and the dynamic force of the European balance of power. We may further state that this period witnessed the beginning of the foreign loans, that put China on the broad and dangerous road, which, unless checked early by popular control, would inevitably lead China to the precipice of bankruptcy and foreign control. We may also add that this period witnessed the deepest humiliation and greatest peril that China had ever undergone. As to how this darkest period of Chinese diplomatic history was gradually changed into a period on the whole. more favorable and yet in some respects more critical, it will be seen in the next chapter.93

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1895/6; cf. F. H. Huang, Public Debts in China, p. 21. 2. F. H. Huang, ibid., pp. 22-23.

3. Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, No. 52, pp. 321-323.

6. Art. 3, ibid., p. 324.

7. Art. 5, ibid., p. 326.

8. Art. 5, ibid., p. 326.

9. MacMurray, op. cit., 1896/5.

10. Hertslet, op. cit., No. 59, pp. 350-354; also Shantung question, published by The Chinese National Welfare Society, 1920,

P. 50.

11. Hertslet, op. cit., No. 88, pp. 505-508.

12. Ibid., No. 89, pp. 508-509. 13. Ibid., No. 54, pp. 327-328. 14. Ibid., No. 55, pp. 329-331. 15. Ibid., No. 22, p. 113. 16. Ibid., No. 22, pp. 113-119. 17. Ibid., No. 24, pp. 120-122. 18. Ibid., No. 25, pp. 122-123. 19. Ibid., No. 25, p. 122. 20. Ibid., p. 122.

21. MacMurray, 1898/2.

22. MacMurray, 1897/2; also Doc. Dip. Chine, 1894-8, p. 33. 23. MacMurray, 1898/6; Doc. Dip. Chine, 1894-8, p. 49.

24. MacMurray, 1898/1.

25. MacMurray, 1898/8.

26. Shantung question, op. cit., p. 28.

27. MacMurray, 1915/7. 28. MacMurray, 1898/13. 29. MacMurray, 1898/20. 30. MacMurray, 1903/2. 31. MacMurray, 1908/2. 32. MacMurray, 1898/12.

33. M. C. Hsu, Railway Problems in China, pp. 41-44; Sir MacDonald to Lord Charles Beresford, British Blue Book, Affairs of China, No. 1, 1899, pp. 344-347.

34. Rockhill, p. 273, Art. 17.

35. MacMurray, 1902/8.

36. Hsu, op. cit., p. 40; Sir MacDonald to Lord Charles Beresford, British Blue Book, Affairs of China, No. 1, 1899, pp. 344-347.

37. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 128-143.

38. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 141-142, Count Mouravieff to Tower.

39. U. S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 299.

40. State papers, Vol. 94, p. 686 et seq.; U. S. For. Rel., 1901, Appendix, Affairs in China, French text, pp. 306-312, English text, 312-318.

41. Hertslet, No. 27, pp. 148-170.

42. Hertslet, No. 28, pp. 171-188.

43A. Hertslet, No. 66, pp. 383-391.

43B. Art. 8, Sec. 14, Hertslet, No. 28, p. 180.

44. Hertslet, No. 100, pp. 566-578.

45. W. W. Willouby, For. Rights and Interests in China, Appendix, p. 572.

46. MacMurray, 1907/3.

47. Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 151; China, No. 1, 1901, No. 256.

48. Ibid., p. 152; China, No. 1 (1901), p. 113, No. 256.

49. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 3, p. 305; U. S. For. Rel., 1901, Appendix, p. 19.

50. Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 166-167; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 5, Jan. 4, 1901.

51. Ibid., p. 169; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 8; No. 13; No. 12; No. 19.

52. Ibid., p. 174; The Times, February 28th, 1901, p. 5; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 6, No. 14, Nos. 25 and 42.

53. Ibid., p. 193; U. S. For. Rel., 1902, pp. 273-274.

54. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 275.

55. State papers, Vol. 95, pp. 83-84.

56. Hertslet, No. 90, pp. 509-512.

57. Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 242-244; China, No. 2, 1904; No. 94. 58. Ibid., pp. 303-304.

