equity (which are judicial questions), nor is any power to decide therein give to the federal judiciary. One species of controversy relates to the form of government. The other flows from its operation. The power by which a general government is formed or altered, is not the power by which the law-suits of individuals are tried; and therefore, a power to try suits in law and equity, was never supposed to comprise the former power. Among the cases to which the federal jurisdiction is extended, not one is to be found recognizing a power to decide controversies between any of these political departments. It is inconceivable that a jurisdiction transcending, beyond comparison, the jurisdiction cautiously specified, should have been tacitly given without any specification."-p. 134.

But let us hear the Chief Justice in the case of Jonathan Robbins. "By extending the judicial power in all cases of law and equity, the Constitution had never been understood to confer on that department any political power whatever. A case of law or equity, proper for judicial decision, may arise under a treaty where the rights of individuals acquired or secured by a treaty are to be asserted or defended in a Court. But it cannot be extended to political compacts, as the establishment of the boundary line between the American and British dominions," &c. (Bee's Adm. Rep. 268.)

Did not the Convention express the same opinion when it twice rejected propositions, giving the power to settle disputes between the United States and a State respecting "territory," and once again when the proposition was to decide, generally, controversies between the State and the United States?

The Constitution of the United States being admitted, at least in South-Carolina, to be a compact between Statcs, all the differences with the General Government must then be governed by the same principles of public law which apply to disputes between other sovereignties. It is an international dispute which falls not within the province of the judiciary to determine. "It cannot pronounce upon the external political relations of treaties between government and government." If in case of a palpable breach of the articles of union, by the misinterpretation of the judges or from any other cause, our citizens have no hope of redress by applying to the ordinary tribunals of justice, they have the same right to look to their State government for redress, as the British creditors had to ask of their sovereign, to require a fulfilment of the treaty of peace, as it regarded British debts. There is nothing which can deprive a sovereign State of this power to protect its citizens. It is the highest attribute of sovereignty. VOL. VI. NO. 12.

64

No State can be sovereign which yields this right. This is not only sound sense and sound law, but it is the very law of the compact in the case before us. All sovereign rights which are not granted are expressly reserved. Can there be reserved rights of sovereignty if the States have not, in every case of their violation, the same recourse by remonstrance, negociation or force, which belongs to every State, where its treaties are disregarded? If they have not, is not the Constitution a mockery, and the cry of State rights a "sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal?" It is the State only that has a right to interfere. As to the citizen, it is his duty to submit to the law of the land, as enacted by Congress, or as expounded by the judges. If he enters into a combination to resist the laws by force, he becomes a rebel and a traitor, and for the best of reasons; it is so written in the compact. He is not recognized as having any right to interfere apart from the body politic and corporate of which he is a member. He is no party to the Federal Constitution in any shape. It is the people of the separate States as States, and not the people aggregately, who are the constituents of the government. The right of a State to raise between itself and its associates in government, the political question, whether the league be not broken, is an inherent right, of which it cannot be divested; and the same acts of resistance in individuals, which taken by themselves would be treason, become meritorious and patriotic when exercised by the authority of the State. A State cannot commit treason. It is the sole judge whether it will or will not submit to the interpretation of the compact, as given by the other States, or by the tribunals of justice. This may be discovered in that principle of public law which provides that 'a denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of Courts" is a justifiable cause of war. The very right of a sovereign to declare war, in such a case, presupposes in that sovereign the inherent right to place his own construction on the compact, or to judge of its infractions. In this view, the usurpations of Congress, as the acts of a majority of the States, are a cause of war. Whether they are to be resisted or not, is not a question of allegiance, for there is no allegiance due by one State to the others. It is as our Senate has properly adjudged, a question altogether of expediency.

We are not a little mortified that we should be compelled to prove before an American public a proposition so plain as that the States have the exclusive right, as parties to the federal compact, to judge of its infractions. Our apology however, will be found in the prevalence of the opposite opinion throughout the United States, and in the sanction which it has received

from some distinguished names. Amongst these, Mr. Madison's has lately become the most conspicuous. He is the original testimony and the ancient faith which our Northern brethren are now so disposed to venerate. But it is unfortunate for this statesman's reputation, that he has not been consistent on this subject. The 39th number of the "Federalist," written by him, contains his first opinion. After stating distinctly, that in our mixed government "the local and municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere," he continues"It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary of the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Government; but this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution, &c. Some such tribunal is clearly essential, to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact." But how does this opinion comport with his general doctrines in the "Federalist ?" No person can peruse that work without perceiving, that one great object of its publication, and as a means of recommending the Constitution to the people, was to prove a co-ordination of authority in all the State and federal departments. This is the context. The above extract is the commentary. The views of our author, of Caroline, are on this head well worth a perusal. They show that Messrs. Hamilton and Madison in the "Federalist," are not only at variance with each other, but each is at variance with himself. After quoting various extracts, and condensing Mr. Hamilton's construction of the Constitution, in which the most glaring inconsistencies are observable, he proceeds in the same manner with Mr. Madison, whose disagreement with himself he shews to be at least equal to those of Mr. Hamilton. It is to us a subject of disappointment that our limits will not permit us to make extracts, but we refer to the work itself. So much for Mr. Madison when the Constitution was formed. His opinions in 1799, as expressed in the Virginia resolutions and the report drawn up by him, we have fully adverted to in a former article, and we noticed them then as we trust we always shall do, with the greatest satisfaction, notwithstanding the manifest discrepancy between the doctrine contained in these Resolutions and that of the "Federalist." In 1799, Mr. Madison distinctly denies what he had previously asserted in the "Federalist." According to the Resolutions, the judicial authority is not the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this subject there can be no mistake, for what was the cause

