NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Documents Diplomatiques, Affairs Du Tonkin, 1874/82, p. 1

et seq.

2. State Papers, Vol. 65, 1874, Traite de Paix et d'Alliance Entre la France et l'Annam, Signé à Saïgan, le 15 Mars, 1874, pp. 375-381.

3. State Papers, Vol. 75, 1884, pp. 100-103.

4. Hertslet, Vol. 1, No. 52, pp. 321-323.

5. Hertslet, No. 53, pp. 323-327.

6. Vide supra, Chapter on the International Struggle for Concessions.

7. Hertslet, No. 54, pp. 327-328.

8. Hertslet, No. 55, pp. 329-331.

9. MacMurray, 1897/2, March 15, 1897. 10. MacMurray, 1898/6, April 16, 1898.

11. MacMurray, 1895/5.

12. Sir E. Monson to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 31, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 128.

13. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 931, Memorandum handed to the Secretary of State, March 19, 1902.

14. MacMurray, 1907/7.

15. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, Ambassador Bacon to the Sec. of State, Feb. 4, 1910.

16. A. Gérard, Ma Mission En Chine, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

17. M. C. Shu, Railway Problems in China, p. 76 et seq.

18. Ibid., p. 82 et seq.

19. MacMurray, 1913/8. 20. MacMurray, 1914/2. 21. MacMurray, 1905/11.

22. MacMurray, 1913/12.

23. Memorandum of terms of agreement come to at a meeting

at the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, Paris, on the 23rd day of May, 1910, U. S. For. Rel., pp. 280-281; MacMurray, 1911/5.

24. Millard's Review, Sept. 4, 1920, p. 4.

25. Millard's Review, Supplement, July 17, 1920, p. 19.

26. André Tardieu, French Policy after War, article published in World's Work, Jan., 1921, p. 242 et seq.

VII

THE POLICY OF GERMANY IN CHINA

IN the decade lying between 1895 and 1905 the policy of Germany in China was rather indefinite and undecided. It inclined probably, more or less, toward the example of Russia. After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), however, her policy changed and she became a devoted adherent of the doctrine of the Open Door.

In the first years (1895-1905) of her participation in the affairs of the Far East, she was quite uncommited as to the fate of China. Whether that country was to be partitioned, or demarcated into spheres of influence, or remain intact under the shelter of the Open Door, seemed not to matter to her, provided she be a party to whatever benefits accrued therefrom. She would not object to a partition which would give her a new colonial possession. Nor would she object to the establishment of a sphere of influence, which would yield an outlet for her capital and commerce. Nor, again, would she be unwilling to welcome a strong and stable China, which would be a counterpoise to her own rivals-Great Britain, Japan, France and Russia. Whatever the fate of China, the thing she cared for most was that she should not lose out in any game that was being played. Prince Von Bülow, the then Chancellor of Germany, said in the Reichstag on April 27, 1898:1

"We should certainly not take the initiative in a partition of China. All that we did was to see in good time that, whatever happened, we should not draw a blank. The moment when the train starts does not always de

pend on the will of the passenger. It is his business to see that he does not miss the train. The devil take the hindmost."

The first event that brought her influence to the Far East, as we have seen, was the tripartite intervention for the retrocession of Liaotung in 1895. Her joining in the intervention was largely dictated by the policy of encouraging Russian expansion in the Far East, so that she could avoid a conflict with Russia in Europe. To this effect Prince Von Bülow wrote in his "Imperial Germany": 2

"Towards the end of the eighties Prince Bismarck once said to me, with reference to Russia and Asia: 'In Russia there is a very serious amount of unrest and agitation which may easily result in an explosion. It would be best for the peace of the world if the explosion took place in Asia and not in Europe. We must be careful not to stand just in the way, otherwise we may have to bear the brunt of it.' If we had allowed ourselves to be thrust forward against Russia before the Russo-Japanese War, we should have had to bear the brunt."

Quite in line with the opinion of Bismarck, Germany did not stand in the way of Russian expansion in North China, but on the contrary, gave her passive encouragement thereto.

Following the tripartite intervention, Germany made a second move and that was the capture of Kiaochow. She had long desired to obtain the possession of that port, and in November, 1897, when, in a general attack by the robbers on the village, two German priests were killed in Kiaochwang, Shantung, "in circumstances beyond the control of the local authorities," she seized the pretext and occupied Kiaochow. As a consequence,

3

by the convention of March 6, 1898, she obtained the lease of Kiaochow for ninety-nine years (Section I, Art. 2). Besides, she made Shantung an exclusive sphere of influence by acquiring the right of first option in any undertaking, in which foreign assistance is needed:

"If within the province of Shantung any matters are undertaken for which foreign assistance, whether in personnel, or in capital, or in material, is invited, China agrees that the German merchants concerned shall first be asked whether they wish to undertake the works and provide the materials. In case the German merchants do not wish to undertake the said works and provide the materials, then as a matter of fairness China will be free to make such other arrangements as suits her convenience." (Section 3.)

Germany, on the other hand, engaged "at no time to sublet the territory leased from China to another power" (Section I, Art. 5).

The significance of the lease convention needs to be emphasized. Said von Bülow:

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. . . In any case, I say, we have secured in Kiaochow a strategical and political position which assures us a decisive influence on the future of the Far East. From this strong position we can look with complacency on the development of affairs. We have such a large sphere of action and such important tasks before us that we have no occasion to grudge other nations the concessions made them. German diplomacy will pursue its path in the East as everywhere else calmly, firmly and peacefully. We will never play the part of mischief maker, nor will we play that of Cinderella."

Thus, in the occupation of Kiaochow, its strategic location was fully realized. It is, and undoubtedly will continue to be, the leading commercial port of North

China. Tientsin, its rival, is closed in winter by ice; Kiaochow is open throughout the year. When the railways connect the Tientsin-Pukow line with the PekingHankow line, that is, by the Tsinan-Shunteh railway, and when the Lung-Hai railway is completed, running through the Yellow River Basin connecting with Kiaochow by the Kaomi-Hsuchow line, Kiaochow will become the outlet of the trade of North China and the Yellow River Basin, just as Shanghai is the outlet of the trade of the Yangtze Valley. The trade of North China, which goes now through the Peking-Hankow railway to Peking and thence to Tientsin for export will in time be all diverted to Kiaochow. Von Bülow therefore said: "We have secured in Kiaochow a stragetical and political position which assures us a decisive influence on the future of the Far East."

The German occupation of Kiaochow was also significant, not only from the point of view of its strategic location, but also from that of European politics and the German policy of Weltpolitik. The capture of . Kiaochow was the first practical step of the German policy of Weltpolitik and the German expansion. It also dated the beginning of the German naval expansion, resulting in a deadly rivalry with Great Britain. To this effect Prince von Bülow said: "

6

"About the time when we began to build our fleet, (our landing in Kiaochow took place in the autumn of 1897, when I first held office as Secretary of State for foreign affairs. 'It is from the year of Kiaochow that the growth of the formidable German navy dates,' wrote the Times in the course of the present war; this paper has from the first followed the development of our sea power with eyes sharpened by envy. It was quite. true that the fact that we established ourselves on the coast of China was directly and indirectly connected with our naval program, and was our first practical step along the path of world politics. A few weeks after