THE FIRST GREAT GERMAN DRIVE: THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME

At the beginning of 1918, Germany's strength in comparison with the strength of the Allies was greater than at any other period of the war after 1914. The armistice with Russia made possible the concentration of practically all the German man-power on the western front. The submarine warfare, although it had failed to compel the Allies to sue for mercy, was nevertheless seriously crippling the Allies, and in particular was hindering their production and transportation of munitions and other materials. An American army was being assembled in France, but it was not yet ready to strike. France had thrown her maximum strength into the war early in 1915 and the force she was exerting on the western front was now declining to a sufficient degree to counterbalance to a great extent the increase in the British force. Italy was on the defensive and German troops and guns could be withdrawn from the Italian front. Roumania had capitulated and hence German troops could also be withdrawn from the Balkans. And, finally, so efficient was the long-planned and comprehensive German system of conducting war that Germany had not yet reached, as had France, the point when her strength was beginning to decline.

But in 1919 the story would be different. By that time, there would be several million well-trained men under Pershing, ready to take over their share of battle-line. The ship-building record of America was beginning to soar and the production of new shipping would probably more than atone for submarine losses. The climax of Germany's effort would have passed-it was inconceivable that even the German people could continue their sacrifices for another year. Italy would have recovered from Caporetto and would again demand attention. There was no telling how long the Bolsheviki might remain in control of Russia. Austria-Hungary was restless and openly clamoring for peace-the nationalistic movements of the Slavs

and Czechs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire could not be suppressed much longer.

And the Allies were still unwilling to concede a German victory. They were still insisting that Germany must be defeated; and certainly Clemenceau would make no peace without Alsace-Lorraine, LloydGeorge would make no peace without the complete restoration of Belgium, Wilson would make no peace at the expense of Russia. Germany could doubtless have obtained a peace in accordance with the "Fourteen Points" promulgated by President Wilson, but the strict application of those principles would end the war to Germany's great disadvantage. Germany could obtain a German peace only through a devastating victory over the Allies, and if Germany was to obtain a devastating victory over the Allies, she must obtain it in 1918 or never. Germany weighed the situation; considered the risks; reckoned on the penalties of failure no less than upon the rewards of success; counted the cost-and determined to risk all upon one last final effort. It was to be everything or nothing.

In 1916 and 1917, the Germans, by the confession of Lloyd-George himself, had been outnumbered on the western front at a ratio of about two to three. Even with the concentration of all Germany's available troops upon the western front and with reinforcements in both men and guns from Austria-Hungary, the same authority has stated that in 1918 the Germans were still slightly inferior in infantry and artillery and certainly in aircraft. But Ludendorff and von Hindenburg had the advantage of the offensive-they could secretly mass their troops and guns on a certain sector while the Allies were compelled to divide their strength along their entire line. Moreover, with their ignorance as to where the blow would fall, the Allies were compelled to maintain a certain proportion of their forces behind the battle-line as reserves. Accordingly, the Germans would be and were able to strike with great superiority in men and guns on the sector decided upon for the thrusts upon which the entire result of the war hinged.

Ludendorff obtained a great advantage also by re-arranging his forces so that they were into a greater number of divisions, with fewer men to each division and to the battalions comprising a division. His

plan was to tax the resources of one group of troops to the utmost, when they would be relieved by another group and sent to the rear for rest until they could be shoved up again. That is to say, the plan was much like an endless chain of men, always fresh; whereas it was expected that on the attacked sector the Allied troops would be kept constantly in the fight because of their inferiority in numbers in that sector and because of the exigencies of retreating. This plan was to be especially effective because of the new system of attack which the German General Staff had developed.

Each year of the war had seen a development of new military tactics. After their retreat from the Marne in 1914, the Germans had taken the initiative in depending for defense upon trench systems of an elaborate and intricate nature. In 1915 the scheme of shoving an infantry wedge behind a great artillery attack had come into vogue, and the favorite method in 1916 was that of attempting to gain a broad section of line by a terrific bombardment all along the front. In 1917, the method of step-by-step but ceaseless nibbling had been used by the Allies in the summer; but at Cambrai in the fall of that year the British had developed the new method of a sudden attack without a long warning bombardment. At Cambrai also the Germans had revealed a new method, that of strong and isolated machine-gun nests, used for defense instead of the general trench line system. And the new plan developed by the German General Staff for 1918 was a combination of the two new methods revealed at Cambrai. The Germans intended to strike without warning and they intended to use the plan of separate clusters of machine guns, this time for offense instead of for defense. Their method might thus be described as one of infiltration. That is to say, a number of separate groups were to break through at different points of the attacked sector, maintain their positions, keep closely in communication with one another, hastily get their machine guns into position, and then rake the Allied lines until the adjoining regions had to be abandoned. Into the gaps thus created, new German units would penetrate until the accumulation of one position after the other would throw the Allied lines into complete disorder and confusion and open up wedges big enough for whole divisions to be thrust