59. Ibid., pp. 308-309. 60. Ibid., pp. 324-325. 61. Ibid., pp. 328-329. 62. Ibid., pp. 330-331. 63. Ibid., p. 333.

64. Ibid., pp. 337-339.

65. U. S. For. Rel., 1904, p. 118.

66. U. S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 1.

67. State Papers, Vol. 98, pp. 735-740; MacMurray, 1905/8. 68. Hertslet, No. 67, pp. 391-396.

69. MacMurray, 1908/1. 70. MacMurray, 1910/4. 71. MacMurray, 1907/2. 72. MacMurray, 1908/3. 73. MacMurray, 1908/13. 74. MacMurray, 1908/13. 75. MacMurray, 1909/2. 76. MacMurray, 1907/3. 77. MacMurray, 1908/18.

78. MacMurray, 1909/6, 1909/7.

79. MacMurray, 1907/5.

80. MacMurray, 1909/8.

81. The Canton-Hankow Railway Contracts, Irving Press, N.

Y.; F. H. Huang, p. 32.

82. MacMurray, 1905/7. 83. MacMurray, 1905/9. 84. MacMurray, 1905/9. 85. MacMurray, 1911/5.

86. U. S. For. Rel., 1909, pp. 155-157; MacMurray, 1911/5.

87. MacMurray, 1911/5.

88. U. S. For. Rel., 1909, pp. 178-180.

89. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, p. 280.

90. MacMurray, 1911/5.

91. MacMurray, 1909/12.

92. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, p. 234 et seq.

93. During this period four more states entered into treaty relations with China-Congo Free State, 1898; Korea, 1899; Mexico, 1899; Sweden, 1908.

IV

THE INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION AND CONTROL (1911—)

THE fourth and present period of the diplomatic history of China extends from the close of the Chinese Revolution. It is a period in which a radical change of policy on the part of the Powers took place. While in the preceding period the international struggle for concessions was the policy of the Powers, in this period the policy of international coöperation and control is the predominant note.

This radical change was due to several vital reasons. The first was the unavoidable disadvantage of international cut-throat competition. It is well known in economic science that such competition leads inevitably to either mutual destruction or combination and coöperation. So likewise in the field of international politics, the same law holds true. International cut-throat competition must inevitably result either in mutual destruction of one another's ends or in international combination and coöperation. For instance, as we have seen, in the case of the Peking-Hankow railway, the British, the American and the Belgian capitalists were all competitors, among whom the British were especially anxious to win the premier concession, passing as it does from the capital of China to the heart of the Yangtze Valley; but the Belgian capitalists, supported by Russia and France, underbid the other and won the concession. Again, in the case of the Hankow-Canton railway, the British capitalists, although holding a prior option by virtue of the pledge of Viceroy Chang Chi-tung, were defeated by German capitalists who were willing to accept the con

cession on the Tientsin-Pukow terms which the British had rejected. It was because of the painful experience of this sort that the Powers began to realize the inexpediency of international competition and favored the policy of international combination and coöperation.

In addition, there was another cause for the radical change of the policy of the Powers in China, and that was the possible occurrence of the foreign control of China's finance. In the preceding period there were a few foreign loans made for the immediate payment of the war indemnity to Japan, but there were practically no loans made that were of an administrative character, most of the loans being largely for railway construction and other commercial purposes. But with the advent of the Republic, and the falling off of provincial revenues, which either were diverted to provincial uses or failed to reach Peking on account of the relatively independent position of the military governors in control of the provinces, the Peking Government was forced to resort to administrative loans for the purpose of meeting ordinary non-productive needs of the government. With the coming of administrative loans, there loomed the ghastly apparition of possible and probable bankruptcy, and hence there arose the possible eventuality of foreign control of China's finance. As no one power would allow any other single power to have the exclusive control of her finances, the Powers were compelled to reach the conclusion that they must combine and coöperate, so that, in case there should be any foreign control of China's finance, it would be an international control rather than the control by any single Power.

Toward the close of the preceding period, there were a few instances of international combination and coöperation, but on the whole they were not the results of deliberate choice, but rather the consequences of inevitable circumstances. For instance, the Hukuang railway loan was equally shared by the four Powers-Great Britain,