the merchandise was shown to have been produced from latex by means of a new and patented process and that when subjected to the solvent test for crude rubber, which consists in dissolving it in benzene, the imported merchandise did not dissolve, which indicated that the rubber was not crude. Obviously in the instant case the imported merchandise can be dissolved in benzene. This court sustained the judgment of the trial court for the reason that apparently the imported merchandise had many if not all the characteristics of vulcanized rubber but that since it was still a material suitable only for use in manufacturing articles which themselves would be manufactures of rubber it was dutiable as a nonenumerated article manufactured in whole or in part.
Appellant argues in its brief that while the merchandise in the Wilkinson case, supra, was treated in a different manner from the lamination process employed in producing the involved merchandise it was not the manner in which the merchandise was treated in the Wilkinson case but rather the result of that process, which is that the imported sheets possess many if not all the characteristics of vulcanized rubber, which was the reason for its classification. The vulcanization of rubber, as we understand it, is done for the purpose of restoring to rubber the "nerve," resiliency and tensile strength that is lost from the crude rubber by reason of machine processes. Therefore it does not matter that the imported goods possess any of the characteristics of vulcanized rubber.
In that case, as here, the Government cited the decision in Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 210, as supporting authority. There the importation consisted of boards sawed and bound together in bundles called "shooks," which were ready to be made up into boxes in this country. The only operations required to form the shooks into boxes were to nail them together and to trim the edges. Drawback was claimed by the importer on the theory that the boxes had been wholly manufactured in the United States from imported material. The decision there was that they had not been wholly manufactured in any one country and therefore the terms of the statute were not complied with. The court in that case defined the meaning of the word "manufacture" and there is no doubt but that its statements as applied to raw materials and the applicable statute then being considered are settled law. The court there stated "Ordinarily, the article so manufactured takes a different form, or at least subserves a different purpose from the original materials; While the imported goods in the instant case differ in form merely in that they are thicker than the thin sheets, they do not serve any different purpose from that of crude rubber.
We do not deem it necessary to discuss the other cases cited by appellant.
It is conceded by appellant in its brief that it was the legislative intent to admit free of duty under paragraph 1697 all forms of crude rubber. India rubber, crude, appeared for the first time on the free list of the tariff act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. L. 256, 267, and has continued to be free of duty in all of the tariff acts enacted since then.
The trial court in its decision cited the case of Lunham & Moore v. United States, 31 Treas. Dec. 386, T. D. 36787, as pertinent. In that case rubber sheets similar in material respects to the merchandise at bar were held free of duty as india rubber, crude, under the tariff act of October 3, 1913. The merchandise there consisted of sheets of plantation rubber especially prepared for the manufacture of ponchos. It had been assessed for duty as an unenumerated manufactured crude article under paragraph 385 of that act and was claimed to be free of duty as india rubber, crude, under paragraph 513. There, as here, the merchandise had been held to be free of duty until that importation was received, when under instructions from the Treasury Department, T. D. 34897, the classification was changed from that of india rubber, crude, to that of an unenumerated manufactured article. The reason for the assessment of duty on the merchandise in that case as a manufactured article seems to have been that it contained foreign substances; namely, talc and shellac, but the Board of General Appraisers (now the United States Customs Court) was of opinion that the presence of those substances would not constitute the imported goods a manufactured article even without explanation.
This court in the case of United States v. Michelin Tire Co., 1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 518, T. D. 31544, 20 Treas. Dec. 864, held that india rubber reclaimed from scrap or refuse under paragraph 579 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, was india rubber, crude, and stated that "The manifest purpose of Congress, in paragraph 579, was to put on the free list all india rubber, whatever its source or condition, which was imported to be used as a material in the manufacture of indiarubber articles."
In the summary of Tariff Information, 1920, at page 687, the decision of the Board of General Appraisers in the case of Lunham & Moore v. United States, supra, was before the Congress, and no change with respect to india rubber, crude, was made in the subsequent tariff act. By reenactment of the provision for india rubber, crude, in the free list of subsequent tariff acts it must be presumed that the Congress gave legislative approval to the court decisions in the Lunham & Moore and the Michelin Tire Co. cases, both supra.
There can be no doubt that the imported merchandise here involved is crude rubber and was imported for use as a material in the manufacture of india-rubber articles such as soles and other rubber articles. For the reasons hereinbefore stated the judgment of the United States Customs Court is affirmed.
Altars and parts thereof.
Where certain altars and parts thereof were furnished to the St. Louis
Cathedral in New Orleans by appellee, pursuant to contracts under which
the cathedral agreed to pay and did pay to appellee the price agreed upon,
the mere fact that the cathedral paid for them out of a special fund did
not change the transaction from a sale to the cathedral to a presentation
to it of the imported merchandise without charge. United States v.
