A town or city, which is bound to maintain highways, has been held to have such an interest in them, and in bridges and structures forming a part of them, as to entitle it to maintain an action against a railroad company for injuries to them.1

Street Railway Companies. Respective Rights of the Company, and of the Public in the Use of the Street. A street-railway company owns the structure laid by it on the highway, and has a superior right to the space covered by its track. Its cars are confined to a fixed line of movement, and upon that line have precedence over other carriages which can pass on the remaining surface of the highway.2 The public on foot or in carriages may cross its track, and travel on the space covered by it when its cars are not passing, and even incidentally, though not to the obstruction or inconvenience of the railway cars, drive ordinary carriages upon its rails. A person driving his carriage on the track should keep on the lookout for the railway cars, so as to leave the track without retarding their movement.3 The company, in the exercise of this superior, though not exclusive, right to its track must use the reasonable care allowed by its mode of movement so as not to injure persons lawfully using the street in other ways, and similar care is incumbent on such persons. Having a property in the structure which it has laid for its purposes, and also a franchise, its rails cannot be used by other competing common carriers driving railway or other carriages, without special legislative authority. Such a use is a direct interference with its franchise, entitling it to compensation,

1 Troy v. Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83; Hooksett v. Amoskeag Man. Co., 44 N. H. 105; Greenwich v. Easton & A. R. Co., 9 C. E. Green, 217, 220.

2 Commonwealth v. Temple, 14 Gray, 69; Commonwealth v. Hicks, 7 Allen, 573; State v. Foley, 31 Iowa, 527; Jatho v. Green & C. St. Pass. R. Co., 4 Phil. 24; Hegan v. Eighth Av. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 380; Adolph v. Central Park, N., & E. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 530, 65 N. Y. 554, 33 N. Y. Superior, 186, 43 N. Y. Superior, 199; Barker v. Hudson River R. Co., 4 Daly, 274.

3 Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Jersey City & H. Horse R. Co., 5 C. E. Green, 61, 69; Wilbrand v. Eighth Av. R. Co., 8 Bosw. 314; Fettrick v. Dickenson, 22 How. Pr. 248; Hegan v. Eighth Av. R.

Co., 15 N. Y. 380; Adolph v. Central Park,
N., & E. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 530, 65 N. Y.
554, 33 N. Y. Superior, 186, 43 N. Y.
Superior, 199; Chicago W. D. R. Co. v.
Bert, 69 Ill. 388.

4 Shea v. Portrero & B. V. R. Co., 44 Cal. 414; Lynam v. Union R. Co., 114 Mass. 83; Unger v. Forty-Second St. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 497; Shea v. Sixth Av. R. Co., 62 N. Y. 180; Baxter v. Second Av. R. Co., 3 Rob. 510; Adolph . Central Park, N., & E. R. R. Co., 33 N. Y. Superior, 186, 43 N. Y. Superior, 199, 65 N. Y. 554, 76 N. Y. 530; Brooklyn Cent. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Commonwealth v. Temple, 14 Gray, 69; Meyer v. Lindell R. Co., 6 Mo. App. 27; Pendleton St. R. Co. v. Stallman, 21 Ohio St. 1.

and differs essentially from an incidental use of its rails by the general public.1 The grant to a street-railway company is not by implication exclusive, and a grant may afterwards be made to another company to use other parts of the street for a competing line, without compensation being made for the injury to the earlier grant arising from such competition.2 The municipal authorities retain the control of highways on which street railways are laid, and may make necessary repairs and improvements of the highway, which cause a temporary inconvenience or obstruction to the movements of the railway cars.3

The State retains its police power to require of corporations already created further safeguards in the crossing and use of streets. A license by a charter to a street-railroad company to make a connection with another railroad owned by a city, does not involve a guaranty that the city shall maintain the railroad with which the connection is to be made.5

The power to lay a double track in a street may be exercised by laying one track at one time, and the other subsequently." The power to lay such a track is presumed to mean two sets of tracks upon the same location, so that cars can be run on the same route in opposite directions, and not two sets of tracks in different streets.7

The company may remove snow from its track to another part of the street, but it must exercise the right reasonably, avoiding unnecessary injury to the owners of property.8

1 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Quincy R. Co., 12 Allen, 262; Sixth Av. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330, 45 Barb. 138; Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Jersey City & H. Horse R. Co., 5 C. E. Green, 61; Camden Horse R. Co. v. Citizens Coach Co., 1 Stewart (N. J.), 145, 2 Stewart (N. J.), 299, 4 Stewart (N. J.), 525; Brooklyn Cent. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 32 Barb. 358; Buffalo Street R. Co. v. Leighton, 10 Reporter, 149; Central City Horse R. Co. v. Ft. Clark R. Co., 81 Ill. 523; ante, Chap. VII. pp. 194, 217, 218. Statutes provide for the use by one street railroad company of another company's track, by paying compensation. Brooklyn, W., & N. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 245, 19 Hun, 314.

