in our own eyes." It advocated military preparedness without being specific. It called for "a strict and honest neutrality in the European War." The Democratic platform called for the protection of "the sacred rights of American citizenship" both at home and abroad; it condemned the efforts of every organization "that has for its object the advancement of the interest of a foreign power"; it advocated an army and navy "fully adequate to the requirements of order, of safety, and of the protection of the nation's rights"; it stated the belief that "the time had come when it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association" to preserve the peace of the world. THE

HE CANDIDATES BEFORE THE PEOPLE.

In the campaign which followed Mr. Hughes devoted much attention to criticising the Administration for its Mexican policy and for its handling of the European situation, but he failed to give any clear statement as to how he would have acted differently under the circumstances. Much interest was manifested as to how the large German American vote would be cast. It was felt that President Wilson had alienated a large part of this vote by his policy toward the submarine campaign and the shipment of munitions to the Allies. Mr. Wilson won approval for a sharp rebuke which he administered to an anti-British agitator named Jeremiah O'Leary who wrote an offensive letter to the President predicting his defeat. In his reply the President said: "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them. It was not until a week before the election that Mr. Hughes was willing to state frankly his attitude on the embargo question and on the right of Americans to travel on belligerent ships. This hesitancy gave some people the impression that the Republican candidate was trying to conciliate the German vote.

The results of the election gave no

conclusive evidence of the attitude of the country on the great problems confronting it. Mr. Wilson was re-elected by 277 electoral votes to 254 for Mr. Hughes. It was the closest presidential contest since 1876. Broadly speaking the South and the Far West supported Wilson while the East and the Middle West supported Hughes. Though unauthorized, the slogan, "He kept us out of the war" undoubtedly won votes for Mr. Wilson in the West. Of the seven states containing the largest German-American population Mr. Wilson carried three and Mr. Hughes four. It is apparent that the issues which were decisive in the election were domestic and not foreign issues.

HE PROVINCIAL ISOLATION OF THE

THE PROVINCIALIS IS SHOCKED.

For more than two years the people of the United States had watched the great European drama with absorbing. interest. In those two years American. public opinion had undergone a slow but fundamental transformation. In 1914 the United States was still a provincial nation. The people of this country, as a whole, knew little and cared less about the great problems of world politics. To the majority of Americans the European war was only another one of the many struggles for European leadership.

Those critics who condemn the Administration for not breaking with Germany in May 1915, after the sinking of the Lusitania, do not realize how deep-seated was this American provincialism. Slowly, however, Americans began to see the great struggle in a new light. People began to realize that American interests were vitally bound up with the interests of the rest of the world. Submarine ruthlessness and German crimes in Belgium alienated such sympathy as there was for Germany among Americans of the old stock. Instinctively the American people came to feel that the success of the Allies meant the preservation of American ideals: It had taken two years of experience and education to prepare America for the part she was destined to play in the world drama. NELSON P. MEAD.

THE word Verdun has passed into world currency, and posterity will rank its soldiers with those that fought at Thermopyla, at Châlons and at Tours. The story survives of a Russian soldier who encountered French troops in Siberia but was unable to communicate with his western allies. He solved the difficulty in characteristic fashion: "Verdun!", he said, saluting, and immediately the gap was bridged.

VERD
TERDUN ONE OF THE GREATEST BATTLES
ERDUTO WORLD.

Psychologically, the battle was a revelation of hitherto unsuspected endurance in the make-up of the French. "Ils ne passeront pas!" repeated the poilu, doggedly confident through all the horror and misery that prevailed at Verdun, and only changing with the fortunes of battle into the quiet but still more determined "On les aura!" Comparisons are always invidious, but it is indisputable that this struggle witnessed one of the most signal triumphs of spirit over material things that the world has ever known. That so much beauty of courage, of suffering, of bearing, and of hoping could have flowered and survived amidst the hideous inferno of bombardment and torturing thirst, "makes one to think" as the suggestive French idiom would say. Militarily also, the battle is

extraordinary for the mass of metal used on both sides, the number of troops employed, and the dramatic change in fortune on the Douaumont Plateau, no less sudden indeed, than the Battle of the Marne.

