a license from the Chinese Government for the undertaking. In 1918, Japan proposed a loan of 100,000,000 yen on the hypothecation of the various iron deposits in China, including those at Lung-Kwan, Shienhwa, Tayeh, Yochow, Fenghuangshan and those in Shantung and Anhui.64 In recapitulation, we may state that with respect to railway concessions, Japan has dominated South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia and Shantung with strategic lines; that with reference to mines, she owns or controls the two greatest collieries of China-the Fushan and the Pingshiang-and controls about forty per cent of China's total production of coal and over seventy-five per cent of the output of modern equipped mines.65 The conclusion may also be inferred that her recent attempts indicate her desire to control, if not to monopolize, the foreign trade and iron industry of China. Thus, persistently, Japan has pursued a policy of economic exploitation in regard to China, a policy she, quite obviously, intends to continue. NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 1. Statesman's Year Book, 1900, p. 1018, on December 31, 1918. 2. Stateman's Year Book, 1920, p. 1017. 3. K. K. Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, pp. 49-50. 4. Statesman's Year Book, 1920, p. 1018. 5. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 538. 6. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 538. 7. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 538. 8. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 559. 9. K. K. Kawakami, Japan and the World Peace, p. 163. 10. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 561. 11. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, pp. 561-562. 12. K. K. Kawakami, Japan and the World Peace, p. 164. 13. U. S. For. Rel., 1905, pp. 825-826 et seq. 14. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 740. 15. Lancelot Lawton, Vol. 2, p. 1165; Japan Year Book, 1920 21, p. 742. 16. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 741. 17. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, pp. 741-742. 25. Hand in hand with the South Manchuria Railway Company there is the Manchurian Export Guild. It aims to monopolize the foreign trade of Manchuria. For a brief account see Overlack, Foreign Financial Control in China, p. 172. 26. MacMurray, 1907/3; Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 743. 27. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 743. 28. The Chino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, pp. 8-9. 29. MacMurray, 1913/9. 30. The Shantung Question, submitted by China to the Paris Peace Conference, published by the Chinese National Welfare Society of America, March, 1920, p. 69. 31. Lamont's Reply to Mr. Kajiwara, President of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Millard's Review, October 23, 1920, p. 386; Documents Concerning the New Consortium, released to press by the Department of State, March 30, 1921, Exchange of Letters between Lamont and Kajiwara, May 11, 1920. 32. MacMurray, 1918/9. 33. MacMurray, 1918/11. 34. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 191. 35. MacMurray, 1915/8; The Shantung Question, op. cit., p. 30 et seq. 36. MacMurray, 1915/8; The Shantung Question, op. cit., exchange of notes respecting the explanation of "Lease by Negotiation" in South Manchuria, pp. 33-34. 37. The Shantung Question, op. cit., p. 32; MacMurray, 1915/8. 38. MacMurray, 1915/8; the Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 49 et seq. 39. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 746. 40. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 50. 41. The Shantung Question, op. cit., pp. 66-67; MacMurray, 1918/16. 42. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 192. 43. Asia, Sept. 19, p. 905. 44. Ibid. 45. Japan Year Book, 1920-21, p. 746. 46. Pooley, op. cit., p. 161; Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, p. 51. 47. Pooley, op. cit., p. 191. 50. Pooley, ibid., p. 162. 51. H. K. Tong, art. on Japan's Railway Program in China, Millard's Review, June 12, 1920; Coleman, op. cit., p. 63 et seq. 52. H. K. Tong, art. on Japan's Railway Program in China, Millard's Review, June 12, 1920, p. 65. 53. Pooley, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 54. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, pp. 67-68; MacMurray, 1915/8. 55. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 21. 56. Pooley, op. cit., p. 191. 57. Millard's Review, June 23, 1917, pp. 67-69. 58. MacMurray, 1917/9. 59. MacMurray, 1918/7. 60. For a list of loans made by the Japanese from January 1, 1909, to October 25, 1918, see Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 187. 61. H. K. Tong, art. on Japan's Seeking China's Tobacco Monopoly, Millard's Review, June 8, 1918, p. 49 et seq. 62. H. K. Tong, article on America Protests Against the Chinese Trading Monopoly, Millard's Review, November 9, 1918, p. 388 et seq. 63. H. K. Tong, article on Japan's Conditions for Remitting Her Share of Boxer Indemnity, Millard's Review, October 26, 1918, p. 303 et seq. 64. H. K. Tong, article on Japan's Newest Intrigue for Possession of China's Iron Mines, Millard's Review, January 18, 1919, p. 233 et seq. 65. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 192. XII THE POLICY OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION As we have already indicated, the policy of territorial expansion is one of two ways for solving the population problem of Japan. Barred by the Gentlemen's Agreement with the United States, and by the colonies of Great Britain, Japan was forced to alleviate the congestion and consequent economic misery of surplus population, by finding an outlet on the Asiatic mainland. Confined within the narrow limits of her small islands, she was in constant fear of being some day deprived of any channels of expansion and smothered. Unless she face stagnation, congestion, and misery, she must seek some territory to which she can send her surplus sons and daughters. Searching for an outlet, she finds that her first available region of colonization is her own northern Island, Hokkaido, which can hold five times as many people as its present population of 2,200,000. But the Island is mountainous and its winter severe and protracted. The second available territory is Korea, which can at least support twice as many people as her present population of about 15,000,000. But Korea has a density of population of 169 per square mile and offers no great attraction for Japanese settlers.2 The third region that Japan logically looks to for amelioration on the mainland is South Manchuria. Though as thickly populated as Korea, great natural resources and the fertility of the soil nevertheless offer many attractions for Japanese colonization. Aside from the natural attraction afforded by the country, Japan feels that she has a special claim to South Manchuria. By the Sino-Japanese War, she obtained possession of the Liaotung peninsula forming the projection of the southern half of Manchuria, but because of the tripartite intervention she was constrained to disgorge this territory. Though deprived of the cession, she still cherishes the desire and hope of some day regaining it. What is more, she fought Russia and so saved South Manchuria from her clutches. She staked her whole national existence on the struggle; she spent about a billion yen and lost over one hundred thousand lives. Therefore, "Considering that every inch of South Manchurian soil was soaked with Japanese blood and that their coffers were left sadly depleted by the war, it would not have been surprising if the Japanese in the wake of the great conflict had been tempted to regard Manchuria as their own territory by right of conquest, and to adopt these discriminating measures calculated to advance their trade." 3 Again, it was said: "Manchuria is consecrated to Japan by the blood of dead Japanese soldiers." " Furthermore, the traditional ambition for a Greater Japan impels the government to the policy of territorial expansion in the direction of Eastern Asia. Yoshida, the great teacher of "Patriotic Schools," among whose famous disciples were Kido, Inouye and Ito, advocated the expansion of Japan in Asia by force of arms. His program included the acquisition of the Kurile Islands, Saghalien, Kamchatka, Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, and a large part of Eastern Siberia-with a view to the expansion of Japan into an Eastern Asiatic power." For these reasons therefore-the economic pressure of surplus population, the special claim to South Manchuria |