CHAPTER VII.

LAND AND INTERESTS THEREIN ACQUIRED BY THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

Source of the Power. The right of eminent domain, or right to take private property for public use, has been referred to the feudal theory of tenure, to implied compact, and public necessity; but upon whatever principle it is asserted, it is an inherent sovereign power of the State. Its limitations are that compensation must be made to the owner, or otherwise the taking would be confiscation; and that the object must be public, for, if merely private, it would be in effect the mere transfer of the property of one person to another, which is not a legislative function.2

The right of eminent domain, being an essential attribute of sovereignty, exists even when not expressly conferred by the State Constitution; and its continued exercise being necessary to the existence and well-being of the State, it cannot in the opinion of jurists be surrendered by a legislative act.*

The power exists in territorial governments which are invested with general legislative power. It belongs to the national government, and may be exercised by it within the States to the

1 Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 61; Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige, 45, 72, 73; Heyward v. New York, 7 N.Y. 314, 324; Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N.Y. 137; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 532, 533, 539; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 372; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 406; People v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 250; 2 Kent Com. 339.

2 Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige, 45; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Buffalo & N. Y. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100, 108; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Bloomfield & R. Nat. Gas Light Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437; Giesy v. Cincinnati,

W., & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308, 326; Reeves v. Wood County, 8 Ohio St. 333; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54; New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & I. Co., 37 Md. 537, 559; Nesbitt ". Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Edgewood R. Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 257; Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 259.

8 Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63.

4 Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp. Bridge, 7 N. H. 35, 69; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 24.

5 Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Warren v. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 18 Minn. 384.

extent necessary for executing the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.1 The exercise of the power by the States in its behalf has sometimes been justified; 2 but the better opinion is that each sovereignty can constitutionally act only for itself, and use the power only for its own purposes. The exercise of the power by the States cannot be controlled by the United States.1

may

A Public Use. The right of eminent domain be resorted to for a public use; that is, for an object which concerns the public interest, convenience, or safety. Its exercise, when reasonably required by the public exigencies or convenience, is within the discretion of the legislature. It has been used for the purposes of public roads, turnpikes, canals, ferries, bridges, telegraphs, parks, mill-sites, for the draining of marshes, and bringing water and gas into cities and villages. Railroads have uniformly been regarded as public improvements, for which the State is justified in calling into exercise the sovereign right of eminent domain; and they are, still of that character, although operated by private corporations, which exclusively collect and enjoy the tolls for persons and merchandise carried upon them.5

To make the use a public one, neither the whole nor a considerable part of the public need have a direct interest in it. The immediate pecuniary benefit may appear to inure to the advantage of comparatively few people, and yet the use be in its nature public.6 On this principle, railroads connecting private mines with lines of traffic, and solely or chiefly useful for that purpose, have been held to be a public use; 7 and it has been

1 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. St. 382.

2 Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356; Orr r. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590.

People v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. St. 382

4 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403.

5 Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige, 45; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137; Townsend's Case, 39 N. Y. 171; New York & H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6

How. 507, 537; Bellona Company's Case, 3 Bland Ch. 442; Secombe v. Milwaukie & St. P. R. Co., 23 Wall. 108; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W., & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308, 326; Holt v. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258; San Francisco, A., & S. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367; Buffalo Bayou, B., & C. R. Co. v. Ferris, 26 Texas, 588.

6 Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 425 ; Denham v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 202; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. 7 Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63;

deemed a legitimate exercise of the power to condemn land for tracks connecting a company's railroad with an elevator or abattoir used in its business.1 It cannot, however, be resorted to for a railroad or other way which is purely private in its character. The power may be conferred by a general law creating corporations with the right to construct railroads lying wholly within a single city or town. The State may intervene

by a proper proceeding against a corporation to enjoin its abuse of the power of eminent domain in taking property for a private use; 4 4 and equity will restrain such abuse at the suit of individuals who suffer thereby special injury.5

Delegation of the Power. The State may delegate the power of eminent domain. The uses for which the power is invoked, rather than the instruments employed in its exercise, are the test of its existence. A railroad corporation is under a legal obligation to serve the public for a reasonable and uniform toll, and cannot refuse one and accommodate another at its pleasure. In view of its purposes and obligations, the power of eminent domain may be exercised by the State to provide it with a right of way. The State may confer the power of eminent domain on an individual as well as a corporation;7 and on a foreign as well as a Hays v. Risher, 32 Pa. St. 169; Bank- 4 Stewart (N. J.), 475, 494, 5 Stewart head v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Contra (N. J.), 755. Costa R. Co. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 323; New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & I. Co., 37 Md. 537.

1 New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gas Light Co., 63 N. Y. 326, 5 Hun, 201, 6 Hun, 149.

2 McCandless's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 210; Edgewood R. Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 257; Waddell's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 90; Central R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 4 Stewart (N. J.), 475, 494, 5 Stewart (N. J.), 755; Memphis Freight Co. v. Memphis, 4 Cold. 419; Salt Co. v. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191. See article on "The Constitutionality of Private Ways," 6 Am. Law Rev. 197.

8 Long Branch Com'rs v. West End R. Co., 2 Stewart (N. J.), 566; National Docks R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 5 Stewart (N. J.), 755, 4 Stewart (N. J.), 475.

4 People v. Pittsburg R. Co., 53 Cal. 694.

Edgewood R. Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 257; Central R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co.,

Beekman v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 3 Paige, 45; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. Co., 14 Wend. 51, 18 Wend. 9; Parmelee v. Oswego & S. R. Co., 7 Barb. 599, 625; Kerr's Case, 42 Barb. 119; Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; New York & H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; City of Buffalo, In re, 68 N. Y. 167; Bloomfield & R. Nat. Gas Light Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437; Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40; Bonaparte v. Camden & A. R. Co., Baldwin, 205; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W., & Z. R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Kramer v. Cleveland & P. R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 40; Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591; Weir v. St. Paul, S., & T. F. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155; Whiteman v. Wilmington & S. R. Co., 2 Harring. (Del.) 514.