Dr. Oidtmann Studios, Inc., Etc. (1930)_.
116
When articles are purchased by a religious organization and paid for by
it, as in the instant case, whether out of a special donation or out of
general donations, paragraph 1774 has no application. Ib.
Amendments.
The right of an importer to amend his entry is controlled by section
487, Tariff Act of 1930. United States v. William Heyer (1930) _ -
A decision reopening a reappraisement proceeding for the introduction
of further evidence is not subject to review. Cox & Fahner, etc., et al. v.
United States (1930).
The order of the single judge restoring the cases here involved to the
docket for the sole purpose of enabling appellants to introduce evidence
of cost of production was merely an interlocutory order, and the statute
(sec. 501) makes no provision for applications for review of interlocutory
orders made by the single judge. Ib.
Paragraph 228 (a) as modified by the French Trade Agreement pro-
vides for "Prism Binoculars, having a magnification of five diameters or
less, and valued at not more than $12 each * * * "" The language of
the agreement is clear and unambiguous and there is no reason for an
extraneous inquiry respecting the intention of those who negotiated it.
L. Oppleman, Inc. v. United States (1930).
In order to obtain the 45 per centum ad valorem rate provided in the
agreement both elements-magnification of five diameters or less, and a
value of not more than $12 each-must be present in the merchandise.
The merchandise involved having a magnification of 8 diameters and
valued at $4.04 each were therefore properly classified and assessed with
duty under paragraph 228 (a), Tariff Act of 1930, at 60 per centum ad
valorem, rather than under the same paragraph as modified by the
French Trade Agreement (T. D. 48316) at 45 per centum ad valorem.
Ib.
Bolting cloth is not the only cloth used in screen printing, but any
other silk cloth similarly used is not necessarily bolting cloth. United
States v. D. H. Armaghanian et al. (1930)
Not all leno woven silk fabric is bolting cloth, but all silk bolting
cloth is so woven. Ib.
Certain galvanized malleable iron castings (the castings having been
subjected to the galvanizing process after they were annealed and made
malleable) are properly dutiable as articles composed of base metal not
specially provided for at 45 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 397,
as held by the trial court, rather than as castings of malleable iron not
specially provided for at 20 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 327,
or as castings of iron at 10 per centum ad valorem under said paragraph
as modified by the trade agreement with Canada (T. D. 49752), as
claimed by importer. Columbia Malleable Castings Corp. v. United States
(1930) -
Inasmuch as the articles have not been threaded, they have not been
so advanced as to become "fittings ready for use. Ib.
The trade agreement with Canada does not relate to the provision in
paragraph 327 here in question, that is, "castings of malleable iron not
specially provided for." It relates only to the provisions for cast-iron
andirons, etc., and castings of iron advanced in condition "but not made
up into articles, or parts thereof, or finished machine parts." .Ib.
Cassis.
Certain imported liquor in bottles, invoiced variously as "cassis,"
"creme de cassis," and "cazanoe cassis,” containing 15 per centum of
alcohol by volume, and used in the United States as an ingredient in
making cocktails, is properly dutiable as "fruit juices and fruit sirups
* * * containing *
*
* alcohol" at 70 cents per gallon plus $5
per proof gallon on the alcohol contained therein, under paragraph 806
(a), and not as "cordials" at $2.50 per gallon under paragraph 802, as
assessed by the collector. DeFremery & Co. v. United States (1930)____ 83
The imported merchandise was properly assessed with internal revenue
tax of $2 per gallon under section 600 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, as
amended by the Revenue Act of 1926, and as further amended by the
Liquor Taxing Act of 1934. Ib.
Tins of chicken breasts, each tin containing 10 oz. of meat and 6 oz.
of a gelatinous substance known as "zalivka" (which is composed of
water, salt, caramel or burnt sugar, and agar-agar), are dutiable at
10¢ per pound under paragraph 712 on the weight of the chicken meat
alone. United States v. E. W. J. Hearty, Inc. (1930).
The mere fact that some of the juices remaining in the chicken after
the first cooking may have exuded from the chicken during the second
cooking and become mixed with the agar-agar does not necessarily mean
that the gelatinous matter has the broth character which would make it
of commercial value in this country.
Component material of chief value.
The determination of the component material of chief value results
from the relative costs of the component materials to the manufacturer
at that stage of manufacture where nothing remains to be done but to
combine them. Adolph Goldmark & Sons Corp. v. United States (1930) _ _
Construction. I. Rules of.
It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that all parts of a
statute should be given effect if possible, and that general language in
one part of a statute will not be held to modify specific provisions of an-
other part unless such modification is expressly stated or clearly implied.