of the Virginia resolutions? The alien and sedition laws were passed by Congress, and they were declared by the Supreme Court to be constitutional. Did Mr. Madison and the Vir ginia legislature bow with deference to the opinion of the Court as the proper tribunal appointed by the Constitution to decide the boundaries of the State and Federal jurisdictions, or did they both reject and repudiate the doctrine. Let the Resolutions and Report speak for themselves. They shew that the sole object which Mr. Madison had in view when he penned this memorable Report, was to prove that the Constitution was a compact to which there were no parties but sovereign States, and that, as in all other compacts among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself of all infractions.

We have thus seen Mr. Madison in 1787 and in 1799 directly opposed. If there be a resemblance in the two persons, let those imagine it who can. For our part, we can discover in the opinions advanced at these different periods, nothing but repugnance and contradiction. Far, however, be it from our intention to reproach him for his opinions of 1799. To the friends of liberty, it was a proper subject for congratulation that there should be enlisted under the banners of State rights, such a statesman as Mr. Madison. It was by these Resolutions that he had built for himself a reputation and a fame, such as seldom falls to the lot of mortal man. It is here that he forcibly vindicates the rights of the States and the great cause of constitutional freedom; and it must have added not a little to his high consolation, that in the great work his fellow-labourer was Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Kentucky resolutions. The principles set forth in these documents are the great land-marks of State sovereignty, and we should say, that if there be any truths which, next to the words of eternal life, shall stand the test of time, these truths are to be found in the doctrine of State rights, as illustrated in the Virginia resolutions. With the maintenance of these doctrines; the rights and liberties of the people are safe; without them, we had all of us better tear up our parchment Constitution, and idly talk no more of the rights of the States. We had, indeed, hoped that Mr. Madison, as one of the most favoured of Virginia's sons, would have nurtured and cherished the fame he had, by this exposition, so nobly earned-a fame which was above all price, and which was to him a crown of glory. We had anticipated him as descending into the vale of his old age, with all his honours fresh and blooming on his brow, carefully revising the testament which he had prepared when his mental faculties were in their

meridian splendour, and bequeathing to his countrymen, in more ample terms of security, the imperishable principles of the Virginia resolutions, as the most glorious of texts for future commentary, and as the palladium of the sacred rights and dearest liberties of the unborn generations of freemen who are yet to inhabit this western world. But how vain are all earthly calculations. We have lived to see this gentleman, so exalted in our affections, drawn out, in some unguarded moment, from his retiring and peaceful pursuits into the vortex of party opinions and politics; and he stands before the High Priest of NewEngland, and publicly renounces his articles of faith, and studies to prove them as the worst of heresies. He now addresses a letter to the editor of the North-American Review, in which he avers that there has been a total misconception of the meaning of the Virginia resolutions, that nothing was intended beyond a mere invitation to the other States to concur in a declaration of opinion that the alien and sedition laws were unconstitutional, and he here reasserts the doctrine set forth by him in the Federalist." We do not know that we can adopt a better mode of shewing the inconsistency of Mr. Madison's opinions, than by placing them in striking contrast in the same page.

60

In the Report of 1799. "It appears to your committee to be a plain principle founded in common sense, and illustrated by common practice and essential to the nature of compacts, that where resort can be had to no tribunal superior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges, whether the bargain made (the Constitution) has been pursued or violated." Again: "the States then being the parties to the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity it follows of necessity there can be no tribunal over their authority to decide in the last resort, whether the com pact made by them be violated, and consequently, that as the parties to it, they must decide in the last resort such questions, as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition."

In the letter of 1830. "Between these different constitutional governments, the one operating in all the States, the other operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them,it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction, and that some provision ought to be made for such occurrences. Again it is true, that in controversies relating to the boundary of the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the General Government. But this does not alter the principle of the case."

It must be borne in mind, that in 1799, Mr. Madison does not refer to a revolutionary right in the citizens of the States to resist oppression. On the contrary, he refers to a mode of redress in cases of palpable infractions of the Constitution, as resulting to the State sovereignties from the nature of the compact.