Free WillRoutledge, 18. 12. 2014. - 192 страница The question whether human choices and actions are causally determined or are in a way free, and the implications of this for our moral, personal and social lives continues to challenge philosophers. This book explores the determinist rejection of free will through a detailed exposition of the central determinist argument and a consideration of the responses to each of its premises. At every stage familiar examples and case studies help frame and ground the argument. The discussion is at no time peremptory and the invitation to the reader to be drawn in and to contribute to the debate as an engaged participant is palpable in the manner and approach adopted throughout. "Free Will" will be welcomed by students looking for an engaging and clear introduction to the subject, and as a rigorous exercise in philosophical argument it will serve, for the beginning student new to philosophy, as an excellent springboard into the subject more generally. |
Садржај
exposition | |
qualifications and clarifications | |
two varieties | |
the utilitarian position | |
the twolanguage view | |
The irrelevance of determinism | |
The very idea of causal necessity | |
Conclusions and reflections on philosophical method | |
chaos theory and determinism | |
A guide to further reading | |
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accept action-description agency agent causation apply asking assumption billiard balls Campbell Campbell’s position causal chain causal descriptions causal explanation causal laws causal necessity causal story causally determined causes central ceteris paribus clauses chaos theory Chapter choose commitment common-sense compatibilism compatibilist conception concerns conjoined consider constraint context contrast crop circles denying described determinist argument determinist conclusion discussion distinction elementary particles example explicable finite totality fit to plead Frankfurt-type free action free will defenders genuine Grey happen hence human behaviour idea initial conditions Inwagen issue kind of event kleptomaniac KEY language least Leopold and Loeb libertarianism moral responsibility natural science necessitating notion of choice objection occurred offer one’s outcome perhaps person philosophical physical plausible possibility predictable in principle premise problem psychological determinism question reason relevant seems sense simply Strawson suggest thesis things two-language view typically uncaused uncertainty principle universal causation urges utilitarian position