United States v. Siegfried Lowenthal Co. (1930) .
Construction. II. Statutes.
Section 562 is to be construed in the light of the provisions of para-
graph 813 and section 563. United States v. Siegfried Lowenthal Co.
(1930)_
Paragraph 813 is a provision directed specifically to intoxicating liquor
and it would be repugnant to rules of statutory construction to hold that
general provisions such as appear in section 562 overrule, modify, or re-
peal the specific provisions of the paragraph. Ib.
Paragraph 1527 (c) (1) (2) is complete within itself, and must be
construed as a whole, and the trade agreement with France (T. D. 48316)
which follows it in every material detail of words and punctuation (except
for the final phrase in the trade agreement) must likewise be construed
as a whole and, so construing it, there is no sound reason for holding that
the phrase "and valued above $5 per dozen pieces" does not apply to
articles "composed wholly or in chief value of metal other than gold or
platinum" in the same way that it applies to articles "set with and in
chief value of precious or semiprecious stones, pearls * * * ""
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. United States (1930) - .
Construction. II. Statutes-Continued
Paragraph 1774 providing, among other things, for altars and parts
thereof "for presentation (without charge) to, and for the use of, any
corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for re-
ligious purposes" requires that a donor must at the time of importation
have such relationship to the imported articles either directly or by his
agent that he could exercise control over the articles, for without such con-
trol they could not be presented by him without charge to a religious
organization. United States v. Dr. Oidtmann Studios, Inc., Etc. (1930)-- 116
Section 22 (b) of the Customs Administrative Act of 1938 was intended
to and did modify not only section 557, Tariff Act of 1930, but it modified
and, in part, supplanted certain of the customs regulations, particularly
article 1201 (c), which apparently was applied by the trial court under
the theory that section 22 (b)_was not retroactive in a manner affecting
the situation in this case. Eurasia Import Co., Inc. v. United States
(1930) __.
The statute by its very terms became retroactive from its effective date
both as to the right to protest classification after liquidation subsequent
to that date and as to the right to receive any refund of excessive duties
resulting from a liquidation based upon reclassification. Ib.
Construction. III. Words and phrases.
The legislative purpose in enacting the provision for "waste wholly
or in chief value of cellulose acetate," contained in paragraph 31 (a) (1),
was to provide only for refuse or so-called "new waste" resulting from
the manufacture of products such as those provided for in that para-
graph. United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons (1930)---
Construction. IV. Trade agreements.
The trade agreement with Canada (T. D. 49752) does not relate to the
provision "castings of malleable iron not specially provided for in para-
graph 327." It relates only to the provisions for cast-iron andirons etc.
and castings of iron advanced in condition "but not made up into
articles, or parts thereof, or finished machine parts." Columbia Malle-
able Castings Corp. v. United States (1930).
As related to the instant case, the first clause of article XII of British
Trade Agreement referring to "ordinary customs duties" makes appli-
cable $2.50 per proof gallon on whisky as fixed in the agreement, rather
than the rate of $5 per proof gallon as fixed in the statute. The second
clause, relating to all other duties, etc. apparently had the effect, so far as
here important, of "freezing" such duties at the rate in effect at the
time of the signing of the agreement, but it did not provide for a dis-
continuance of the levy under section 303. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v.
United States (1930) -
Since it appears that the Revenue Act of 1938 provides that all dis-
tilled spirits imported into the United States should be subject to an
internal revenue tax of $2.25 per proof gallon, and since it further
appears that article VIII of the Cuban Trade Agreement of 1934 provides
that rum, in bottles containing each one gallon or less, shall be subject to
a net tax of $2 per proof gallon, the two are absolutely irreconcilable
with respect to the issue here. Therefore, the subsequent legislation
supersedes by clear implication the quoted portion of the trade agreement.
United States v. Rathjen Brothers (1930) _ _ _
To come within the Swiss Trade Agreement provision for bolting cloth,
the silk fabric must be leno (gauze) woven and chiefly used for bolting
purposes. United States v. D. H. Armaghanian et al (1930) -
Looms having been expressly excepted from the second clause of the
trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom
(T. D. 49753) and not having been otherwise provided for in the agree-
ment, the involved looms and parts thereof are dutiable as assessed by
the collector, under the provisions of paragraph 372 at 40 per centum ad
valorem. Brandon Corporation v. United States (1930) – –
The fact that comparatively few looms were imported into the United
States from the United Kingdom at the time of entering the trade agree-
ment does not justify the conclusion that less protection was needed on
looms, and that the contracting parties sought to lift what amounted to
practically a "total embargo." Ib.
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