Here we have the same point of view as in the first picture, but with the men in slightly changed positions. The loader is inserting the cartridge in the breech of the gun, while the layer and the firer have taken their places astride their seats an indication that the gun is properly laid, in other words, that the spade is sufficiently imbedded in the earth. The next step is to fire the shot. If the shell, which contains the powder and which remains in the breech after the shot has been fired, fails to be driven out by the ejector, the firer must thrust a rammer down through the mouth of the gun to push the shell out of the breech. For cleaning the bore of the gun, a swab is used. Indisputably, the principle of the "break-through" is excellent. The Germans did almost the same thing in their 1918 March offensive. But in modern warfare, tactics are intimately linked to armament and effectives, and on the Aisne the vision was too great. The end and the method were not compatible with the means and material at hand. The finest military conceptions are only valuable if finely executed, and in April it must be admitted that the command was worse than mediocre. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg's verdict on the Arras-Aisne-Rheims battle must complete this account of its first phase. "In my judgment the general result of the great enemy offensive in the West had not been unsatisfactory hitherto . . . Though gaining a good deal of ground, our enemies had never succeeded in reaching more distant goals, much less in passing from the break-through battle to open warfare." On the British front in conformance with the general scheme the Flanders battle flared up at the end of July, and did not die down until December. As on the Somme neither of the two adversaries could raise the shout of victory, though in November the British gained a striking success on another part of the line at Cambrai. was made. The French had advanced to a penetration of 14 miles. All the fortifications between Avocourt Wood, Le Mort Homme, Corbeaux and Cumières Woods, Côte de Talou, Champneuville, Mormont Farm, Hill 240 and Fosses Wood had been taken. The French had regained the positions they had held in February, 1916. In October Pétain's preparations were complete for a renewed stroke on the Aisne. As an example of his meticulous care in all departments, in his arrangements for transportation, every army corps had a supply station directly behind it where there was a platform 350 yards long, for discharging heavy shells, another platform the same length for light shells, another for engineers' supplies, another for macadam for roads and another for food. Although the Germans had lost their observation posts commanding the Aisne, yet they believed that their positions south of the Ailette would stand any amount of bombing. On the 17th, Pétain began searching out these positions, hidden in quarry caverns, sometimes with 6-inch and sometimes with 8-inch guns. Having ascertained them by the German return fire, on the 20th he added some batteries of 15-16inch guns and for three days thundered away until the rocks crumbled and the caverns lay exposed. Aeroplanes observed the breaches and then into them poured a steady stream of shrapnel from the famous French "75's," hitherto silent in hiding places near the front line. "Zero" was set for 5:15 on the 23rd and in mist and rain the French infantry pushed forward and carried Malmaison Fort in the centre and Allemant and Vaudesson on the left. Supported by a highly concentrated barrage of 16-inch shells and by squadrons of newly devised tanks, the infantry captured 10,000 prisoners and 70 heavy guns. The next day the Oise-Aisne Canal was reached, and the French consolidated their gains. Aviators found signs of preparation for the enemy's retreat which was inevitable, "KEEP OUR LOVED ONES NOW FAR ABSENT" A field post-office and letter box, the sight of which opens a whole realm of human history to the imagination. In a box perhaps somewhat similarly situated our "own soldier" has put his precious letters that we have devoured with such eagerness, and dwelt upon with such lingering care. Along the roadside a line of apple trees offers partial concealment for these gunners who have dug for themselves shallow pits as temporary gun positions. After months of trench fighting, with earthen or concrete walls shutting one in, and with shattered, desolated country lying on every side, open warfare on fresh ground makes a strange contrast. A squadron of "Chars d'Assaut" or French baby tanks on the Aisne front. Because of the late spring and bad On the British Front in 1917 DESPERATE FIGHTING IN MUD AND RAIN GAINS TERRI TORY AT A TERRIBLE PRICE WHEN, in November, 1916, active operations in the area of the Somme and the Ancre were no longer possible, Sir Douglas Haig directed the efforts of the armies there toward improvements and adjustments to pave the way for new advances in the spring. Trenches, roads and all means of communication required immediate and energetic attention. To help solve the serious transport problem, England and Canada contributed of their own rails, locomotives, and rolling stock; and engineers worked assiduously. And, in order to be ready to assault the strong enemy lines along the Ancre and north of that stream, the artillery was arranged in new positions. HE BRITISH EXTEND THEIR LINES AND In January, a decision was reached among the Allies to extend the British front until it should reach as far south as Roye. Before the end of February this had been accomplished. Through January and February, many local attacks near the Ancre resulted in the gradual broadening of the reclaimed section, as the Germans evacuated Grandcourt, Serre, Gommecourt and other positions, one by one. This withdrawal of the enemy-a part of Hindenburg's plan of retreat to the strongly prepared Siegfried (or Hindenburg) The reasons for the strategic German retreat have been explained in the previous chapter. The Siegfried Line (renamed by the Allies the Hindenburg Line), branching from the old positions just south of Arras, running through Quéant, then southward, passing west of Cambrai and St. Quentin, crossing the Oise to the heights of the Aisne northeast of Soissons, lying along the Craonne plateau there, and extending on toward Rheims, "had been built to meet the experience of the Somme battle." Its wire entanglements were so deep and close that a man could not see through them, and its low machine-gun shelters of concrete were so constructed as to be invisible from the air and to resist even tank attacks. The plan of making it a development in depth where an enemy might become ensnared only to find himself facing stronger fortifications while under enfilading machine |