G

ENERAL FALKENHAYN STRIVES FOR A
DECISION.

In 1915 German arms had sought success and gained it-against the Russians and in the Balkans. But decision was lacking, and that only could be attained in the west, and in the west it was sought by the two general staffs. General von Falkenhayn in his book "The German General Staff and its Decisions," published after the war, says: "The strain on the French has almost reached a breaking point. If we succeed in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object, the uncertain method of a mass breakthough in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach, behind the French sector of the Western Front, there are objectives, for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every

man they have. If they do so, the forces of France will bleed to deathas there can be no question of a voluntary withdrawal whether we reach our goal or not. If they do not do so, and we reach our objectives, the moral effect on France will be enormous. For an operation limited to a narrow front, Germany will not be compelled to spend herself so freely that all other fronts are practically drained.

"The French lines at that point are barely 20 kilometres distant from German railway communications. Verdun is, therefore, the most powerful point d'appui for an attempt, with a relatively small expenditure of effort, to make the whole French front in France and Belgium intolerable. The removal of the danger as a secondary aim would be so valuable on military grounds, that, compared with it, the so-to-speak incidental' political victory of the 'purification' of Alsace by an attack on Belfort, is a small matter.'

THEMA

ATTEMPT ΤΟ WOUND FRANCE MORTALLY.

The German command, then, was to attack at Verdun, while the AustroHungarian command was to invade Italy from the Tyrol. Verdun was selected as a spot in the Allied line where it was believed possible to inflict a mortal wound upon France, and furthermore drive Britain into a premature offensive. This at least was Germany's first aim, though as the attack fell short, it became modified in like degree. When she failed in the first few weeks to capture Verdun, and Joffre forbade the beginning of the offensive on the Somme until its appointed time, German aims then. were merely to pin the French down on the Meuse so that their assistance in the British drive would be very slight. Thus the two great battles on the western front, during 1916, are closely interwoven-French defense of Verdun providing needful time for the training of the British professional army; the British offensive on the Somme affording necessary relief for the French corps that had been so hardly engaged on the Meuse. were attained.

Both of these objects Both of these objects

What were the German grounds for choosing the fortress of Verdun for their point of assault? Strategically, they were sound. Ever since September, 1914, Verdun, with its outworks, had stood as a salient in the German line as a salient, moreover, which had lost its railway communicationsfor of the two main railroads, the Lérouville line was cut off at St. Mihiel and the second, through Châlons, was under ceaseless German fire. Only the narrow gauge line connecting Verdun with Bar-le-Duc remained, in addition to road communication. Nevertheless, von Ludendorff in his Memoirs writes that the fortress was considered by the German Staff as a particularly dangerous sally-port, which seriously threatened their rear-communications, a premonition fully justified by the events of the autumn of 1918. If then the defenses on the right bank of the Meuse could have been gained, the enemy's strategic positions on the Western Front, as well as the tactical situation of his troops in the St. Mihiel salient would have been materially improved.

There were other reasons: Verdun was only a short distance from Metz, the centre of great military activity and the source of such supplies. It was dangerously near the valuable deposits of iron ore in Lorraine, which the Germans meant to hold whenever peace might come. The moral factor involved in the capture of the "Eastern Gate of France," the "Key to Paris" was enormous. From a military point of view, the Germans wished to profit by certain failures on the part of the French, who, relying on the nature of the country, had neglected to strengthen the fortified positions to the west of the Meuse, and were known to be holding the fortress with second line troops. Lastly, in the examples of Liège and Namur, the weakness of the fortress before modern artillery had been clearly shown. The French in their defense of Verdun would be holding a position that had grave dangers in the event of a forced retreat;