2 New York & H. R. Co. v. Forty- Md. 73.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LOCATION.

Choice of Location. The charter or special legislative act creating the corporation may define in detail the location;1 or indicate the termini and general route, leaving the company to fix its line within certain limits in some plan to be recorded; 2 or, as under general railroad laws, the general and particular location may be left to the determination of the corporation, subject to the approval or revision of certain public authorities. Whether a charter justifies a certain location, and whether a recorded location applies to particular land, is a question for judicial construction.

Where only the general termini and route are prescribed by the legislature, the location in other respects, including the precise. termini and intermediate points, is usually left to the election of the company; and the exercise of its discretion, where it acts in good faith and within the limits of its powers, cannot be reviewed by the courts. But the company cannot abuse such discretion and depart from the purpose of its charter by building another railroad than that intended by the legislature."

Power of Choice, when exhausted.

Change of Location.

The power of the company to determine its location, when once exercised, is exhausted. It may have a discretion as to its termini or the selection of its intermediate points, or its route

1 Coney Island & B. R. Co., In re, 12 325; Parke's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 137; Hun, 451.

2 Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & W. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360; ante, Ch. VII. p. 147.

3 Boston & M. R. v. Lowell & L. R., 124 Mass. 368; ante, Chap. VII. pp. 147, 148.

Hentz v. Long Island R. Co., 13 Barb. 646; People v. New York Cent. & H R. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 302, 12 Hun, 195; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. St.

Struthers v. Dunkirk, W., & P. R. Co., 87 Pa. St. 282; Newcastle & R. R. Co. v. Peru & I. R. Co., 3 Ind. 464; Southern Minn. R. Co. v. Stoddard, 6 Minn. 150; Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Old Colony & F. R. R. Co., 5 Allen, 221.

5 Brigham v. Agricultural Branch R. Co., 1 Allen, 316; Commonwealth v. Franklin Canal Co., 21 Pa. St. 117; Central R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 4 Stewart (N. J.), 475, 5 Stewart (N. J.), 755.

between certain fixea points, but, having exercised the discretion, it cannot change the location without legislative authority. This is in accordance with the ancient rule of the common law, that, "if a man once determines his election, it shall be determined forever." 1

The power to change the location, to a certain extent, is sometimes given by statute; 2 but when given, it is to be strictly construed. Thus, an authority to vary the route and change the location after a selection, is construed not to be an authority to change the location after the road is constructed.3 A power. to change the route does not include the power to change the terminal points. The power to lay double tracks is not exhausted by the laying of one set, and may be used subsequently to lay another set.5

Expiration of Power. The power of the company to take lands may be determined by the expiration of the time within which, by the charter, it is required to be exercised. But the language of the statute may be comprehensive enough to authorize the condemnation of land after the completion of the road, when required for its maintenance and operation. Thus, where

1 Com. Dig. tit. "Election," C. 2; State v. Norwalk & D. Turnp. Co., 10 Conn. 157; Turnpike Soc. v. Hosmer, 12 Conn. 361, 364; Hudson & D. C. Co. v. New York & E. R. Co., 9 Paige, 323; Mason v. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co., 35 Barb. 373; People v. New York & H. R. Co., 45 Barb. 73; Doughty v. Somerville & E. R. Co., 1 Zab. 442, 459; Morris & E. R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 2 Vroom, 205; Louisville & N. Branch Turnp. Co. v. Nashville & K. Turnp. Co., 2 Swan (Tenn.), 282; Mine Hill & S. H. R. Co. v. Lippincott, 86 Pa. St. 468; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 315, 66 Mo. 228, 248; Brigham v. Agricultural Branch R. Co., 1 Allen, 316; Kenton County Court v. Bank Lick Turnp. Co., 10 Bush, 529; Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Co., 1 My. & Keene, 154, 1 Cl. & Fin. 262, 3 You. & Jerv. 60, 1 Am. Rail. Cas. 151, notes. See Works v. Junction R. R. Co., 5 M'Lean, 425; South Carolina R. Co., In re, 2 Rich. 434; South Carolina R. Co. v. Blake, 9 Rich. 228; Mississippi & T. R. Co. v. Devaney, 42 Miss. 555.

