the point as settled by some of our ablest writers. Conscience, we think, the appropriate term. * As to the celebrated "Theory of Moral Sentiments," we agree perfectly with Brown in his view of it. However eloquent in his illustrations, however perspicuous in his details, Dr. Smith is guilty at the outset of the very common error of "begging the question." His "sympathy," into which he resolves all the elements of moral sentiments, never could arise in the human breast, if the original moral susceptibility did not there previously exist; and that original susceptibility to moral emotions is precisely what Shaftesbury and Hutcheson meant by moral sense, and our author by conscience. It is for this reason, (and we would appeal to those conversant with the work for the accuracy of our remarks,) that, however much we have been charmed by the eloquence and ingenuity of Dr. Smith, in his "Theory," we have ever found a vagueness, a want of conviction, our constant companion in the perusal. Again and again have we laid down the volume, and returned to it, but without being able to dissipate this cloud, which seemed to overshadow even bis most brilliant pages; we think the mystery here explained. We will not attempt to lead our readers further into the points, in which our author may differ from other writers. But in his own words : "After this preliminary examination of the more elevated attributes of reason; after this short exposition of the principal intellectual phenomena of " Our sensible system," we offer to our readers a sketch of the Nature of our Passions, (nature passionnée.) We quit the field of abstractions, and proceed to the investigation of those facts which more. directly concern our happiness. I have attempted here a faint sketch of the science of man, freed from vain reasonings and scholastic subtleties, I must trace it out with that simplicity which becomes the subject."-Prel. Con. pp. 106, 109. Socrates held the science of morals of such importance, that in his view, all other branches of knowledge were of minor consideration. And the experience of the greatest and best men, of all ages, has but corroborated the opinion of this "wisest of the Greeks." The great error of most of our moral philosophers has been, that, by over-refinement, they have rendered their works of but little utility; rather metaphysical disquisitions than a developement of principles applicable to our duties. Yet many of the moral principles have been thoroughly analyzed and reduced to practical use in the business of life. * See Brown's Philosophy, vol. iii. The rules of property, and justice between man and man; the relations of husband and wife, father and child; our common duties to our neighbour and ourselves; the duties of courtesy and benevolence, have been philosophically investigated, and laid so plainly before us, that every member of the community may apprehend them sufficiently for all the purposes of social inter course. The science of morals belongs not to the region of abstraction, though philosophers have often made it so. True, it requires abstraction, as in every other science, to trace out the higher principles on which it is based; but the natural sphere of its action is in the bosom of our families, in the circle of our relations and friends, in the wider intercourse of the world, in our duties to our country and our kind. The study of the moral sentiments is then the study of man, in the most noble and precious attributes of his nature. It would seem vain for those who deny the existence of moral elements as inherent in our nature, to disclaim the design of impairing the validity of moral obligation. If moral rules be the mere result of custom alone, then must necessity alone have afforded any reason for their establishment. If the opinion of their necessity be the only original basis of their authority, then are they only binding whilst that necessity is thought to exist. And is it not universally known, that the plea of necessity has been the fruitful parent of almost every crime? It is by such absurd and visionary hypotheses, (in the words of our author) that the highest doctrines of philosophy have been debased. But let us turn to the volume before us: "However little we may consider the moral nature of man in the aggregate, or investigate the universal action of his system, we perceive that there exists in every living being four innate propensities, which we may regard as the primordial laws of the animal economy. In the various situations of life, all that we feel, all that we think, all that we execute, have reference to these four primitive impulses; from which arise, as from their natural source, all the phenomena of the sensible system." p. 7. The first of these interior, and, as it were, irresistible inclinations, is that by which the animal reacts against the causes of its destruction, and resists the perils which threaten it. It is a power always active, and may be called the "the instinct of self-preservation." The more any being relies on the gratuitous bounty of nature for its preservation, the less perfect is its organization. Plants, not possessing the power of locomotion, are altogether dependent on her for their aliment. There is a second propensity, the "instinct of imitation," from which no individual is free. This law is one of the most solid foundations of social life. It is this instinct which imparts character and physiognomy to nations. The third propensity is that of "relation," or what we would call among animals, the gregarious instinct. It is the instinct which prompts us to seek the society of our kind, and from this arises the establishment of civil communities. The fourth and last propensity, according to our author, is that of "reproduction." It has given birth to some of the noblest and most generous of human passions, the maternal, &c. We presume that the "hominum divomque voluptas, alma Venus" of the ancients, is but a personification of this instinct. They represent all nature as being warmed and vivified by her presencethe earth, the heavens, and the sea; the flowers, the birds, and every thing that lives, as teeming with new principles of life, at her approach. On these four original instincts, of selfpreservation, of imitation, of relation, and reproduction, rests the whole basis of the moral science. All the moral emotions spring from, and are but modifications of these. It