7 Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591.

domestic corporation; 1 but a power conferred in terms on domestic corporations does not extend by implication to foreign corporations. A de facto corporation may be clothed with the power; and in proceedings for condemnation the regularity of its organization cannot be questioned, provided there is a conformity to law sufficient to create and maintain corporate existence.* The power, when conferred on a corporation, ceases with the termination of corporate existence, and with the expiration of the period limited for the taking of land. It is conferred as a personal trust and confidence, and cannot be delegated or assigned. It cannot, therefore, when conferred on a railroad corporation, be exercised, without express statute provision, by a lessee of the railroad, or by a person employed to build it. When conferred on a corporation, the action of the directors in exercising it is ordinarily deemed corporate action.7

The delegated power to take private property for public uses is in derogation of common right, and exists only when conferred by statute, and to the extent it is so conferred. Statutes granting it, while they are to be construed reasonably, so as to effect the evident purpose of the legislature, are not to be extended by inference and implication beyond the fair import of the terms expressed. The power is presumed to exist only when required by the public necessity; but such necessity need not be controlling in the particular instance.8

1 Townsend's Case, 39 N. Y. 171, 24 Barb. 658; Black v. Delaware & R. Canal Co., 7 C. E. Green, 130, 418, 9 C. E. Green, 455; New York & E. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. St. 175; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 251; Southwestern R. Co. v. Southern & A Tel. Co., 46 Ga. 43; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65.

5 Brooklyn, W., & N. R. Co., In re, 72` N. Y. 245, 75 N. Y. 335, 19 Hun, 314; Peavey v. Calais R. Co., 30 Me. 498; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 66 Mo. 228, 250, 3 Mo. App. 315; Morris & E. R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 2 Vroom, 205, 210.

6 Worcester v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 109 Mass. 103; St. Peter v. Denison, 58

2 Holbert v. St. Louis, K., C., & N. R. N. Y. 416. Co., 45 Iowa, 23.

& Cincinnati, L., & C. R. Co. v. Danville & V. R. Co., 75 Ill. 113; McAuley v. Columbns, C., & I. C. R. Co., 83 Ill. 348; National Docks R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 5 Stewart (N. J.), 755, 4 Stewart (N. J.), 475; Oregon Cascade Co. v. Baily, 3 Oreg. 64.

4 Atlantic & O. R. Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio St. 276; Atkinson v. Marietta & C. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21; Powers ». Hazelton & L. R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 429. See ante, Chap. I. pp. 6, 11.

7 Eastern R. Co. v. Boston & M. R., 111 Mass. 125.

8 Adams v. Saratoga & W. R. Co., 10 N. Y. 328; Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137, 146; New York & H. R. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546; New York & C. R. Co. v. Gunnison, 3 Thomp. & C. 632; Currier v. Marietta & C. R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 228; Miami Coal Co. v. Wigton, 19 Ohio St. 560; Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; Thacher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 18 Pick. 501; Boston & L. R. Co. v. Salem & L. R. Co., 2 Gray, 1, 36, 37;

What is a Public Use, a Judicial Question. Whether a use is a public one, for which private property may be taken, is a judicial question; and it is for the judicial department to determine whether a use for which the legislature has assumed to authorize its appropriation is of a public nature. If the use itself is found to be only private, or, further, if the use being public, the appropriation can in no respect be subservient thereto, it is the duty of the judicial department to protect the citizen by proper remedies from the taking of his property, whether attempted in open disregard, or under color, of law. But otherwise than in determining whether the use is public, and whether just compensation has been made or provided for by an adequate remedy, the power of eminent domain is a political power vested in the legislative department, and, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, is to be exercised in its discretion, on such occasions and by such methods as it may see fit.1

Legislative Discretion as to the Exercise of the Power for a Public Use. The power to decide whether there is a necessity, emergency, or exigency (which are in this connection equivalent and interchangeable terms), justifying a particular enterprise of a class which is judicially found to be a public use, is, in the absence of a constitutional provision to the contrary, solely a legislative function; and the legislative discretion is, in this respect, of that plenary character that not only it cannot be

Glover v. Boston, 14 Gray, 282; Wilson v. Lynn, 119 Mass. 174; Prather v. Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16, 36. But see Leisse v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 105.

1 Buffalo & N. Y. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100, 108; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Townsend's Case, 39 N. Y. 171; Brooklyn Park Com'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; Deanville Cemetery Assoc., In re, 66 N. Y. 569, 5 Hun, 482; Bloomfield & R. Nat. Gas L. Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Haverhill Bridge Proprietors ». County Com'rs, 103 Mass. 120; Eastern R. Co. v. Boston & M. R., 111 Mass. 125; Brayton v. Fall River, 124 Mass. 95; Holt v. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Coster v. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54; Central R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 4 Stewart (N. J.),

475, 487, 5 Stewart (N. J.), 755; New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & I. Co., 37 Md. 537, 560; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W., & Z. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308, 325; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Contra Costa R. Co. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 323; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Johnson v. Joliet & C. R. Co., 23 Ill. 202; Chicago, R., I., & P. R. Co. v. Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Dietrich v. Murdoch, 42 Mo. 279; Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; Mount Washington Road, In re, 35 N. H. 134; Ford v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 14 Wis. 609; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Whiteman v. Wilmington & S. R. Co., 2 Harring. 514.

2 Supra, note 1. In some States the Constitution requires a jury to determine the necessity. Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108.