a distance on all sides; in the case of Verdun, the battle-line had swept below the fortress to both right and left. On the west, the battle-line descended gradually through the Argonne Forest into Champagne; but on the east it descended sharply to St. Mihiel. Verdun was thus at the head of a sharp, advanced salient into the German line and at best its position was precarious. But its position had been rendered more precarious by the fact that its railroad communication with Paris had been all but cut off. The German possession of St. Mihiel cut off one of the main lines to Paris. At Montfauçon the Germans had seized and had maintained strategic positions which covered and accordingly rendered almost useless the other main line. The defenders of Verdun could thus rely for supplies and for reinforcements only upon the sadly inadequate narrow-gauge line. Early in 1916, the Germans had been able to withdraw a large part of their forces from the Russian and Serbian fronts. These they combined with a huge surplus of guns and shells made possible by the comparative inactivity in the winter along the western front, and the German General Staff prepared to utilize all this concentrated strength for a desperate drive upon the Allied lines. Germany realized that even with Russia helpless to assume the offensive, a war of attrition in the west could result finally only in the ultimate defeat of Germany, because of the Allied ultimate superiority in man-power and supplies. Germany therefore was striving again for a decision, with the possibility of another drive directly on Paris in case she should break through. At first blush, it would seem that the Verdun salient would be the last point chosen for the big attack in the spring of 1916. Verdun was a salient into the German, not into the French, lines. The tip of the salient was some 150 miles from Paris-other points of the line were less than sixty. But Germany was hoping for a surprise, and realized that the Allies, not expecting an attack on Verdun, had prepared other sectors more adequately for the big German drive than they had prepared Verdun. Verdun was well toward the centre of the Allied line in France after the, battle-front turned at the Oise to run east and west instead of north and south. If the Germans broke through there, they could flank, not a mere army, but either half of the Allied forces. The very sharpness of the St. Mihiel salient held by the Germans on the east of Verdun would aid them both in reducing the Verdun salient and in having a broad base for an entering wedge into the French lines in case Verdun should be reduced. Verdun, moreover, despite the reputation of its forts, was probably the weakest point in the Allied line. The war had proved that fortresses were helpless before huge siege guns-indeed, Sarrail, who had been the commander at Verdun for a large part of 1914 and 1915, had placed his chief reliance, not in the guns of his fortresses, but in trenches and field positions. Again, as we have seen, the Verdun communications were inadequate. In late winter and early spring the Meuse could always be counted upon to overflow its banks and to flood the country, so that the defenders of the main positions of Verdun would be isolated from one another so far as the different clusters of forts were concerned. It would be thus almost impossible for the French to retire in good order to new positions in case an initial retirement were forced upon them. Similarly, under flood conditions it would be very difficult for the French in the advanced positions before Verdun to maintain a comprehensive system of communication with the defenders of the fortresses which crowned the hills around Verdun. And Verdun was the most famous of the French fortresses-it had become a by-word throughout the world. Its acquisition in itself might be of small material value to Germany, but the immaterial value would be immense. The capture of Verdun would not only stimulate German morale, it would depress Allied morale; and Germany had already recognized the value of the morale of the population within the borders of Germany as well as that of the army which was occupying northern France, most of Belgium, all of Russian Poland and Servia. Neutrals leaning toward the Entente, such as Roumania and Greece, would take sober second thoughts before entering the struggle, and Germany's hand would be strengthened in her negotiations with the United States concerning submarine warfare. Throughout the latter part of February, Germany delivered a series of feint attacks along the entire battle-line from the North Sea to Switzerland, with the purpose, evidently successful, of masking her real intentions. Opposite Verdun many picked corps of the best troops of the German army, long prepared for enormous exertions, had been massed. The guns ran well into many hundreds and there were literally mountains of shells. Germany was going to try the batteringram tactics which had been so irresistible on the Polish and Serbian fronts. Both the Allies and Germany had shown in the west that a heavy artillery attack would result in gains for the first several days. It was Germany's plan to continue the artillery attack beyond the first several days by moving forward her guns as she occupied territory, so that finally the guns would mow down the first line. Germany was counting upon the effects of surprise, and had no intention of advertising her intentions by a preliminary attack. At seven o'clock on the morning of February 21, 1916, the German drive on Verdun was spontaneously launched. FEBRUARY At the beginning of the first furious German drive on Verdun, the battle-line stretched east and west, at right angles to the Meuse, about eight miles from the town of Verdun and about four miles from its important northern forts. The French had prepared only two, instead of the usual three, lines of defence trenches; and there is much evidence that even these had been allowed to deteriorate since the days of 1914 when they had been painstakingly constructed by Sarrail. Moreover, the French troops on the battle-front before Verdun were chiefly territorial and colonial troops, and their num bers were comparatively small-Joffre was holding back his reserve forces until he could be quite sure' at which point of the line the Germans were going to make their great effort. Soon after the initial days of the bombardment of the Verdun lines, General Pétain, at the beginning of the war a mere colonel, arrived to direct The stages of the German advance are shown as follows: A-A-The line at the beginning of the German drive B-B-The line on March 8 C-C-The front at the end of the first stage of the battle, April 9 the defence. The opposing German army was under the nominal leadership of the Crown Prince of Germany, but the actual director of the military operations was General von Häseler. Even the most imaginative observers at Verdun were amazed, on the morning of February 21, at the power of the artillery onslaught suddenly delivered upon the lines before the fortifications on the Heights of the Meuse. Within several hours the first line of French trenches had completely disappeared. The shells not only spread death and mutilation along the entire line-they broke up formations |