is to be observed, that through the whole of these discussions, our author professes altogether to lay aside abstractions, and in this physiological investigation, merely to trace out the moral phenonema as they appear actually to exist in the constitution of man, without attempting to go further into the nature of these principles, than the apparent phenomena warrant. This, he thinks, the only method of investigation calculated to produce useful results. "If, in meditations of such an elevated character, there are facts susceptible of rigorous demonstration, there are others of which we must be satisfied to seek the proof in that universal inspiration which is every where incidental to sensible beings. The most interesting to collect, are those which render us better and happier." p. 12. None will deny, we believe, the existence of the first primordial law of our animal economy, the instinct of "self-preservation." It belongs to every living creature, and is the "reactive principle which protects our particular nature against the efforts of universal nature." The child, at its birth, seems to be actuated by this instinct alone. The other instincts develope themselves at a later period. Without this instinct, man, surrounded by the common dangers and accidents of life, could not survive a day. Every animal is endued with it in an equal degree, and with the organization most requisite to secure its safety, according to the grade of its existence. If there be a creature in whom this instinct is weaker than in any other, it is man himself. He, only, ever thinks of suicide; ever raises his hand against his own life. And it is during the period between childhood and old age-in the prime and vigour of manhood-that this crime against his nature and himself, most frequently occurs. It is but seldom that we hear of children or the aged falling by their own hands. The child, exhilarated by the natural buoyancy of his spirits and the inexhaustible novelty of every thing around him, cannot spare time to meditate upon the evils of life, even if he saw them, and will not believe in them, until, in after life, he feels them; while on the other hand, this instinct of self-preservation seems to grow upon the old, and they cling to the remnant of their days, with a tenacity increased in proportion to the fewness of their number Nature seems then to make an effort for our preservation, if but for a time, against the universal law. Self-love, egotism, avarice, are the passions of old age; happy are the old who are free from them. "This extraordinary act (suicide) is most always the result of a diseased state of the brain. This fact is manifestly demonstrated by the observations of physiologists and physicians. He who resists the instinct of self-preservation, is, manifestly, in a state of insanity." Vol. i. p. 202. 66 Our author says that he has always frequented the hospitals and asylums of poverty; that he has seen thousands of men overwhelmed with misery of every kind, yet none of them wished to be relieved by a loss of life. I remember one who was deprived of the use of most of his senses. He was afflicted with many infirmities, one alone of which must have robbed him of all the pleasures of life, yet was he still agitated with hope; all he implored, was the preservation of his existence. I can bear with resignation,' he said, 'all the sorrows with which heaven has visited me. I can surrender happiness, but I cannot yield my life."" And this is the true history of human nature; the fear of death and the instinct of self-preservation are one. If death be not an evil-and we know not that it is, since it is the first condition annexed to the boon of life-yet the dread of annihilation is unconquerably inherent in the bosom of man. Let him speak, who has watched-and who of mature age has not-in the chamber of the dying. Let every man say from his own experience, what he has then witnessed? In many instances, un doubtedly, christian resignation, manly fortitude, cool and calm and dignified submission to the irresistible decree. The virtue of man will triumph over even the terrors of death itself. But we would ask, has he ever witnessed an instance in which the dying would not have regarded it as a boon, still to live? However pure in conscious rectitude man may be-however firm his reliance upon the benevolence of Him who made him, yet the fear of death is the preserver of life. It has been implanted in his nature for that purpose alone; and so powerful, so enduring is this first and last of instincts, that it will cling to him while life remains; it will display itself even in his last actions-it will obtrude itself and hover in the dim twilight of his latest thoughts. We do not question but that the awful uncertainty of a future state, is one cause of a dread of death. Nam, velutei puerei trepidant, atque omnia cæcis But we do not consider it as the principal cause. This, reason and religion may dispel. But the instinctive feeling of selfpreservation, we believe, nothing can wholly eradicate while life and thought remain. The passions, according to M. Alibert, attached to this primordial law of the sensible system, are, egotism, avarice, pride, vanity, coxcombry, modesty, courage, hope, fear, prudence, idleness, ennui and intemperance. All of these propensities of our nature, he considers as belonging to the instinct of selfpreservation. Many of these he treats with great ingenuity and clearness; some of which we propose to present to our readers. Others he appears to handle but clumsily, as though he had not sufficiently investigated their elements. The sketch he has given us of egotism and avarice, and of the difference between these two passions, are ably executed. We will present them together. He says, that both of these passions prevail mostly in those who are of weak, physical organization, or of weak minds. Idiots live in a continual egotism. "Would you observe the Egotist, such as he appears in the bosom of our cities? Go to one of those splendid feasts at which this troublesome personage assists. Here he manifests in all its extent the exaggerated desire of his own self-preservation. He thrusts himself, without scruple, into the best place. He appropriates to himself, the choicest pieces. He respects no rule of politeness that stands in the way of his petty appetites. He violates, every instant, the rules of benevolence. He is trou |