2 Boston & P. R. Corp. v. Midland R.

Co., 1 Gray, 340; Hudson River R. Co. v. Outwater, 3 Sand. 689; Mahaska County R. Co. v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 28 Iowa, 437. See Baltimore & S. R. Co. v. Compton, 2 Gill, 20, where a landowner brought an action of damages for removal of the location from his land.

3 Moorhead v. Little Miami R. Co., 17 Ohio, 340; Little Miami R. Co. v. Naylor, 2 Ohio St. 235; Atkinson v. Marietta & C. R. Co., 15 Ohio St. 21.

4 Attorney-General v. West Wisconsin R. Co., 36 Wis. 466.

5 Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103; People's Pass. R. Co. v. Baldwin, 37 Leg. Int. 424.

6 Peavey v. Calais R. Co., 30 Me. 498; Morris & E. R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 2 Vroom, 205; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 66 Mo. 228, 250, 3 Mo. App. 315; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Rucker, 14 Ill. 353; Regina v. London & N. W. R. Co., 16 Q. B. N. s. 864; ante, Chap. VII. p. 145.

7 Childs v. Central R. Co., 4 Vroom, 323; Phil., W., & B. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103; Farnham v. Del. & H. C.

a railroad company was authorized to "maintain and continue a railroad, with a single and double track, and with such appendages as may be deemed necessary for the convenient use of the same," it was held that the power to acquire land by condemnation for workshops, and whatever is included in the term "appendages," is not exhausted by an apparent completion of the road, where the increase of its business requires land for those purposes. The power to build branches has been held to expire with the power to build the original or main road.2

Identity of the Property taken.

Certainty in the Description of the Location. A written description, usually called the location or survey, duly verified and deposited or recorded, as required by statute, in most jurisdictions determines finally, by metes and bounds, the particular property taken, and becomes the permanent record evidence of the amount taken, which cannot be controlled by extrinsic proof. This description, aided by maps and documents, properly referred to, must identify clearly the property taken, and show with reasonable certainty the limits of the taking. The owner is entitled to know precisely what is taken and what is left." A plan or map, referred to, may be used to explain the written description, and to aid it when it is defective; but the plan, in order to assist the description, must be

Co., 61 Pa. St. 265; Selden v. Del. & H. C. Co., 29 N. Y. 634; ante, Chap. VII. pp. 151, 152.

1 Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123; Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390; ante, Chap. VII. pp. 150, 151.

2 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Central R. Co., 2 Vroom, 205; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 315, 325, 66 Mo. 228. See Pittsburg v. Penn. R. Co., 48 Pa. St. 355.

8 Baker v. Gee, 1 Wall. 333; Pacific R. Co. v. Lindell, 39 Mo. 329; Western Pacific R. Co. v. Tevis, 41 Cal. 489; Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 1 Stock. 635; Coe v. New Jersey Midland R. Co., 4 Stewart (N. J.), 105, 146.

4 Hazen ". Boston & M. R., 2 Gray, 574; Lowell & L. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co., 7 Gray, 27.

5 Strang v. Beloit & M. R. Co., 16 Wis. 635; Housatonic R. Co. v. Lee & H. R. Co., 118 Mass. 391; Kohlhepp v. West

Roxbury, 120 Mass. 596; Penn. R. Co. v. Porter, 29 Pa. St. 165; Heise v. Penn. R. Co., 62 Pa. St. 67; Vail v. Morris & E. R. Co., 1 Zab. 189; New York & B. R. Co., In re, 62 Barb. 85; State v. Armell, 8 Kan. 288; Atlantic & O. R. Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio St. 276; Callender v. Painesville & H. R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 516; Cleveland & T. R. Co. v. Prentice, 13 Ohio St. 373; State v. Bailey, 19 Ind. 452; Prather v. Jeffersonville, M., & I. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16, 40; Anderson, L., & St. L. R. Co. v. Kernodle, 54 Ind. 314, 318; ante, Chap. VII. p. 180.

6 Hazen v. Boston & M. R.. 2 Gray, 574; Andover v. County Com'rs, 5 Gray, 393; Grand Junction, R., & D. Co. v. County Com'rs, 14 Gray, 553; Pinkerton v. Boston & A. R. Co., 109 Mass. 527; Hunt v. Smith, 9 Kan. 137; Quincy, M., & P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 54 Mo. 334. See Mason v. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co., 35 Barb. 373; Vail v. Morris & E. R. Co., 1 Zab. 189.