churia, and of military instructors in the Cadet schools, and the establishment of police stations in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.22 Had these demands been conceded, it would have meant the Japanese control of the military development of South Manchuria and granting of the police power over Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Finally, when the new Consortium was being organized in 1919-1920, Japan qualified the participation of her financial group with the reservation that South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia should be excluded from its scope.23:24 Thus, by this diplomatic stroke, she attempted to secure the recognition of the Great Powers as to her special political status in these regions and her right to exclusive exploitation of the same. Hence, if China should in the future come under the control of the New Consortium and thus lose her independence, Japan would have saved these two regions from a similar fate, and would be free to snatch them from the grip of the Consortium and incorporate them under her own sovereignty.25

It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that Japan did entertain the design of controlling, if not of possessing, South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Impelled by the economic pressure of an increasing population at home, supported by the special claim growing out of the Russo-Japanese War, and inspired by the traditional ambition of a Greater Japan, she has set her heart on the policy of territorial expansion in these two regions. Using Article Six of the Russo-Chinese Railway Convention of 1896 as a basis, she planned to extend her sovereignty over these regions, by the creation of the imperium in imperio in the railway zone, the establishment of police stations, and the repeated attempts to wrest the police power from the Chinese Government.20

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

1. K. K. Kawakami, Japan in World Politics, p. 58.

2. Ibid., p. 58.

3. Ibid., p. 131.

4. Patrick Gallagher, America's Aims and Asia's Aspirations, P. 407.

5. J. O. P. Bland, article on Moral Factors in Japanese Policies, Asia, March, 1921, p. 217.

6. John Spargo, Russia as an American Problem, p. 150.

7. Shin Nihon, editor, Count Okuma, April, 1912, quoted in Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 76n.

8. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, pp. 130-131.

9. MacMurray, 1896/5.

10. MacMurray, 1905/18.

11. The society shall have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its territories.

12. Cf. U. S. Foreign Relations, 1910, pp. 203-205, the letter of the Secretary of State of the United States Government to the Russian Ambassador on April 9, 1908.

13. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 268. 14. Ibid., p. 268; Millard's Review, Nov. 8, 1919, p. 399.

15. Lancelot Lawton, The Empires of the Far East, Vol. 2, p. 1167.

16. MacMurray, 1917/2; W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interest in China, pp. 84-85; Japanese Minister's Aide Memoire, Oct. 18, 1916.

18. MacMurray, 1917/2; W. W. Willoughby, op. cit., p. 83 et seq.

19. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 20.

20. Ibid., p. 12.

21. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

22. MacMurray, 1917/2.

23. T. W. Lamont, Preliminary Report on the New Consortium for China, p. 7.

24. Documents concerning the new consortium released to press by the Department of State on March 30, 1921, the letter of M. Odagiri of the Yokahoma Specie Bank to Mr. T. W. Lamont of the J. P. Morgan & Co., June 18, 1919.

25. For a complete account of the new consortium, vide infra, chapters on the New International Banking Consortium.

26. Japan's recent occupation of Eastern Siberia may or may not effect her policy of territorial expansion in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. For an account of Japan and Siberia, see John Spargo, Russia as an American Problem, Chapter V, p. 199 et seq.

XIII

THE POLICY OF PARAMOUNT INFLUENCE

IN the two preceding chapters we have examined the policies of economic exploitation and territorial expansion,-two of Japan's solutions for her population problem. We come, now, to the third policy—that of paramount influence.

This policy is actuated in the first place by Japan's desire to obtain and possess the largest Chinese sphere of influence. Being China's closest neighbor and of the same racial and linguistic family, she feels that she ought to have the largest influence. When the battle of concessions commenced in 1898-which resulted in the Powers demarcating their respective spheres of influence on the map of China-Japan was not yet a full-fledged Power. She had therefore to be content with the demarcation of Fukien as her humble share. When, by dint of extraordinary exertion, and by reason of her victory over Russia, she had achieved the position of a great Power, she found, to her regret, that all the regions in China had already been occupied as spheres of other Powers, and she had again to be contented with South Manchuria which she had won by the sword and Eastern Inner Mongolia attained by cordial agreement with Russia. When, however, the World War broke out, leaving China free for her expansion, she promptly seized the opportunity and extended her sphere of influence as far as China and the other Powers would allow her. This she did, partly to the end that in case of an eventual break-up or partition of China, she would be able to secure the largest share of territory. "It was because European Powers were bent upon dividing China

into so many spheres of influence that Japan was obliged to step in and take such measures as might be necessary to safeguard her position in the Far East against any emergency that might arise from an unhappy condition in China." 1

This policy is again a concomitant of Japan's other policies-economic exploitation and territorial expansion. Economic exploitation requires the existence of a sphere of influence, and quite logically, the fullest measure of economic exploitation requires the possession of the largest sphere of influence. In order, therefore, to carry out this policy to the fullest satisfaction, the acquisition of the largest sphere of influence is highly desirable, if not quite necessary. Likewise, territorial expansion demands the existence of a sphere of influence wherein a Power entrench itself against the authority of the territorial sovereign and the intrusion of other Powers. While it is not indispensable, the possession of the largest sphere of influence will nevertheless help to consummate the annexation of the regions desired.

In the case of Japan and China this policy is animated by the former's desire to displace the predominating Western influence by her own paramount interest. She feels chagrined over the presence of such an influence in a land where, by virtue of the similarity of language and race, she feels that she ought to have the largest share. She is also afraid that the presence of a dominating Occidental influence may imperil the independence of China and so jeopardize her own existence. Therefore, to check the further extension of such an influence, she proposes to displace it with her own paramount interest. Supporting this view is the following

statement:

"It must be frankly admitted that ever since China opened her doors to Western nations, her territory has been regarded as a happy hunting ground by concession

seekers of all, but especially of European countries. Her inefficiency, her impotency and the general disorganization and corruption of her administrative system have been such as to invite a veritable universal scramble over concessions. . . . To the Japanese, it is certain that, unless they take the necessary measures of precaution, the whole province of China will sooner or later be held in the grip of Western interests. Of course she could not, even if she would, undertake to safeguard all the vast dominion of China, but she must by all means forestall the establishment of preponderating Western influence in such sections of that domain as are contiguous or adjacent to her own territories." 2-3

This policy is, moreover, motivated by Japan's consideration of her own special position in China. She fought war with Russia, partially because of China's incapacity to resist Russian aggression in Manchuria. By dint of supreme sacrifice, she saved Manchuria, and so rendered China a distinct and invaluable service. She also feels her exalted mission of Chinese guardianship. Being the only nation in Eastern Asia that has been able to resist successfully the Western onslaught, she feels that she has the duty of extending her protection to the other nations of Eastern Asia, particularly China. Further, her own economic, and to a certain extent, her own political existence depends upon China's prosperity and independence. Should her neighbor ever come under Western control, or what is worse, should she ever be partitioned, Japan would be left alone in the world. With the Western Powers entrenched on the opposite shore of her sea, her own days of independence would be numbered. As preserver of Manchuria and protector of China, dependent as she is upon her and inseparately interwoven as is her destiny and well-being with that of China, she is therefore impelled by a high sense of justification to put forth her claim of a special position in that country.